Tobal and Amaya, who had been seized in Panama on the evening of November 3, by the independents, and held as prisoners, were not released by 2 o'clock, P. M., he, Torres, would fire upon the town of Colon and kill every United States citizen in the place, and my advice and action were requested. I advised that all the United States citizens should take refuge in the shed of the Panama Railroad Company, a stone building susceptible of being put into good state of defense, and that I would immediately land such body of men, with extra arms for arming the citizens, as the complement of the ship would permit.

"This was agreed to, and I immediately returned on board, arriving at 1.15 P.M. The order for landing was immediately given, and at 1.30 P.M. the boats left the ship with a party of forty-two men under the command of Lieutenant-Commander H. M. Witzel, with Midshipman J. P. Jackson as second in command. Time being pressing, I gave verbal orders to Mr. Witzel to take the building referred to above, to put it into the best state of defense possible, and protect the lives of the citizens assembled there, not firing unless fired upon. The women and children took refuge on the German

steamer Marcomania and the Panama Railroad steamer City of Washington, both ready to haul out from dock if necessary.

"The Nashville got under way and patrolled along the water-front close in and ready to use either small arm or shrapnel fire. The Colombians surrounded the building of the railroad company almost immediately after we had taken possession, and for about one and a half hours their attitude was threatening, it being seemingly their purpose to provoke an attack. Happily our men were cool and steady, and, while the tension was great, no shot was fired.

"At about 3.15 P.M. Colonel Torres came into the building for an interview and expressed himself as most friendly to the Americans, claiming that the whole affair was a misapprehension, and that he would like to send the alcalde of Colon to Panama to see General Tobal and have him direct the discontinuance of the show of force. A special train was furnished and safe conduct guaranteed. At 5.30 P. M. Colonel Torres made the proposition of withdrawing his troops to Monkey Hill if I would withdraw the Nashville force and leave the town in possession of the police until the return of the alcalde on the morning of the 5th.

"After an interview with Colonel Shaler and the United States consul as to the probability of good faith in the matter, I decided to accept the proposition and brought my men on board, the disparity in numbers between my force and that of the Colombians nearly ten to one— making me desirous of avoiding a conflict as long as the object in view the protection of American citizens - was not imperiled.

"I am confident that the determined attitude of our men, their coolness and evident intention of standing their ground, had a most salutary and decisive effect upon the immediate situation, and was the initial step in the ultimate abandoning of Colon by these troops and their return to Cartagena the following day. Lieutenant Witzel is entitled to much praise for his admirable work in command on the spot.

"I feel that I can not sufficiently represent to the Department the grossness of this outrage and the insult to our dignity, even apart from the savagery of the threat. Very respectfully, "JOHN HUBBARD,

66

Commander, United States Navy,
Commanding.

"The Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D.C."

Following this occurrence, President Roosevelt sent a message to Congress in which he reviewed the relations of the United States and Colombia in the matter of a canal treaty and expressed his opinion of the policy that ought to be adopted toward Panama: " During all the years of negotiation and discussion that preceded the conclusion of the Hay-Herran treaty, Colombia never intimated that the requirement of the United States to control over the canal strip would render unattainable the construction of a canal by way of the Isthmus of Panama; nor even were we advised, during the months when legislation of 1902 was pending before the Congress, that the terms which it embodied would render negotiations with Colombia impracticable. It is plain that no nation could construct and guarantee the neutrality of the canal with a less degree of control than was stipulated for in the Hay-Herran treaty. A refusal to grant such control was necessarily a refusal to make any practicable treaty at all. Such refusal therefore squarely raised the question whether Colombia was entitled to bar the transit of the world's traffic across the isthmus. . . . Colombia, after having rejected the treaty in spite of our protests and warnings

when it was in her power to accept it, has since shown the utmost eagerness to accept the same treaty if only the status quo could be restored. One of the men standing highest in the official circles of Colombia on November 6 addressed the American minister at Bogotá, saying that if the Government of the United States would land troops to preserve Colombian sovereignty and the transit, the Colombian Government would declare martial law, and by virtue of vested constitutional authority, when public order is disturbed, approve by decree the ratification of the canal treaty as signed; or, if the Government of the United States prefers, call an extra session of the Congress with new and friendly members-next May to approve the treaty.'

Having these facts in view, there is no shadow of a question that the Government of the United States proposed a treaty that was not only just but generous to Colombia, which our people regarded as erring, if at all, on the side of over-generosity, which was hailed with delight by the people of the immediate locality through which the canal was to pass, who were most interested in the new order of things, and which the Colombian authorities now recognize