Ambiguity Repugnant or Inconsistent Provisions. written documents. Billington v. Cana- | Co., 5 L. R. A. 799; 116 N. Y. 54; 26 N. Y. S. dian Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 39 Up. Can. Q. | Rep. 453; 22 N. East. Rep. 221. B. 433. 65. Ambiguity. Ambiguous words in a policy of insurance may be construed by extrinsic evidence of accompanying circumstances and the usages of the business in which the property insured was employed. New York Belting & Packing Co. v. Washington Fire Ins. Co., 10 Bosw. 428 (N. Y.) 66.- In case of ambiguity knowledge of facts by company is potent upon the question of intention and construction. Reynolds v. Commerce Fire Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 606. And see Ludwig v. Jersey City Ins. Co., 48 N. Y. 379. 70.— When a stipulation or exception to a policy of insurance is capable of two meanings, the one is to be adopted which is the most favorable to the assured. *Utter v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 9 West. Rep. 108; 32 N. W. Rep. 812; 65 Mich. 545. 71. The language of the policy being that of the company, any doubt of its meaning must be resolved against it. *Olson v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 35 Minn. 432. 72.- Where two equally fair interpretations may be given to an insurance contract, that which affords the greater indemnity should prevail. *Meyer v. Queen Ins. Co., 41 La. Ann. 1000. 67.— In construing a condition or stipulation in a policy, doubtful and ambiguous provisions, or those in favor of the insurer, must be taken most strongly against the company. Fisher v. Crescent Ins. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 549; Allemania F. Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Exposition Soc., 10 Cent. Rep. 292; 11 Atl. Rep. 572 (Pa.); Vette | N. East. Rep. 1104; 132 N. Y. 540. v. Clinton F. Ins. Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 668; New Orleans Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 68 Tex. 144; 3 S. W. Rep. 718; Goddard v. East Texas F. Ins. Co., 67 Tex. 69; 1 S. W. Rep. 906. 68.- The language of a policy being that of the insurer is to be construed most favorably for the insured in cases of ambiguity or doubt. Niagara Ins. Co. v. Scammon, 100 Ill. 644. 73.- A contract by an insurer, when capable of more than one interpretation, should be construed in the sense the insurer had reason to suppose was understood by the insured. *Wadsworth v. Jewelers & T. Co., 42 N. Y. S. Rep. 765; 29 69.- If a policy is so drawn as to require interpretation and to be fairly susceptible of two different constructions, the one will be adopted that is most favorable to the insured. *Thompson v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 136 U. S. 287; 34 L. ed. 408; 19 Ins. L. J. 481; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1019; *Philadelphia Tool Co. v. British American Assur. Co., 132 Pa. 236; 25 W. N. C. 370; 47 Phila. Leg. Int. 248; 19 Atl. Rep. 77; *Illinois Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hoffman, 19 Ins. L. J. 72; aff'd, 132 Ill. 522; 19 Ins. L. J. 663; 24 N. East. Rep. 413; *Rogers v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 121 Ind. 570; 19 Ins. L. J. 492; 23 N. East. Rep. 498; *Wallace v. German-American Ins. Co., 19 Ins. L. J. 623; 41 Fed. Rep. 742; *Meyer V. Queen Ins. Co., 41 La. Ann. 1000; 19 Ins. L. J. 45; 6 So. Rep. 899; *Pettit v. State Ins. Co., 41 Minn. 299; 42 Balti. Underwriter 278; 19 Ins. L. J. 138; 43 N. W. Rep. 378; *Kratzenstein v. Western Assur. 74. If an insurance policy is susceptible of two constructions, that which is most favorable to the assured must prevail. *Germania F. Ins. Co. v. Deckard, 28 N. East. Rep. 868 (Ind.) 75. Repugnant or inconsistent provisions. Where the printed condition of a policy excepted losses "caused by or consequent upon the bursting or collapsing of a steam boiler or steam pump," but the written portion insured the steam engine; and the fire by which the insured property was destroyed was caused by an explosion of the steam boiler; held, that there was no such repugnancy between the written and printed portions of the policy, as to entitle insured to recover. Hayward v. Liv. Lond., & G. Ins. Co., 5 Abb. N. S. 142; 3 Keyes, 456 (N. Y.); Overruling Id. v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 19 Abb. 116. 76.— Where the written and printed portions of a policy conflict, effect must be given to the former. Fire Ins. Asso. v. Merchants' & M. Transp. Co., 66 Md. 339. 77.— Repugnancy between written and printed conditions, former prevails. Benedict v. Ocean Ins. Co., 31 N. Y. 389; Goss v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 18 La. Ann. 97; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 5 Minn. 492. Admission of Parol Evidence. 84.- Parol evidence not admissible to vary the terms of a written contract, or to show what risks were intended to be covered and protected by the policy. Honnick v. Phonix Ins. Co., 22 Mo. 82. 78.- A printed clause in an insurance policy which, if given effect, will lead to an absurd and unreasonable result, making the description in the policy inconsistent with that in the application, will be rejected. *Schreiber v. German-Am- 85.- A verbal promise not to use any erican Hail Ins. Co., 45 N. W. Rep. 708; other fire in the building cannot be 19 Ins. L. J. 730; 43 Minn. 367. proved. The policy alone is the contract, 79.- If a policy of insurance contains and cannot be varied by parol proof. inconsistent provisions, that most favor-Schmidt v. Peoria M. & F. Ins. Co., 41 Ill. able to the insured will be accepted and the other disregarded. *Illinois Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hoffman, 31 Ill. App. 295; affi'd 132 Ill. 522. See Subd. XIV. Cases on construction printed hazards. Page 106. 295. 86.- A policy of insurance to "K. and others," on stock in process of manufacture, may be shown by parol evidence to have been issued to a corporation in which K. was a stockholder, having no other title in the property; and upon proof of that fact an action may be maintained thereon by the corporation in their own name; and evidence that before the policy was issued K. owned the property and had made an agreement to sell it to them, under which they had entered into possession, and carried on alone the business of manufacturing, and that the application for insurance was made by one of their directors, who procured the insertion of a provision therein, making it payable to the corporation in case of loss, tends to prove that fact. Shawmut Sugar Refining Co. v. Hampden Mut. Ins. Co., 12 Gray, 540 (Mass.) 87. A witness, in an action on a policy of insurance, cannot be allowed to testify what is meant by a permanent policy; it not appearing to be a term of art, or one employed in any particular business. Baptist Church v. Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co., 28 N. Y. 153. 88.- Proof that company had insured property for years, and knew purpose for which it was erected, the manner in which 82. The policy in controversy was on a stock of goods. At time this policy was made, another policy, in favor of the same party, was made on the building in which the stock was kept. Held, that a copy of this last policy, with the indorse-it was occupied, general character of its ments thereon, the original being lost, contents, and nature and extent of the was admissible in evidence, if it had any risk, is admissible as tending to aid the bearing upon the other, and its weight was court in applying descriptive language of for the jury. Fogg v. Middlesex Mut. Ins. policy to actual subject of insurance, and Co., 10 Cush. 337 (Mass.) And see No. 42. in giving effect to the words of the con83.- Opinions are only admissible tract in the precise sense in which they where the nature of the inquiry involves were understood and employed by the a question of science or art, or of profes-parties. Mayor of N. Y. v. Exchange sional or mechanical skill, and then only Fire Ins. Co., 3 Keyes, 436 (N. Y.) from witnesses skilled in the particular business to which the question relates. Hartford Protection Ins. Co. v. Harmer, 2 Ohio St. 452. 89.- A policy, like other contracts, is liable to be reformed for accident and mistake, or set aside for fraud; latent ambiguities are explainable, and terms of art Special Words and Phrases. definable, by extrinsic evidence; but it is not otherwise an exception to the rule that its terms must stand, unless, for some of the reasons mentioned, it may be moved from the precise terms written. Weisenberger v. Harmony F. & M. Ins. Co., 56 Pa. 442. 90. When policy contains plain and unambiguous language, courts must look to it alone to find intention and meaning of the parties, and parol proof is inadmissible. Hough v. People's Ins. Co., 36 Md. 398. 91. In a suit upon the policy parol evidence is inadmissible to show intent of parties to be different from what the words express, and when language employed has a settled legal construction, such evidence cannot be admitted to contradict such construction. All understandings are merged in the written instrument, and neither party can be permitted to prove that the instrument does not mean what it says. Pindar v. Resolute Fire Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 114; S. P. Mills v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 37 Iowa 400; McClusky v. Providence Ins. Co., 126 Mass. 306. 92.- A letter from company to assured after the fire, being a written declaration of an officer in regard to his construction of the policy is not admissible in evidence as against the assured. Planters' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Engle, 52 Md. 468. 93.- Parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict the provisions of a policy. * Robinson v. Insurance Co., 51 Ark. 441. 94.- Parol evidence is admissible to identify property included in a bill of sale, to which insured represented that he had title. Claffey v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 68 Cal. 169. 95. In the construction of a policy, where the object insured is of a peculiar character, and many of the conditions of the policy are inapplicable to it, resort must be had to the character of the conditions and the reason of the same, to ascertain the intention of the parties. Authorities cited. Haws v. Philadelphia F. Asso., 5 Cent. Rep. 714; 114 Pa. 431. 96.- Note on variation of contract. See 5 L. R. A. 638; also see Ambiguity, supra, Nos. 65 et seq. 97. Special words and phrases. The policy required that if the building insured was to be used as "mills or manu 66 factories of any kind," permission should be expressed on the policy. Held, by mill or manufactory" is meant what common usage recognizes as such, a mill not being a place where something might be ground, nor a manufactory where something may be made by hand or machinery; its principal design must be such use. A tenant who kept hay, produce, etc., by permission, gave these up, and kept broom corn and made brooms by hand, has not forfeited his policy. In cases of doubtful signification, the meaning most favorable to the assured is to be adopted. Franklin Fire Ins. Co. V. Brock, 57 Pa. 74. 98.- Policy provided that company should not be liable for any loss or damage by fire occasioned by earthquakes or hurricanes or by burning of forests, and that it should remain suspended and of no effect in respect of any loss or damage “however caused" which shall happen or arise during the existence of any of the contingencies aforesaid. Held, that under such a condition the fact that at the time of the loss neighboring forests were burning is sufficient to prevent a recovery. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Canada Manufacturing Co., 18 L. C. Jurist 80 (Can.) 99. Policy covered household furniture, beds, bedding, wearing apparel, and family stores. One clause in the policy provided that the company was not to be liable for loss on plate unless particularly specified. Certain silver forks, tea and tablespoons being destroyed by fire, and not being specified in the policy, company claimed that it was not liable for their loss. Held, that such claim was not well founded. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Mannasson, 29 Mich. 316. 100.- Policy read "the said buildings herein insured are more than 'oix' feet from any other buildings," etc. The case turned upon the question whether the word italicised was "six," and hence sensible, or "oix," and therefore without meaning; if the former, it was against the right of the plaintiff to recover; if the latter, it favored recovery. Trial court submitted the question to the jury to find whether the word was written "six" or " oix," and received their verdict for the plaintiff. Held, error, that the court Effect of Statutory Provisions. should have decided the point as a mat-in part on right of state to prescribe terms ter of construction and that inspection upon which foreign corporations may showed plainly that the word was "six" transact business within its limits. And and not "oix." Lapeer Ins. Association see Subd. XIV, Miscellaneous. Infra. v. Doyle, 30 Mich. 159. 107. Cross references. 66 101.- Policy covered 'electrotypes, steel plates, and cuts." It was claimed that certain dies were covered by the terms used. Held, that jury should be instructed that when words have acquired an exact and technical meaning in any trade or business, and are used in contract relating to such business, prima facie they are to be construed in the meaning or sense which they have acquired in that business. It is error to charge jury that if words have both a technical meaning and an ordinary meaning they should determine in which sense the words were used. Houghton v. Watertown Fire Ins. Co., 10 Ins. L. J. 547; 131 Mass. 300. 102.- In all insurance contracts where stipulations avoiding the same are inserted for the sole benefit of one of the parties the word "void" is to be construed as though the contract read "voidable." Turner v. Meridan Ins. Co., 16 Fed. Rep. 454. 103.- The term "household furniture," in an insurance policy having nothing therein to restrict the meaning of those words, includes goods, vessels, utensils, and other articles necessary and convenient for housekeeping. *Reynolds v. Iowa & N. Ins. Co., 46 N. W. Rep. 659; 80 Iowa 563. 104. And see section one, Subd. V, Location and description, page 23. 105. Effect of statutory provisions. The standard form, although prescribed by a legislature, should not be construed as a statute; it is none the less a contract, deriving its validity from consent of the parties. It is not to be presumed that the legislature intended by prescribing a form of contract and prohibiting any other to give it an effect in depriving a party of such rights which it would not have as a contract. Reed v. Washington Fire Ins. Co., 14 Ins. L. J. 465; 138 Mass. 572. 106.- When a state statute and the conditions of a policy are in conflict, the statute must prevail. Ins. Co. of N. A. v. Burr, 16 Ins. L. J. 720; 111 Ind. 281. This decision seems to have been founded As Affected by Garnishment, Attachment or Trustee Process. Effect appointment of attorney for the garnishee will not be liable for in service of process. Right to contract outside of state. Statutory provision may be waived. Other special cases. 1. As affected by garnishment, attachment or trustee process. A loss incurred on a fire insurance policy, the amount of which has been fixed by the award of arbitrators, indifferently chosen by the insured and insurer, may be levied on by attachment or execution, as a debt due to the assured. Boyle v. Franklin Ins. Co., 7 Watts & Serg. 76 (Pa.) terest, while the attachment remains in force, unless he has been found guilty of neglect or fraud. But if there has been any unreasonable delay occasioned by the conduct of the garnishee, such case will form an exception to the rule that he is not chargeable with interest. Nevins v. Rockingham Fire Ins. Co., 5 Fost. 22 (N. H.) 6.- Where a policy is assigned after loss, and the company is sought to be charged as garnishees of the assignor, it is the duty of the assignee to give notice of the assignment in season to enable the company to show such assignment in their answer, or, at least, before judgment against them. Having received such notice, if the company neglect to show it in defense, they cannot resist a subsequent claim of the assignee; and on 2.- A claim for loss though unadjusted the other hand, having shown such asis a subject of foreign attachment. West signment, they cannot be charged as v. Franklin F. Ins. Co., 2 Pa. Law J. Rep. garnishees. Walters v. Washington Ins. 70; Girard Fire Ins. Co. v. Field, 3 Grant Co., 1 Iowa 404. Cas. 329 (Pa.) 3.- The garnishee is liable on a claim for a loss unascertained when notice was served, but which was ascertained before answer; nor does any assignment of the claim by the debtor after notice affect the liability. Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. West, 8 Watts & Serg. 350 (Pa.) 4. Under trustee proceeding the defendant is entitled to any set off which he could plead against the principal debtor, and is not liable for interest after the date of the notice. Swamscot Machine Co. v. Partridge, 5 Fost. 369 (N. H.) 7. Certain policies were assigned to Middlesex Institution for Savings, as collateral security for a debt, with a stipulation that "any surplus of the proceeds of said policies is to be paid to William Crawford." The Savings Institution received the amount of the policies, and a creditor of Crawford sought to charge them with the surplus. Held, that the stipulation did not give Crawford a right of action for the surplus, and could not therefore render the Institution chargeable in the trustee process in favor of his creditors. Field v. Crawford, 6 Gray, 116 (Mass.) 8. If a foreign insurance company have complied with the law of the state, in regard to foreign insurance companies, and have an agent in such state, they are liable to garnishment, by process served on the agent; the latter being held to be a chief or managing officer of such corporation," within the meaning of the 26th section of the execution law in Missouri. McAllister v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 28 Mo. 214. 5.- Action on a policy of insurance; plea, trustee process pending. Held, that the pending trustee process was no defense to the suit. The defendants might have applied for a stay of proceedings, if the trustee process were not determined before the trial came on. But the sum paid by the defendants, to satisfy the judgment against them in the trustee process should be deducted from the amount due to the plaintiff at the time of the judgment. This would be 9. An insurance company is not an answer pro tanto to the plaintiff's chargeable as trustee for the amount of claim, and would not require a spec-a loss under a policy after payment ial plea, as our statute provides that thereof, made in good faith by its authorsuch a defense may be made under ized agent, without knowledge of any the general issue. As a general rule actual or intended service of process upon |