MARRIAGE-CONTRACT-Continued.
tion to keep up the policy. The marriage having been dissolved by
the death of the husband, and the insurance company having paid the
sum due under the policy to the widow, the marriage-contract trustees
claimed that sum on the ground that the wife took under the destina-
tion in the policy, and by virtue of section 2 of the Married Women's
Policies of Assurance (Scotland) Act, 1880, a vested right in the pro-
ceeds of the policy stante matrimonio, and that this right was carried to
them by the above quoted clause of the marriage-contract. Held that
the sum due under the policy was not property which pertained or be-
longed to the wife during the subsistence of the marriage, and that the
widow was entitled to it absolutely. Coulson's Trustees v. Coulson,
July 5, 1901, p. 1041.
Deed by woman before marriage, but after agreement to marry-Revoca-
tion-Jus quæsitum-Fraud on Marital Rights-Trust.
4. A woman before her marriage, but after it had been agreed upon, exe-
cuted a disposition and assignation in trust of all the means and estate
she should acquire during her marriage to trustees therein named.
The trustees were directed (1) to pay the annual income of the trust-
estate to herself during her life, exclusive of her husband's jus mariti
and right of administration; (2) in the event of her husband surviv-
ing her, and there being issue of the marriage, to pay the annual
income to him during the survivance of such issue; and failing issue
(3) to pay to him an annuity of £200 a year; (4) on the death of
the longest liver of herself and her husband, to pay over the capital
to the child or children of the marriage subject to a power of appor-
tionment given to the spouses or the survivor; (5) and failing issue
of the marriage, to pay over the capital to her in the event of her sur-
viving her husband, or to such person or persons as she might direct,
subject to her husband's annuity in the event of his surviving her.
The deed was declared to be irrevocable. The husband also executed
before marriage a bond of annuity for the sum of £200 in favour of
his wife. He gave no formal assent to his wife's deed, but he was
aware of its intended execution, and made no inquiry as to its provi-
sions. A child was born of the marriage, and thereafter the trustees
entered on the management of certain funds to which the wife had suc-
ceeded. In an action by the wife and husband against the trustees to
have the wife's deed declared revocable, or otherwise to have it reduced
as in fraudem of the husband's rights, held (1) that it was not revoc-
able; and (2) that it was not reducible. Lyon v. Lyon's Trustees,
March 12, 1901, p. 653.
Postnuptial provision to wife taking effect stante matrimonio-Donatio
inter virum et uxorem-Bankruptcy.
5. A husband, by deed of assignation dated June 1898, on the narrative
that there was no marriage-contract between himself and his wife, and
"in order so far to supply that defect and make provision for the said "
wife, assigned, in the first place, to her and her heirs and assignees
whomsoever the lease of the house which he and she occupied; in the
second place, he assigned to her, her executors, administrators, and
assigns, a policy of insurance on his life, which he had taken out twenty-
three years before; and, in the third place, he assigned to her the furni-
ture in the house; declaring that he should have no right or title to
the lease, and that neither the lease nor the subjects second and third
assigned should be liable to his deeds or subject to the diligence of his
creditors, it being further declared that the wife should be entitled to
manage the said leasehold subjects in every respect as if she were still
unmarried, his jus mariti and right of administration being excluded
from these subjects as well as from the subjects second and third
assigned. The deed of assignation was registered in the Register of
MARRIAGE-CONTRACT-Continued.
Sasines quoad the leasehold subjects, and the assignation of the policy
of insurance was intimated to the insurance company. The subjects
assigned, which amounted in value to about £200, constituted the hus-
band's whole property (apart from his annual income, which amounted
to £120 a year), with the exception of a sum of £439 in bank, which
was held to be his property, and which he uplifted two months after
the date of the assignation, and, to the extent of £400, handed over
to his wife. The husband's estates were sequestrated in April 1899 in
consequence of the failure of a business which he was carrying on as
one of a body of testamentary trustees.
the sequestration against the wife and the husband for his interest,
In an action by the trustee in
concluding for reduction of the assignation, held that the assignation
fell to be reduced as a donatio inter virum et uxorem.
Trustee v. Robertson, Jan. 22, 1901, p. 359.
See Entail, 2-Succession, 1, 14.
MASTER AND SERVANT. Lease or Service-Occupancy of house as part
remuneration for services.
1. The proprietors of an estate entered into an agreement with B, a gardener,
whereby B agreed to keep in order the policy grounds, garden, and
avenue of the mansion-house, for which services he was to receive £15
in money, the occupancy of a cottage in the kitchen garden, and the
occupancy and use for his own profit of that garden, and a cow's keep.
The proprietors having thereafter dismissed B from their service brought
an action to have him summarily removed from the cottage. They did
not ask for his removal from the garden. Evidence on a consideration
of which it was held that B occupied the cottage as tenant, and that
the pursuers were not entitled to have him removed except after due
notice to him as tenant to remove. Dunbar's Trustees v.
1900, p. 137.
Bruce, Nov. 24,
Use by servant after leaving service of information obtained during ser-
vice-Implied Contract-Confidentiality.
2. Evidence on a consideration of which it was held that a person
had been the agent of a friendly society was not entitled, after he had
left the society's service, to give written lists of the members of the
society to the officials of a rival society. Liverpool Victoria Legal
Friendly Society v. Houston, Nov. 2, 1900, p. 42.
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897-Accident arising out of and in the
course of the employment-Act, sec. 1 (1).
3. A workman in the course of his employment in a "factory," within the
meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, met with an acci-
dent caused by his fellow-workmen, who, at the time, were not engaged
at their work, but were indulging in horseplay. Held that the accident
was not one arising "out of" the employment in the sense of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, sec. 1 (1), and that the injured
workman was not entitled to compensation under the Act. Falconer
v. London and Glasgow Engineering and Iron Shipbuilding Co.,
Limited, Feb. 23, 1901, p. 564.
4. A workman employed in the renovation of the interior of a church found
the church door locked on his arrival in the morning, and was unable
to unlock the door. To gain access to his work he climbed the iron
railing of a neighbouring schoolyard, which enabled him to scale the
churchyard wall and enter the church by a window.
topped by spikes, one of which pierced his foot, from the effects of
The railing was
which injury he died. Held that the accident did not arise "
and in the course of the employment" of the workman in the sense of
section 1 (1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897. Gibson V.
Wilson, March 12, 1901, p. 661.
MASTER AND SERVANT-Continued.
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 "Course of Employment "-
Serious and wilful misconduct-Act, secs. 1 (1) and (2) (c).
5. In a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
1897, by a father for the death of his son, the following facts were
set forth in a case stated by the arbitrator:-The deceased, who was
engaged as a workman in the process of filling scrap-iron into barrows,
was killed owing to the defective condition of a hoist in which he
was ascending to a furnace platform, in order to procure handleathers,
which were necessary to his work. The furnace platform could be
reached either by a fixed iron ladder or by the hoist in question. Work-
men were forbidden to ascend by the hoist, a notice to that effect being
posted on a wall close by, and at the time of the accident the hoist
had been rendered especially dangerous by recent alterations. There
was no finding that the deceased knew of the notice, and it was stated
that there was no proof that his attention was directed to the changed
condition of the hoist. It was further stated that some of the work-
men knew of the notice and that some did not, but that all of them
used the hoist. Held (1) that the deceased had been killed in the
course of his employment; and (2) that the arbitrator was right in
holding that the deceased had not been guilty of serious and wilful
misconduct in the sense of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897.
Logue v. Fullarton, Hodgart, & Barclay, June 26, 1901, p. 1006.
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897-Serious and wilful misconduct —
Act, sec. 1, (2) (c).
6. A woman employed in a spinning mill was injured through attempting
to clean a teaser card-machine, at which she was working, while it was
in motion. It was the rule and practice of the factory, known to the
woman, that no cleaning of machinery was to be done unless the
machinery was stopped. Held that the injuries to the woman were
attributable to her serious and wilful misconduct within the meaning
of sec. 1, subsec. (2) (c), of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897,
and consequently that her employers were not liable to her in compen-
sation under the Act. Guthrie v. Boase Spinning Co., Limited,
March 20, 1901, p. 769.
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897-Engineering Work-Act, sec. 7.
7. A firm of engineers sold a hay-cutting machine to a customer, and
undertook to fit it up in the customer's premises, and test its working
before delivery. In the process of fitting up the hay-cutter one of the
engineer's workmen, for the purpose of testing its working, connected
it with a revolving shaft driven by electricity forming part of
the customer's plant already in the premises, and while doing so was
injured. Held (1) that the hay-cutter was an engineering work in the
sense of the Act, (2) that the workman's employers were the under-
takers for its construction, and (3) that the workman was entitled to
compensation under the Act. Reid v. P. R. Fleming & Co., June 25,
1901, p. 1000.
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897-Mine-Siding adjacent to and
belonging to mine-" On or in or about "— Work extraneous to proper
business of employer-Act, secs. 1 (1) and 7—Coal Mines Regulation
Act, 1887, sec. 75.
8. A colliery company, owners of a coal-mine and siding connecting the
mine with a main line of railway, entered into a contract with the
owner of a sand-pit situated on the main line to carry sand from the
sand-pit in railway waggons to the colliery siding, preparatory to
removal by the railway company. The haulage was to be done by an
engine belonging to the colliery company, and used in connection with
their mine and siding. The siding was about 80 yards in length, and
The sand-pit was 300 or 400 yards from
served only the one mine.
MASTER AND SERVANT-Continued.
the siding. In the course of executing this contract the brakesman of
the engine, who was in the employment of the colliery company, was
killed while uncoupling waggons on the main line at or near the
extremity of the siding. Held (1) that the employment of the deceased
was locally "about" a mine in the sense of sec. 7, subsec. (1), of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897; and (2) that a claim for com-
pensation arose although the work upon which the deceased was em-
ployed at the time of the accident was not part of the proper business
of the colliery. Monaghan v. United Collieries, Limited, Nov. 27,
1900, p. 149.
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897-Railway-“ On or in or about" a
railway-Act, sec. 7.
9. A trading company's premises were connected, by a siding, which was
its own property, with a line of railway belonging to a railway com-
pany. The siding, which was not constructed or carried on under any
Act of Parliament, was used solely for the traffic of the trading com
pany, and for that purpose was used by the railway company by means
of its own rolling-stock and servants. A servant of the railway com-
pany, while so employed, was accidentally injured at a point on the
siding three-quarters of a mile from its junction with the line of railway.
Held that the accident had not occurred "on, in, or about" a rail-
way within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897.
Brodie v. North British Railway Co., Nov. 6, 1900, p. 75.
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 Railway-Signal Cabin-
Ancillary or incidental" to business of undertaker-Act, sec. 4.
10. A workman when engaged in the employment of a builder in the
erection of a stone and lime wall in a railway cutting, was run down
and killed by a passing train. The wall, which the builder had con-
tracted to build for the railway company, was intended to prevent
earth on the bank of the cutting from falling down and obstructing the
access to a signal-cabin belonging to the railway company. The work-
man's widow claimed compensation under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, 1897, from the railway company, as the undertakers within
the meaning of the Act. Held that the work on which the deceased
was engaged was not part of the business of the railway company,
was merely ancillary or incidental thereto, and that the railway
company was not liable. Dundee and Arbroath Joint Railway Com-
pany v. Carlin, May 31, 1901, p. 843.
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897-Wharf-Factory-About a factory
-Act, sec. 7-Factory and Workshop Act, 1895, sec. 23.
11. In an arbitration under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, the
following facts were admitted :-The claimant, employed by the respon-
dents as a quay labourer at a wharf occupied by them, was
in removing girders from the street immediately outside the wharf shed
to the side of a steamship belonging to the respondents, which was
being loaded. The girders were lifted by a hand crane on a hand
truck, by which they were conveyed to the ship's side. While remov
ing the hand crane from one pile of girders to another pile, both of
which lay in the street immediately outside the wharf shed, the
claimant got jammed between the platform of the crane and one of the
girders and sustained injuries. Held (1) that, as one or more of the
provisions in sec. 23 of the Factory and Workshops Act, 1895, applied
to the wharf, it was a factory within the meaning of the Act of 1897;
and (2) that the fact that the accident happened on a public street,
immediately outside the wharf shed, did not, per se, exclude a claim for
compensation. Strain v. Sloan & Co., March 13, 1901, p. 663.
12. A rivetter was injured in the employment of a firm of ship-repairers,
while repairing a ship in a public dock at a distance from his em-
MASTER AND SERVANT-Continued.
ployers' factory of 550 yards in a direct line and about a mile by road.
The employers' factory was not a shipbuilding yard. Held that the
rivetter was not, when he received the injuries, employed "about" a
factory in the sense of the Act. Barclay, Curle, & Co. v. M'Kinnon,
Feb. 1, 1901, p. 436.
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897-Factory-Machinery on board
lighter-Dock-Act, sec. 7-Factory and Workshop Act, 1895, sec. 23.
13. A lighter and machinery thereon, the property of and worked by steve-
dores, was employed in raising goods from the hold to the deck of a
vessel moored between the lighter and a quay, the goods being there-
after transferred to the quay, not by the stevedores, but by dock work-
men. Held that sec. 23 of the Factory and Workshop Act, 1895, did
not apply either to the lighter or to the machinery thereon, and that
therefore they did not constitute a "factory" in the sense of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897; and further, that the process
which was being performed by the lighter and its machinery was not
one of unloading to a quay in the sense of the Act of 1895. Laing
v. Young & Leslie, Nov. 2, 1900, p. 31.
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897-Building exceeding thirty feet in
height--Part of building below ground-Foundations-Question of
fact or law-Undertaker-Act, sec. 7.
14. A wash-house, built to the order of the Police Commissioners of a
burgh, was 30 feet 5 inches in height above its foundation. Imme-
diately above the foundation was a basement floor 6 feet below the
level of the surrounding ground which contained pipes in connection
with the wash-house. The floor of the wash-house was 6 feet 4 inches
above the basement floor. Held that the question whether a building
exceeded 30 feet in height, in proceedings under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, 1897, was one of fact for the determination of the arbi-
trator.
Opinions that the building exceeded 30 feet in height in the sense
of section 7 (1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897.
Question whether in estimating the height of a building for the pur-
poses of the Act, the foundations are to be taken into account.
Opinion that the undertakers of the building in the sense of the Act
were the Police Commissioners, and not the tradesmen employed by
them. Halstead v. Alex. Thomson & Sons, March 13, 1901, p. 668.
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897-Building constructed by a scaffolding
-Scaffolding not in use nor erected at time of accident-Question of
fact or law-Act, sec. 7.
15. In the construction of a building, scaffolding, consisting of trestles and
planks, was used from time to time from the beginning to the end of
the job. During the construction an accident happened to a work-
man, at a time when the scaffolding, although its component parts were
there, was neither in use nor erected. Held that at the time of the
accident the building was being constructed by means of a scaffolding
in terms of sec. 7 (1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897.
Opinions that, in proceedings under the Act, the question whether
or not at the time of the accident the building was being constructed
by means of a scaffolding, was one of fact to be determined by the
arbitrator. Halstead v. Alex. Thomson & Sons, March 13, 1901, p. 668.
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897-Separate proof as to preliminary
defence-Reparation-Election.
16. In an action raised by a workman against his employers at common
law for damages for injuries alleged to have been received through
their fault, the defenders, besides denying fault, averred that the pur-
suer had given written notice that he claimed compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, and that subsequently they had paid
|