guarded as holy things, and whosoever neglects to protect them is worthy of death."

In modern times, conspicuous examples of nations whose rulers have claimed direct connection with a deity and divine sanction for royal authority are to be found in Germany and Japan, and in Russia until the recent overthrow of the monarchy. The divine right of kings, observes an authority on the constitution of Japan, "was carried to such an extreme in England that Charles I lost his head; but in Japan the divine right of the Emperor is acknowledged to a degree of which no Stuart ever even dreamed."1 According to Prince Ito, "the Emperor is Heaven-descended, divine, and sacred; He is pre-eminent above all his subjects. He must be reverenced and is inviolable." It is evident, then, that the modern government of Japan is based, to a certain extent, upon the idea of the divine descent of the monarch; and with the merging of the oligarchy into a single power, the reverence of the people for the throne has continued.

A more striking instance of the divine-right theory was the revival at Königsberg by Emperor William of Germany of the rôle of vice-regent of God on earth:

My grandfather [said the German ruler], by his own right, placed the Prussian crown upon his head and again proclaimed it to be bestowed upon him by God's grace alone, and not by parliaments, assemblages of the people, or resolutions of the people; and that he saw in himself the chosen instrument of Heaven, and as such regarded his duty as regent and ruler. . . . Considering myself as the instrument of the Master, regardless of passing views and opinions, I go my way, which is solely devoted to the prosperity and peaceful development of our Fatherland.3

The relation of the force theory to the divine-right theory is expressed in the speech of Emperor William to the Royal Guard in 1898:

1E. W. Clement, Constitutional Imperialism in Japan, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, vol. vi, no. 3, April, 1916, p. 5. 2 Ibid., p. 6.

The Outlook, vol. xcvi (September, 1910), p. 53, "The German Kaiser and Divine Right."

The most important heritage which my noble grandfather and father left me is the army. . . . And leaning upon it, trusting our old Guard, I took up my heavy charge, knowing well that the army was the main support of my country, the main support of the Prussian throne, to which the decision of God has called me.

The abdication of the German Emperor as a result of military defeat and the control of the revolutionary parties bid fair to eliminate the divine-right idea from German politics. In Japan, likewise, the trend toward parliamentary government is weakening the sentiment which supports the divine-right theory. Nevertheless, the theory of the divine origin of political authority cannot be ignored in the study of politics, however foolish or preposterous the extravagant claims of its proponents may seem.

The Contract Theory.-During the latter part of the Middle Ages and up to the early eighteenth century, a new theory was advanced as an explanation for the political association of man. This idea, known as the contract theory, presupposes an original state of nature. From this condition, individuals emerged into political organization by mutual agreement whereby they bound themselves to submit to an external authority. The theory was definitely formulated in continental Europe during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and was later carefully developed and elaborated by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Each conceived a somewhat different notion of the contract through which political society was formed.

To Hobbes, man was essentially selfish and lived in a state of nature in which there was perpetual warfare of all against all.1 Consequently, the individual was inclined to join his fellows in forming a common sovereign who might establish peace and order. The state was thus based upon a compact between individuals whereby each of them gave up a part of his own natural liberty in order that all might be protected by the strength of all. When a number of persons had so delegated their individual rights to a 1 F. W. Coker, Readings, op. cit., pp. 302-352.

common authority, a commonwealth was thought to be formed. The contract, once entered into, was regarded as eternally binding and the sovereign which was formed and in whom political authority was concentrated was absolute. To the people there was no alternative but to submit to this authority, for the right of revolution was forever lost and submerged in the original contract which created a political society. It may readily be seen that Hobbes became a champion of an absolute monarchy such as the Stuarts were trying to establish in England and Louis XIV was laying the basis for in France.

The state of nature, according to John Locke, was peaceful in character, and mankind was getting on fairly well without civic association.1

The state of nature [said Locke] has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone; and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.

But the individual in the state of nature found it desirable, in order to secure better protection for his rights and liberties, to form a political association. The origin of government is, then, conceived by Locke as a compact wherein the individual voluntarily surrendered into the hands of a general authority certain rights and powers by which his remaining liberties and rights should be protected and preserved. The state is thus created to protect rights already in existence. Moreover, these rights remain in the individual even after the contract is formed and have the same binding force as in the state of nature. In other words, the governing power created is in no case absolute, but is limited by these rights. The power of the ruling authorities is a fiduciary one and, when abused, may be revoked by the people who granted it. The belief that government is thus based upon the consent of the governed, and that the right of revolution against an arbitrary and F. W. Coker, Readings, op. cit., pp. 385-436.

abusive sovereign is an inalienable right—both of which are forcibly expressed in the Declaration of Independence -represent, to a great degree, the fundamental principles of the contract theory as expounded by John Locke. These principles were also embodied in large part in American state constitutions.

Rousseau began his Social Contract with the striking epigram, "Man was born free and everywhere is in chains."1 Here was suggested the doctrine of a state of nature which he had previously developed that is, that man lived in a condition of freedom and bliss, and that he lost much of his freedom as the conventions of society grew and as political authority was asserted over him. Although man is naturally free, Rousseau believed his freedom might be protected and even improved upon by the formation of a democratic political society. The problem with him was "to find a form of association which shall defend and protect with public force the person and property of each associate, and by means of which each, united with all, shall obey, however, only himself and remain as free as before." This difficult problem is solved by the formation of government based on the volonté générale, or general will. The general will is not always the will of a majority; it represents rather the will of those who conceive and work for the best good of the entire society. This general will brings into being the sovereign, which, resting upon the agreement and consent of the people, is regarded as inalienable and indivisible. Since it has its source and sanction in the voice of the people, there need be no fear of creating an absolute authority. According to this theory, the government and officers of the state are the mere agents of the sovereign, and they must look to the people for their mandate. In putting the authority of the people uppermost and in placing the sanction of government entirely upon their will, Rousseau formulated the democratic ideal which was embodied in the political 1 F. W. Coker, Readings, op. cit., pp. 479–513.

philosophy of the French Revolution, and which, through that great upheaval, profoundly influenced the growth of popular government in all countries.

The Common-Consent Theory.-In contrast with the force and divine-right theories, there has been a new development of the contract theory toward an ideal of government based on common consent. The ideal of common consent was formulated in the Declaration of Independence, where it was affirmed that

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.

The sentiment of the Declaration as exemplified in the government of the United States was forcefully expressed in the terse phrase of Abraham Lincoln as a "government of the people, by the people, and for the people." President Wilson has more recently presented the case for the common-consent theory in notable state papers. Among these is his address to Congress, April 2, 1917, respecting the relations of the United States with Germany. In recommending the necessity of the declaration of war, President Wilson said:

Our object, now as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles-a steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. . . . Only the free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.