Cases Involving Construction of Printed Classification of Hazards. Kelly v. Worcester Fire within the statute of frauds. Wilbeler v. will not assume. 72.- Insurance on stock of liquors in a building occupied as a liquor store. The assured kept the liquors for sale, and sold them without license, making him liable to punishment, and his stock to confisca tion for nuisance. There was no clause against unlawful use in the policy. Held, that the insurance being to protect illegal acts and make safer a prohibited traffic of the assured himself, the contract was not collateral and independent of the illegal acts, as it was in Boardman v. Merrimack Ins. Co. supra, No. 68, and the policy is void. Kelly v. Home Ins. Co. et al., 97 Mass. 288. 73. A contract of insurance made on Sunday is void, there being no evidence of a subsequent ratification. Heller v. Crawford, 37 Ind. 279. 77. Under a Mississippi statute, insured who has failed to procure any license or an insufficient license for keeping a store, can not recover upon a policy of insurance upon his stock. Pollard v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 15 Ins. L. J. 376; 63 Miss. 244. 78.- An open policy of insurance which stipulates that "this insurance shall not inure to the benefit of any carrier" is not void as being in restraint of trade. *Ins. Co. N. A. v. Easton, 73 Tex. 167. 79.- Note on wager policies. See 12 L. R. A. 409. 80. Cases involving construction of printed classification of hazards. Policy provided that if the premises should be used for the purpose of carry 74.- A policy which covers future ma-ing on therein any trade or vocation deterial of production of the assured in the nominated extra hazardous in a class of course of his business, trade or calling, is hazards annexed to the policy, that, from a valid contract of indemnity, and not a thenceforth so long as the same should be wager policy. Sawyer v. Dodge County Mutual Ins. Co., 37 Wis. 503. so used, the policy should be of no force or effect. Among the extra hazardous risks so specified was that of keeping a private stable, and, at the time of the date of the policy, and at the time of the fire, a part of the building insured was applied by the plaintiff to this use. It appeared that at the time policy was obtained the agent of the company knew that the building in question was in part used as a stable. Held, that the insur could be no application of the doctrine of estoppel founded upon the knowledge of the agent. Dewees v. The Manhattan Ins. Co., 6 Vroom, 366 (N. J.) 75.- Policy covered stock of drugs, medicines, liquors, etc. Company claimed that the contract and claim under it embraced liquors kept for sale contrary to law, and that by reason of such illegality policy was void. There was evidence tending to show that the assured illegally sold liquors, including those not used in compounding medicines. Held, that if such illegal traffic was the business of the as-ance was void by its terms, and that there sured, and his legal traffic, and transaction with other property a mere cover, ostensibly carried on for the purpose of enabling him to secrete and disguise his unlawful acts, the policy would be void; but if he carried on business using alcoholic liquors legitimately in his drug trade, and occasionally sold them in violation of law, if no illegal design entered into the making of the contract in its inception, it is so far collateral to the illegal acts, that latter cannot operate to render the insurance void. That the question should be determined by the jury with preceding instructions. Carrigan v. Lycoming Ins. Co., 10 Ins. L. J. 606; 53 Vt. 81.- Policy contained provision in writing, as follows: "The above premises are privileged to be occupied as hide, fat melting, slaughter and packing houses, and stores and dwellings, and for other extra hazardous purposes," and annexed was the classification of hazards into hazardous, extra hazardous, and specially hazardous. Property used for distillery purposes, classified as "specially hazardous," and the occupations as above specifically privileged belonged to same class. Held, the words in the policy "or 76. A contract to insure, the insur- other extra hazardous purposes," must be ance to commence within a year, is not taken to mean purposes of the same class 418. Power of a State to Impose Conditions Upon a Foreign Corporation. Co., 6 Wend. 488 (N. Y.); Stebbins v. Globe Ins. Co., 2 Hall, 632 (N. Y.); Boatwright v. Ætna Ins. Co., 1 Strobhart, 281 (S. C.); Francis v. Somerville Ins. Co., 1 Dutch, 78 (N. J.); Rathbone v. City Fire Ins. Co., 31 Conn. 193; Appleby v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 45 Barb. 454 (N. Y.); Southern Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 42 Ga. 587. Pindar v. Kings Co. Fire Ins. Co., 36 N. Y. 648; Pindar v. Continental Ins. Co., as those before specified, and the term "extra hazardous" must yield to the specifications accordingly. That plaintiff had a right to use premises for any specially hazardous purpose. Reynolds v. Commerce Fire Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 597. 82.- Policy covered merchandise hazardous and not hazardous, which included "cabinet ware." At time of its issue plaintiffs were lessees of entire building containing the stock. Subsequently 38 N. Y. 364; Pindar v. Resolute Fire Ins. plaintiffs permitted a firm to come in and Co., 47 N. Y. 114; Campbell v. Charter occupy several floors for their business of Oak Ins. Co., 10 Allen, 213 (Mass.); Gasner finishing chairs. They employed glue, v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 13 Minn. 483; paint, alcohol, varnish, and benzine, re- Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. De Graff, 12 quiring four or five barrels at a time. Mich. 124; Mayor v. Brooklyn Fire Ins. An alcohol lamp used for heating glue, Co., 41 Barb. 231 (N. Y.); Whitmarsh v. exploded, and the fire ensued in conse- Conway Fire Ins. Co., 16 Gray, 359 quence. Policy provided "that if prem- (Mass.); Steinbach v. Ins. Co., 13 Wall. ises should be used for purpose of carry-183 (U. S.); Lounsbury v. Protection Ins. ing on any trade or occupation, or for Co., 8 Conn. 458; Rafferty v. New Brunskeeping any articles specified as hazar-wick Fire Ins. Co., 3 Harrison, 480 (N. J.); dous or especially hazardous in the second Moore v. Protection Ins. Co., 29 Me. 97; 30 class of hazards, so long as same should Id. 273; O`Niell v. Buffalo Fire Ins. Co., be so used, policy shall be of no force or 3 N. Y. 122; Leggett v. Etna Ins. Co., 10 effect." And, also, "if the risk shall be Rich. Law, 202 (S. C.); Macomber v. Howincreased by any means within control of ard Fire Ins. Co., 7 Gray, 257 (Mass.); assured, or by occupation of premises for Whitemarsh v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., more hazardous purposes than permitted 2 Allen, 581 (Mass.); Phonix Ins. Co. v. by this policy, it shall be void." Oil, Taylor, 5 Minn. 492; Wetherell v. City Fire alcohol, painters' stock, turpentine, and Ins. Co., 16 Gray, 276 (Mass.); Jones v. varnish were specified as hazardous or Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 2 Daly, 307 (N. specially hazardous in second class, and Y.); N. Y. Equitable Ins. Co. v. Langdon, among the trades specified in same class 6 Wend. 623 (N. Y.); Wood v. Hartford Ins. as specially hazardous were "all work- Co., 13 Conn. 534; Lyon v. Commercial Ins. shops, manufacturing establishments, Co., 2 Rob. 266 (La.); Grant v. Howard trades and mills not above enumerated as Ins. Co., 5 Hill, 10 (N. Y.); Gates v. Madihazardous or extra hazardous." No pre- son County Ins. Co., 5 N. Y. 469; Mead v. vious mention made of trade of "chair Northwestern Ins. Co., 7 N. Y. 530: Lee finishing." Held, verdict should have v. Howard Ins. Co., 3 Gray, 583 (Mass.); been directed for defendant, and that Washington Ins. Co. V. Merchants' conceding that a stock of “cabinet ware" was covered by the policy, it could not be so construed as to permit occupation of premises for purposes established by the evidence. That the term had reference to article in the finished state. Appleby v. Astor Ins. Co., 54 N. Y. 253. & Mfrs'. Ins. Co., 5 Ohio St. 450; Merrick v. Provincial Ins. Co., 14 Up. Can. Q. B. 439; Robinson v. Mercer County Ins. Co., 3 Dutch, 134 (N. J.); Washington Ins. Co. v. Davison, 30 Md. 91; Delonguemare v. Tradesmen's Ins. Co., 2 Hall, 589 (N. Y.) 84.-Note on effect of extra hazards. See 11 L. R. A. 299 (N. Y.) 83.-Cases arising on policies containing classification of hazards, and decided 85. Power of a state to impose conon construction thereof. Westfal v. Hud-ditions upon a foreign corporation. son River Ins. Co., 12 N. Y. 289; Reynolds The legislature of Wisconsin has power v. Commerce Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 597; Camp- to permit or to prohibit the doing of busibell v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 10 Allen, 213 (Mass.); Richards v. Protection Ins. Co., 30 Me. 273; Duncan v. Sun Fire Ins. ness in that state, by foreign insurance companies; and may couple a permit to do business there with such conditions Removal of Action Into U. S. Court. and restrictions as it sees fit to impose. discretion of the legislature. *Hartford F. Fire Department of Milwaukee v. Hal-Ins. Co. v. Raymond, 70 Mich. 485. fenstein, 16 Wis. 136. 91. A state has the power to change at any time its requirements for admission of a foreign insurance company. Fire Association v. People, &c., 16 Ins. L. J. 91 (U. S.) 92. Removal of action into U. S. Court. A foreign insurance company, although it has complied with all the state statutes as to doing business therein, has the right of removal to the federal courts of a suit against it by a citizen of the state; and its members are presumed creating it. Hobbs v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 56 Me. 417. 93. A foreign insurance company doing business in this state, under the laws for such companies has the right to transfer causes to the federal courts. (Of the three judges, one dissents, and a second doubts, but concurs.) Knorr v. Home Ins. Co., 25 Wis. 143. 86.-An insurance company is not a citizen within the meaning of the constitution of the U. S., that "citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges, &c., of citizens of the several states," being a mere creature of local law, and its privileges special privileges. Nor is a policy a transaction of commerce, within the meaning of the clause declaring that "congress shall have power to regulate commerce between the states." There- | for this purpose to be citizens of the state fore, a state statute requiring foreign insurance companies before doing business there, to deposit bonds of a certain amount with the treasury of the state, and to procure a license, does not conflict with those constitutional provisions. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wallace, 168 (U. S.) 87.-Insurance by a corporation of one state doing business in another state, not being commerce between the states, nor a corporation being such a citizen of one state as to be entitled by the constitution to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states, an insurance company of one state, though not called a corporation by that state, yet bearing all the attributes of a corporation, can only exercise its franchise in another state by the comity of the latter, and may be taxed by the other state for the privilege of conducting its business therein. Liverpool & London Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wallace, 566 (U. S.) 94.-An insurance company organized under the laws of one state, having its principal office therein, but doing business in another state, under its statutes, is a citizen of the state creating it, within the meaning of the judiciary act of 1789, and as such is entitled to a removal of the cause to the United States court; and, after application for removal, the state court has no jurisdiction, although the defendant answers therein. Stevens v. Phænix Ins. Co., 41 N. Y. 149, overruling 24 How. 517. 95. A statute providing the conditions on which foreign insurance companies shall do business in Michigan, provides that the state courts have exclusive jurisdiction of suits arising under the act. Held, submission to the act is a waiver of all right as quasi citizens of another state to remove to the federal courts causes accruing in the state. Glenns Falls Ins. Co. v. Judge of Jackson County, 21 Mich. 577. 88.- An insurance company organized as a corporation under laws of one state, and having an agency by which it conducts its business in another state, is not engaged "in commerce between the states," within meaning of U. S. constitution. Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Harrah, 47 Ind. 236. 89.- An insurance policy is a mere contract of indemnity against loss of property, and not an instrument of commerce within the meaning of the United States consti- 96.- A suit in a state court by a citizen tution. Ins. Co. of N. A. v. The Com-of another state, against an insurance monwealth, 87 Pa. 173. company also of another state, doing 90.- Insurance corporations of one business under the laws of the state state have no right to exercise their where the suit was commenced, cannot franchises in another except upon the assent of the latter, and on such terms as it may impose, which, whether reasonable or unreasonable, are absolutely within the be removed into the federal courts, neither party being citizens of the state in whose court the suit lies. Insurance Co. v. Francis, 11 Wallace, 210 (U. S.) Removal of Action Into U. S. Court. 97. A corporation created within the court. Until it is reversed or set aside in sovereignty of Great Britain and under a proper manner by an appellate court it the laws of that country, are presumed is valid, and will be enforced in a colto be citizens or subjects of that kingdom, | lateral action brought upon it. Johnson within the meaning of act of Congress v. Brewers' Fire Ins. Co., 10 Ins. L. J. providing for removal of causes into U. 411; 51 Wis. 570. S. Court. Terry v. Imperial Fire Ins. Co., 4 Ins. L. J. 824; 3 Dill. 408. 98.- The right to remove a cause into the U. S. court is an absolute one secured by the U. S. constitution. Such right cannot be taken away by an act of a state legislature, nor can such an act make valid an agreement to same effect. A corporation is a citizen of the state which creates it. Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wallace, 445 (U. S.); s. P. Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 6 Ins. L. J. 177; 94 U. S. 535. 103.- Plaintiff society and defendant were Wisconsin corporations, and plaintiff insurance company was a New York corporation. Action was brought to recover amount of damages sustained by a fire caused by alleged wrongful act or negligence of the defendant. Insurance company paid amount of its policy to the society, and both joined in action to recover the total loss. Held, that cause could not be properly removed into U. S. court under Act of 1875. First Presbybyterian Society and Ins. Co. v. Goodrich Transportation Co., 10 Ins. L. J. 452; 7 Fed. Rep. 257; 10 Biss. 312. 99.- Denial of state court of motion to remove cause into U. S. court does not excuse defendant from filing the necessary 104.- Whether a foreign corporation papers with the clerk of the U. S. court subject to service of process by the laws as prescribed by the act of Congress, of the state where it is sued, can remove 1875. The right of defendant to a re- a case from a court of such state on the moval is not dependent on the question ground of a difference of citizenship the whether the state court does or does not authorities do not agree. That it canmake an order for the removal. Clip-not, see Scott v. Texas Land Co., 41 Fed. pinger v. Miss. Valley Ins. Co., 5 Ins. L. Rep. 225 (U. S. Cir.); Zambrino v. GalvesJ. 310; 1 Flippin, 456 (U. S. Cir.) ton R. R. Co., 38 Id. 449 (U. S. Cir.); Rid- 100.- A foreign insurance company which has complied with the statute in regard to its admission into the state, and has appointed an agent to accept process, becomes, as to all contracts with citizens of such state, domiciled there, and in controversies with other citizens, growing out of policies of insurance, must sue and be sued in the state courts, and does not come within the terms of the act of Congress relating to the re-been distinctly held, that a corporation moval of cases to the United States court. Continental Ins. Co. v. Kasey, 27 Grat. 216 (Va.) 101. A foreign insurance company doing business in New Hampshire and accepting service of process in conformity to the laws thereof is not thereby deprived of the right of removal to the federal courts of an action commenced against it in the state court by a citizen of that state. Quimby v. Penn. Ins. Co., 58 N. H. 494. 102.- A subsequent judgment of state court is not rendered absolutely void by its refusal to remove case into the U. S. 105.- But on the other hand it has can not have a residence outside of the territory of the government which creates it. Filli v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 65 (U. S. Cir.); Hohorst v. Hamburg American Packet Co., 38 Id. 273(U. S. Cir.); National Typographic Co. v. N. Y. Co., 44 Id. 711 (U. S. Cir.); Denton v. International Co., 36 Id. 1 (U. S. Cir.); Purcell v. British Land Co., 42 Id. 465 (U. S. Cir.); Bensinger Cash Register Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 42 Id. 81 (U. S. Cir.); Myers v. Murray et al., 43 Id. 695 (U. S. Cir.); Henning v. Western Union Tel. Co., 43 Id. 97 (U. S. Cir.); Amsden v. Norwich Union Ins. Co., 44 Id. Removal of Action Into U. S. Court. 515 (U. S. Cir.); Booth v. St. Louis Fire | Traders' Ins. Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 711; 19 Engine Mfg. Co., 40 Id. 1 (U. S. Cir.) Ins. L. J. 606. 106. It has been held that an agree- 112. The period for demurring or ment by a foreign corporation not to re- answering plaintiff's complaint is susmove a cause into the U. S. Circuit court pended, by filing before answer or deis void. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. | murrer a sufficient petition and bond for 445 (U. S.); Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. S. 186. removal to a federal court, until the record is filed in that court. *Pelzer Mfg. Co. v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 185. 107.- As to the power of a state to impose conditions affecting right to removal upon a foreign corporation seeking admission to do business in such state. See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S.); Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 Id. 196; Philadelphia Fire Assoc. v. New York, 119 Id. 110; Barron v. Burnside, 121 Id. 186; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. 114.— An affidavit alleging that the R. Co. v. Becker, 32 Fed. Rep. 849; Whit-affiant has good reason to believe and tier v. Hartford Ins. Co., 4 Ins. L. J. 622; does believe that, from prejudice and 55 N. H. 141. local influence, he will not be able to obtain justice in the state courts, is insufficient to obtain a removal under the Act of March 3, 1887. *Minnick v. Union Ins. Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 369; Hakes v. Burns, 40 Fed. Rep. 33. 113.- The rule in the state courts as to amendment of pleadings, or the discontinuance of the suit in whole or in part, | must control the decision of the federal court in a case removed from a state court. *Nussbaum v. Northern Ins. Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 337. 108.- A foreign insurance company which has obtained a new trial in a suit against it cannot obtain a removal to the federal court, after the calling of a second trial, and after counsel, who has been employed by defendant's agent during a delay granted by the court for that purpose, the regular counsel being absent, has moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the process attached to the declaration is insufficient, as the final trial of the case has then begun, and the petition for removal comes too late. *Fleming v. Philadelphia F. Asso., 76 Ga. 678. 115.- A foreign corporation, which has agreed as a condition of being allowed to do business in the state, that process served on the commissioner of corporations shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served on the corporation, thereby waives its right under the U. S. statute to claim that it is an inhabitant of another district. *Consolidated Store Service Co. v. Lampson Consolidated Store Service Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 833; 8 R. R. & Corp. L. 109.- Under the Act of March 3, 1887, a citizen of one state sued in a state court | J. 123. of another state by a citizen thereof has a right of removal to the United States circuit court. *Swayne v. Boylston Ins. Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 1 (U. S. Cir.) 110.- An extension of time to plead, by stipulation of the parties, cannot enlarge the time to petition for removal of the cause. *Velie v. Manufacturers' Accident Indemnity Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 545. 116.- A motion to remand, based on a petition denying the statement in the petition for removal as to the diverse citizenship of the parties, and alleging that they are both citizens of the same state, raises an issue upon that question which requires adjudication. *Curnow v. Phonix Ins. Co., 44 Fed. Rep. 305. 117. After affirmance, on appeal, of 111.- When an action is removed from an order denying an application for rea state court to a federal court, the action moval of a cause to the federal court, decontinues the same, and all rulings made fendant is not entitled to an amendment and opinions expressed in the highest so as properly to allege diverse citizenship court of the state are treated precisely as upon motion filed in the lower court, alif they had been made in the federal though the order appealed from be treated court; otherwise, if the action in the state as interlocutory or incidental. *Herndon court be discontinued, and a new action v. Etna Ins. Co., 108 N. C. 648; 13 S. E. begun in the federal court. *Cleaver v. Rep. 188. |