with, 129 U. S. 26; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114; Charlotte, C. & S. R. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386; Minneapolis & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Emmons, 149 U. S. 364.

Congress may fix a new rule of civil liability in matters of interstate commerce. Act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 531; Johnson v. Sou. Pac. Co., 196 U. S. 1.

As to the power of Congress to regulate the liability of carriers and others engaged in interstate commerce for injury to person or property, see Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99; Missouri R. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133; Martin v. Pittsburg & L. E. R. R. Co., 203 U. S. 284.

It is for Congress to determine what public policy requires with respect to common carriers engaged in interstate commerce. United States v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U.S. 569, 571; Missouri R. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205.

The allowance of attorneys' fees was proper. Seaboard Air Line v. Seegers, 207 U. S. 73; Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38.

Mr. Wm. S. Kenyon, Assistant to the Attorney General, with whom The Attorney General was on the brief, by leave of the court for the United States, as amicus curiæ in support of the constitutionality of § 20 of the act of June, 1906.

After making the above statement, MR. Justice LurTON delivered the opinion of the court.

The goods of the defendants in error were lost by a connecting carrier to whom they had been safely delivered. Though received for a point beyond its own line and for a point on the line of a succeeding carrier, there was no agreement for their safe carriage beyond the line of the plaintiff in error, but, upon the contrary, an express

agreement that the initial carrier should not be liable for "a loss or damage not occurring on its own portion of the route." Such a provision is not a contract for exemption from a carrier's liability as such, but a provision making plain that it did not assume the obligation of a carrier beyond its own line, and that each succeeding carrier in the route was but the agent of the shipper for a continuance of the transportation. It is therefore obvious that at the common law an initial carrier under such a state of facts would not be liable for a loss through the fault of a connecting carrier to whom it had, in due course, safely delivered the goods for further transportation. Railroad v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 123; Myrick v. Railroad, 107 U. S. 102; Southern Pac. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S. 536, 554. Liability is confessedly dependent upon the provision of the act of Congress regulating commerce between the States known as the Carmack amendment of January 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. at Large, 584, 595. The twentieth section of the act of February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. at Large, 379, as changed by the Carmack amendment, reads as follows: "That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company receiving property for transportation from a point in one State to a point in another State shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass, and no contract, receipt, rule or regulation shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed. Provided, That nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law.

"That the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company issuing such receipt or bill of lading shall be entitled to recover from the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company on whose line the loss, damage or injury shall have been sustained the amount of such loss, damage, or injury as it may be required to pay to the owners of such property, as may be evidenced by any receipt, judgment, or transcript thereof."

The power of Congress to enact this legislation has been denied, first, because it is said to deprive the carrier and the shipper of their common-law power to make a just and reasonable contract in respect to goods to be carried to points beyond the line of the interstate carrier; and, second, that in casting liability upon the initial carrier for loss or damage upon the line of a connecting carrier the former is deprived of its property without due process of law.

The indisputable effect of the Carmack amendment is to hold the initial carrier engaged in interstate commerce and "receiving property for transportation from a point in one State to a point in another State" as having contracted for through carriage to the point of destination, using the lines of connecting carriers as its agents

Independently of the Carmack amendment the carrier, when tendered property for such transportation, might elect to contract to carry to destination, in which case it necessarily agreed to do so through the agency of other and independent carriers in the line; or, it might elect to carry safely over its own lines only and then deliver to the next carrier, who would then become the agent of the shipper. In the first case the receiving carrier's liability, as carrier, extends over the whole route, for, on obvious grounds, the principal is liable for the acts of its agent. In the other case its carrier liability ends at its own terminal, and its further liability is merely that of a forwarder. Having this power to make the one or the

other contract, the only question which has occasioned a conflict in the decided cases was whether it, in the particular case, made the one or the other.

The general doctrine accepted by this court, in the absence of legislation, is, that a carrier, unless there be a special contract, is only bound to carry over its own line and then deliver to a connecting carrier. That such an initial carrier might contract to carry over the whole route was never doubted. It is equally indisputable that if it does so contract, its common-law carrier liability will extend over the entire route. Railway v. McCarthy, 96 U. S. 258, 266; Railroad v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 123; Railroad v. American Trading Co., 195 U. S. 439; Muschamp v. Lancaster Railway Co., 8 M. & W. 421.

The English cases beginning with Muschamp v. Lancaster Railway Company, 8 M. & W. 421, decided in 1841, down to Bristol &c. Railway v. Collins, 7 H. L. Cases, 194, have consistently held that the mere receipt of property for transportation to a point beyond the line of the receiving carrier, without any qualifying agreement, justified an inference of an agreement for through transportation and an assumption of full carrier liability by the primary carrier. The ruling is grounded upon considerations of public policy and public convenience, and classes the receipt of goods so designated for a point beyond the carrier line as a holding out to the public that the carrier has made its own arrangements for the continuance by a connecting carrier of the transportation after the goods leave its own line. There are American cases which take the same view of the question of evidence thus presented. Some of them are Railroad v. Campbell, 7 Heisk. (Tenn.) 257; Railroad v. Mt. Vernon Co., 84 Alabama, 175; Railroad v. Hasselkus, 91 Georgia, 384; Beard v. Railroad, 79 Iowa, 531; Kyle v. Railroad, 10 Rich. (S. C.) 382; Railroad v. Wilcox, 84 Illinois, 240; Railroad v. Rogers & Hartsell, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 143.

Upon the other hand, many American courts have repudiated the English rule which holds the carrier to a contract for transportation over the whole route, in the absence of a contract clearly otherwise, and have adopted the rule that unless the carrier specifically agrees to carry over the whole route its responsibility, as a carrier, ends with its own line, and that for the continuance of the shipment its liability is only that of a forwarder. The conflict has, therefore, been one as to the evidence from which a contract for through carriage to a place beyond the line of the receiving carrier might be inferred.

In this conflicting condition of the decisions as to the circumstances from which an agreement for through transportation of property designated to a point beyond the receiving carrier's line might be inferred, Congress by the act here involved has declared, in substance, that the act of receiving property for transportation to a point in another State and beyond the line of the receiving carrier shall impose on such receiving carrier the obligation of through transportation with carrier liability throughout. But this uncertainty of the nature and extent of the liability of a carrier receiving goods destined to a point beyond its own line was not all which might well induce the interposition of the regulating power of Congress. Nothing has perhaps contributed more to the wealth and prosperity of the country than the almost universal practice of transportation companies to coöperate in making through routes and joint rates. Through this method a situation has been brought about by which, though independently managed, connecting carriers become in effect one system. This practice has its origin in the mutual interests of such companies and in the necessities of an expanding commerce.

In the leading case of Muschamp v. Lancaster Railway Company, cited above, Lord Abinger defended the inference of a contract for through carriage from the mere