219 U. S. Syllabus. BAILEY v. STATE OF ALABAMA. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA. No. 300. Argued October 20. 21, 1910.-Decided January 3, 1911. Prima facie evidence is sufficient to outweigh the presumption of innocence, and, if not met by opposing evidence, to support a verdict. Kelly v. Jackson, 6 Pet. 632. The validity of a statute that authorizes a jury to convict on prima facie evidence must be judged by the fact that the jury may convict even if it is not made the duty of the jury to do so. Although a state statute in terms be to punish fraud, if its natural and inevitable purpose is to punish for crime for failing to perform contracts of labor, thus compelling such performance, it violates the Thirteenth Amendment and is unconstitutional. A constitutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indirectly by creating a statutory presumption any more than by direct enactment; and a State cannot compel involuntary servitude in carrying out contracts of personal service by creating a presumption that the person committing the breach is guilty of intent to defraud merely because he fails to perform the contract. While States may, without denying due process of law, enact that proof of one fact shall be prima facie evidence of the main fact in issue, the inference must not be purely arbitrary; there must be rational relation between the two facts, and the accused must have proper opportunity to submit all the facts bearing on the issue. While its immediate concern was African slavery, the Thirteenth Amendment was a charter of universal civil freedom for all persons of whatever race, color, or estate, under the flag. The words "involuntary servitude" have a larger meaning than slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited all control by coercion of the personal service of one man for the benefit of another. While the Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing, Congress has power to secure its complete enforcement by appropriate legislation and the peonage act of March 2, 1867, and §§ 1990 and 5526, Rev. Stat., are valid exercises of this authority. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207. A peon is one who is compelled to work for his creditor until his debt Argument for the United States. 219 U. S. is paid, and the fact that he contracted to perform the labor which is sought to be compelled does not withdraw the attempted enforcement from the condemnation of the peonage acts. The Federal anti-peonage acts are necessarily violated by any state legislation which seeks to compel service or labor by making it a crime to fail or refuse to perform it. Although this court may not impute to a State an actual motive to oppress by a statute which that State enacts, it must consider the natural operation of such statute and strike it down if it becomes an instrument of coercion forbidden by the Federal Constitution. Section 4730 of the Code of Alabama as amended in 1907, in so far as it makes the refusal or failure to perform labor contracted for without refunding the money or paying for property received prima facie evidence of the commission of the crime defined by such section, and when read in connection with the rule of evidence of that State, that the accused cannot testify in regard to uncommunicated motives, is unconstitutional as in conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment and of the legislation authorized by it and enacted by Congress. Quare, and not necessary now to decide, whether such section is, under the Fourteenth Amendment, an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law or denial of equal protection of the laws. 161 Alabama, 78, reversed. THE facts, which involve the constitutionality of § 4730 of the Code of Alabama as construed by the courts of that State and the validity of a conviction thereunder, are stated in the opinion. Mr. Fred S. Ball, Mr. Edward S. Watts and Mr. Daniel W. Troy for plaintiff in error, submitted. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Harr, with whom The Attorney General was on the brief, by leave of the court, on behalf of the United States as amicus curiæ: The judgment, and the statute upon which it is based, conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment and §§ 1990, 5526, Rev. Stat. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U. S. 219 U.S. Argument for the United States. 207, 216, which settled the question, left in doubt by Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 280. A state penal statute will be construed by this court as though a rule of evidence announced by the highest court of the State as being applicable thereto was incorporated therein. Freund, Police Power, § 448. The act, as amended, is the result of efforts to enforce labor contracts. See act of March 1, 1901, declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Alabama, Toney v. The State, 141 Alabama, 120; and by the Federal court, Peonage Cases, 123 Fed. Rep. 671, 691. That act failing, resort was had to the statute here in question. But first the statute, found ineffective under Ex parte Riley, 94 Alabama, 82, upon the subject of intent, was amended by adding the prima facie clause. Bailey v. The State, 158 Alabarna, 18, 24. The statute was further amended by the act of August 15, 1907 (Gen. Act, Ala., 1907, p. 636), so as to cover expressly tenants of land, and by changing the penalty so as to make it peculiarly applicable to contracts with agricultural laborers. For history of this legislation and the position of the Supreme Court of Alabama in regard thereto, see Bailey v. State, 158 Alabama, 18, 22; Banks v. State, 124 Georgia, 15; State v. Thomas, 144 Alabama, 77; Vann's Case, 150 Alabama, 66. Even if the legislature can punish fraudulent practices in obtaining property by false pretenses under contract for the performance of an act or service, such object is clearly distinguishable from one punishing a mere breach of contract. Freeman v. United States, 217 U. S. 539. In whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 268. In Florida and Mississippi, similar statutes have been declared void under the Thirteenth Amendment by United States judges in charges to grand juries; and see Argument for the United States. 219 U. S. also a similar holding in North Carolina. So also as to the Louisiana act of July 5, 1892, State v. Murray, 116 Louisiana, 655, though it is manifest that it punishes a mere breach of contract. See records in this court this term in Harlan and Gallagher v. McGourin, 218 U. S. 442. In construing the Alabama statute the court will bear in mind that the legislature would naturally seek to accomplish by indirection what it could not do directly. But § 1990, Rev. Stat. specifically covers such a case. Freeman v. United States, 217 U. S. 539, distinguished. A breach of a contract for personal service upon which advances have been received cannot be made prima facie evidence of a fraudulent intent in entering into the contract. Ex parte Riley, 94 Alabama, 82; State v. Williams, 63 S. E. Rep. 949; Ex parte Hollman, 79 S. E. Rep. 9; Vankirk v. Staats, 24 N. J. L. 121; Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585; Commonwealth v. Williams, 6 Gray (Mass.), 1. State v. Kingsley, 108 Missouri, 135, holds that it is necessary to establish fraudulent intent before the prima facie rule in this statute becomes operative, and see State v. Yardley, 95 Tennessee, 546, to same effect, that where the only thing shown was a refusal to pay, the fraudulent intent must be proved before the prima facie rule could become operative. In this case mere breach of contract is made evidence of the fraudulent intent. The prima facie rule established by the Alabama statute, as shown by this case, is unyielding. The inference under that statute of an intent to defraud from a mere breach of the contract is as absolute when the breach occurs eleven months thereafter as when it occurs one day after the making of the contract. The judgment in this case, and the statute of Alabama upon which it is founded, are in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. They deny the defendant the equal protection of the laws. The statute hits especially, as was intended, negro laborers on farms and plantations. Every 219 U.S. Argument for the United States. reported case under the statute is that of a farm laborer. The maximum penalty fixed by the statute, $300, also makes it peculiarly applicable to this class of laborers. See Ex parte Drayton, 153 Fed. Rep. 986, holding unconstitutional on those grounds a similar statute of South Carolina. Even if the Alabama statute, as originally enacted, was not to be regarded as class legislation, the subsequent amendments render it so, and the actual enforcement of the statute against a single class of laborers alone, denies equal protection. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 558; Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 151. Even if the employers of such labor have much to complain of, it does not relieve the statute of the taint of unconstitutionality. See Judge Jones' charge to grand jury in the Peonage Cases, 123 Fed. Rep. 691. Although the legislature may provide that when certain facts have been proved they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the main fact, the fact upon which the presumption is to rest must have some fair relation to, or natural connection with, the main fact. People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32, 43; State v. Beswick, 13 R. I. 211. A law which practically shuts out the evidence of a party, thus denying him the opportunity for a trial, substantially deprives him of due process of law. Commissioners v. Merchant, 103 N. Y. 143, 148; Commonwealth v. Rubin, 165 Massachusetts, 453; Kelly v. Jackson, 6 Pet. 622, 631; Greenleaf on Evidence, § 33; Vankirk v. Staats, 24 N. J. L. 121; Steinhardt v. Beir, 60 N. Y. Super. Ct. Rep. 489; Mooney v. LaFollette, 21 N. Y. App. Div. 510; McCormick v. Joseph, 77 Alabama, 236, 240; Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432, 453; State v. Thomas, 144 Alabama, 77, and see Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 101, as to the guaranties of due process of law. |