lounged with revolutionary freedom on the couch. This was an echo of the hostility of 1830. Talleyrand had always been strongly opposed to the obtrusion of French revolutionary feelings at other courts or capitals, and is not likely to have furnished the slightest ground for this gibe over his coffin. He had brought the Duchess de Dino with him, and this relieved the character of his mission. Such productions of the time as "Raikes' Journal" indicate how prominent and distinguished a place he at once took up in the country. In fact the writer in the Morning Post himself says that in time Palmerston was almost the only man to stand conspicuously aloof from the aged Prince, and speak of him disdainfully as "old Tally." The great issue that complicated his work at London was the revolt of Belgium against the Dutch. Talleyrand had looked forward to the not uncongenial task of introducing the new monarchy into the respectable society of the older ones in Europe by prevailing on England to espouse its cause. Knowing well the pacific feeling of Louis-Philippe and his political integrity, he had every reason to hope for success in this without more than an easy and cheerful use of his own accomplishments. Aristocratic feeling even in England was suspicious and reserved. He would disarm it, and place in the hands of the French Foreign Office the strong card of England's friendship. Unfortunately for his peace, the spirit of the Revolution spread immediately into Belgium, and the Dutch were gradually driven out I vs England especially that had en angam of the Netherlands in 1815, xa de ww boksi va modern on what seemed to be an atenor of Fame to the control of Belgium. The new from France increased the difficulty. Dies vs 1 Sting me hud demand at Paris for the mnestion of de nit and irgely French, provinces of Jerum moins va enced by a considerable party * Brussels. So power was the feeling and so moving en the French Cabinet itself inclined mamo me Lay besed From the end of October ural me end of Ferry Tileged had to fight the vane I Pirs, 8 vs LP Enxiety at London. But he was convinced that a general war would ensue if France SCT Ir birectly recovered control of Belgaum, më he fouge bravely for peace against King mo masters md people. Non-intervention was the viri tur be pleated unceasingly at London and mandered in Paris There is a story that when someone at London asked him to define non-intervention he sed it was fi metaphysical and political term that ment pretty much the same thing as intervention." He may have said so for the fun of the phrase, but his comespondence with Paris shows that he was in deeper ames about it. His policy at London was perfectly straight, but unfortunately his diplomatic history made many hesitate to accept it as such. It is said that once under the Empire some piece of news relating to Spain had reached the knowledge of the Spanish Minister, and Napoleon grumbled. Talleyrand said he would put the matter right. He went to M. d'Azara, said that he had something important to whisper to him regarding his country, and then told him precisely the piece of news that had leaked out. D'Azara was so far unable to conceive Talleyrand speaking the truth in such a matter that he concluded the whole story was a hoax, and wrote to his Government to disregard the information he had sent them. At London in 1830 and 1831 Talleyrand was pleading in perfect sincerity for non-intervention, but Palmerston (who came to the Foreign Office in November) and others were unable to believe him. The more he assured them of his struggle against his own Government, the more they suspected him. Palmerston dreaded his diplomatic ascendancy, and looked for his secret inspiration in every movement towards war and territorial expansion that was reported from Paris. There was no unreality about Talleyrand's statement that he was fighting his own Government. In November they sent Count Flahaut to assist him in London and induce him to favour the scheme of a partition of Belgium between Holland, England, Prussia, and France. Talleyrand told him he would cut off his right hand before signing such a treaty, and sent him back to Paris. Sebastiani (Foreign Minister) then sounded Talleyrand on a scheme for making the King's son, the Duc de Nemours, King of Belgium, and was told that it was a "mad idea." Talleyrand, in fact, resorted to the device of writing constantly to the King's sister, Mme. Adélaide, and told her the Duke "must absolutely refuse" the Belgian crown if it were offered to him. He believed that Belgium would not remain a distinct nation (in which his sagacity failed altogether), and might eventually fall to France, but for the moment it was "a secondary matter." "We must make France first," he said. But the Congress at Brussels on February 3rd did invite the Duc de Nemours to the throne, and Paris wavered once more. Talleyrand signed a protocol at London engaging France to refuse the crown for the Duc de Nemours. Sebastiani complained seriously, and Talleyrand had to submit, but added that "if it seemed to him at any time that there would be imminent danger of war if he refused to sign the protocols of the Conference, and the real interests of France were not at stake, he would sign them in accordance with the first instructions given him," and threatened to leave London if the situation did not improve in Paris. Moreover, when, under the influence of a deputy from Brussels, the King wavered again, and Sebastiani sent word that his reply was postponed, Talleyrand refused to submit his message to Palmerston. The Conference to which he alludes was sitting on the Belgian question at London. When England proposed an international Conference, Talleyrand was instructed to demand that it be held at Paris, and he did His personal opinion was, however, that Paris was in too insecure a condition, and he was not disappointed So. |