case a blockade is declared and maintained. What then would the seizure amount to in the present case except to delay the delivery of the goods? The declaration does not indicate what disposition would be made of such cargoes if owned by a neutral or if owned by an enemy subject. Would a different rule be applied according to ownership? If so, upon what principles of international law would it rest? And upon what rule if no blockade is declared and maintained could the cargo of a neutral ship sailing out of a German port be condemned? If it is not condemned, what other legal course is there but to release it? While this Government is fully alive to the possibility that the methods of modern naval warfare, particularly in the use of the submarine for both defensive and offensive operations, may make the former means of maintaining a blockade a physical impossibility, it feels that it can be urged with great force that there should be also some limit to "the radius of activity," and especially so if this action by the belligerents can be construed to be a blockade. It would certainly create a serious state of affairs if, for example, an American vessel laden with a cargo of German origin should escape the British patrol in European waters only to be held up by a cruiser off New York and taken into Halifax. BRYAN. WILSON'S COMMUNICATIONS TO GREAT BRITAIN ABOUT RE- [Four and one-half months after the beginning of the European war, Wilson sent the note of December 26, 1914, to Great Britain reciting the grievances of American merchants and declaring that the United States "is reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the present policy of His Majesty's Government toward neutral ships and cargoes exceeds the manifest necessity of a belligerent and constitutes restrictions upon the rights of American citizens on the high seas which are not justified by the rules of international law or required under the principle of self-preservation." The British replies were long and complicated, citing American trade statistics and alleging precedents established by Federal maritime operations in the Civil War. March 30, 1915, a second American note answered many of these subtly-argued points and declared that a recent "Order in Council" constituted "a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce, and an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now at peace." A correspondence followed, marked by British communications still more complex than the early ones and extremely voluminous. President Wilson finally summed up the American contention in the following comprehensive note, answering British notes of January 7, February 10, June 22, July 23, July 31, August 2 and August 6, 1915.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, October 21, 1915. To Ambassador W. H. Page (London): I desire that you present a note to Sir Edward Grey in the sense of the following: This Government has delayed answering the earlier of these notes in the hope that the announced purpose of His Majesty's Government "to exercise their belligerent rights with every possible consideration for the interest of neutrals" and their intention of "removing all causes of avoidable delay in dealing with American cargoes" and of causing "the least possible amount of inconvenience to persons engaged in legitimate trade," as well as their "assurances to the United States Government that they would make it their first aim to minimize the inconveniences" resulting from the "measures taken by the Allied Governments," would in practice not unjustifiably infringe upon the neutral rights of American citizens engaged in trade and commerce. It is, therefore, a matter of regret that this hope has not been realized, but that, on the contrary, interferences with American ships and cargoes destined in good faith to neutral ports and lawfully entitled to proceed have become increasingly vexatious, causing Ameri can shipowners and American merchants to complain to this Government of the failure to take steps to prevent an exercise of belligerent power in contravention of their just rights. As the measures complained of proceed directly from orders issued by the British Government, are executed by British authorities, and arouse a reasonable apprehension that, if not resisted, they may be carried to an extent even more injurious to American interests, this Government directs the attention of His Majesty's Government to the following considerations: [Here followed a denial of the correctness of deductions drawn from trade statistics as to the injury to American foreign trade, and (1) objection to the seizure of cargoes on suspicion, and their detention while the British government looked for evidence to support the suspicion (2) insistence that international usage permitted only a search at sea and not a deviation of vessels from their course in order to carry them into a port for search (3) a denial that American practice in this respect during the Civil War justified the British proceedings (4) denial of the British claim that modern conditions made search at sea impracticable, and a statement from American naval experts that the "facilities for boarding and inspection of modern ships are in fact greater than in former times" (5) objections to a demand for evidence of innocent voyage beyond the papers of the ship and the goods found on board, and a repetition of the American objection to the practice of seizing and detaining ships "on mere suspicion while efforts are made to obtain evidence from extraneous sources to justify the detention." (6) Repudiation of the British claim that the American seizure of the Bermuda in the Civil War (a famous case cited frequently by Great Britain) was in any sense similar to the British practices. The British contention that greatly increased imports of neutral countries adjoining Great Britain's enemies raised a presumption that they were intended for sale to the belligerents, was characterized as not laying down a "just or legal rule of evidence. Such a presumption is too far from the facts and offers too great opportunity for abuse by a belligerent, who could, if the rule were adopted, entirely ignore neutral rights on the high seas and prey with impunity on neutral commerce." On this subject the note continued:] Great Britain cannot expect the United States to submit to such manifest injustice or to permit the rights of its citizens to be so seriously impaired. When goods are clearly intended to become incorporated in the mass of merchandise for sale in a neutral country, it is an unwarranted and inquisitorial proceeding to detain shipments for examination as to whether those goods are ultimately destined for the enemy's country or use. Whatever may be the conjectural conclusions to be drawn from trade statistics, which, when stated by value, are of uncertain evidence as to quantity, the United States maintains the right to sell goods into the general stock of a neutral country, and denounces as illegal and unjustifiable any attempt of a belligerent to interfere with that right on the ground that it suspects that the previous supply of such goods in the neutral country, which the imports renew or replace, has been sold to an enemy. That is a matter with which the neutral vendor has no concern and which can in no way affect his rights of trade. Moreover, even if goods listed as conditional contraband are destined to an enemy country through a neutral country, that fact is not in itself sufficient to justify their seizure. Relying upon the regard of the British Government for the principles of justice so frequently and uniformly manifested prior to the present war, this Government anticipates that the British Government will instruct their officers to refrain from these vexatious and illegal practices. . . The British note of July 23, 1915, appears to confirm the intention indicated in the note of March 15, 1915, to establish a blockade so extensive as to prohibit trade with Germany or Austria-Hungary, even through the ports of neutral countries adjacent to them. Great Britain, however, admits that it should not, and gives assurances that it will not, interfere with trade with the countries contiguous to the territories of the enemies of Great Britain. Nevertheless, after over six months' application of the "blockade" order, the experience of American citizens has convinced the Government of the United States that Great Britain has been unsuccessful in her efforts to distinguish between enemy and neutral trade. Arrangements have been made to create in these neutral countries special consignees, or consignment corporations, with power to refuse shipments and to determine when the state of the country's resources requires the importation of new commodities. American commercial interests are hampered by the intricacies of these arrangements, and many American citizens justly complain that their bona fide trade with neutral countries is greatly reduced as a consequence, while others assert that their neutral trade, which amounted annually to a large sum, has been entirely interrupted. While the United States Government was at first inclined to view with leniency the British measures which were termed in the correspondence but not in the Order in Council of March 11 a "blockade," because of the assurances of the British Government that inconvenience to neutral trade would be minimized, this Government is now forced to the realization that its expectations were based on a misconception of the intentions of the British GovernIn the circumstances now developed it feels that it can no longer permit the validity of the alleged blockade to remain unchallenged. ment. The Declaration of Paris in 1856, which has been universally recognized as correctly stating the rule of international law as to blockade, expressly declares that "blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy. [Here followed detailed statements that the German coasts were open to trade with the Scandinavian countries, that German naval vessels cruised freely both in the North Sea and the Baltic and took prizes, and that the British Government itself had issued certain orders that showed the ineffectiveness of the blockade. Referring to the incidental blockade of neutral ports, the American note said:] It is a matter of common knowledge that Great Britain exports and re-exports large quantities of merchandise to |