by the court to withdraw the exhibits filed with the examiner, but to hold the same subject to the order of the court for their production from time to time, as may be necessary. The first of these orders indicates that the exhibits were in the possession of the applicant's solicitor on August 27, while the latter order indicates that they were in the possession of the examiner on the day the exceptions to the report were heard by the court and the decree entered. In McMahon v. Rowley, 238 Ill. 31, where the objection was made that the examiner based his report on certain evidence that was not returned with his report, we said: "Moreover, plaintiffs in error are in no position to complain. It was their duty, under the statute, if the evidence was not returned, to ask the trial judge for a rule on the examiner to report the evidence and file the same. The statute requires this, and this court has said that was the proper procedure in similar matters with reference to masters in chancery." In the case at bar the plaintiff in error made no attempt to obtain a rule on the examiner to file the exhibits in court. He is therefore in no position to complain that such exhibits were not returned into court. (Cregar v. Spitzer, 244 Ill. 208.) The subsequent order granting leave to the applicant's solicitor to withdraw the exhibits filed with the examiner indicates that the exhibits were in the possession or under the control of the examiner and that a rule on him to file them in court would have been effective. It is also urged that the admission in evidence by examiner Farson of a transcript of the proceedings in said cause before former examiner Sheldon was error. While we agree with plaintiff in error in his contention in this regard, for the reason that such evidence had not been certified by Sheldon or included in or attached to any report to the court, (Coel v. Glos, 232 Ill. 142,) we do not regard such error as prejudicial. The only matter shown by that transcript which was not covered by other evidence intro duced before Farson was a tender made by the solicitor for the applicant to Glos. The applicant was by the final decree ordered to pay all the costs of the proceeding, and the fact that a tender had been made was immaterial to any of the issues in the cause. The assignment of errors refers to other alleged errors in the proceedings, but plaintiff in error has only argued those above considered. The others have therefore been waived. Plaintiff in error having failed to point out any prejudicial error in the record of which he is in a position to complain, the decree of the circuit court will be affirmed. Decree affirmed. INDEX. 1 ABSTRACTS OF TITLE. what is not sufficient proof to entitle abstract of title to 'ACCOUNTING. .... PAGE. 605 188 189 the word "account" has no clearly defined legal meaning. 188 ... 189 .... 189 a bill for accounting must state a plain case, but precise what must be charged by the party who seeks to open an 189 190 190 what is not a sufficient averment of facts to justify open- .... 190 a different rule of pleading applies where a bill is filed to 190 ACCOUNTING.-Continued. PAGE. ....191, 195 rules for an accounting between Illinois Central and State ACCOUNTS STATED.-See ACCOUNTING. ACTIONS AND DEFENSES. .... the right of a city to recover damages for an injury to its 313 29 32 43 plaintiff in action of tort against several may take judg- 109 109 when court may grant relief to minor defendants on cross- 313 another language.. when minority of congregation may be enjoined from in- injunction is a proper remedy to restrain unlawful inter- 328 328 328 ACTIONS AND DEFENSES.-Continued. PAGE. when contract should be specifically enforced-effect if the ..... ....... 362 362 when there is no laches in seeking to set aside a deed to 399 465 what is not sufficient excuse for long delay in filing bill to 469 474 485 ... 569 .... 578 593 courts will not entertain a bill to specifically enforce con- ADMINISTRATION.-See EXECUTORS. |