of the penalty, the additional payment of ten dollars will be required to meet the conditions of the first proviso. But so far as the tax is concerned, the person liable therefor, on satisfying the judgment, will have the same right to have the instrument stamped by the collector as though he had paid the taxes to the officer without suit. Such a case would present no administrative difficulty in accomplishing the intent of the statute.

We have examined the other statutory provisions to which our attention has been called in support of the defense, and we find none of controlling significance, or which taken separately or together detract from the force of the provision imposing the obligation to pay the tax and deprive the Government of the remedy here sought.

We are also of opinion that the statute itself provides that payment may be enforced by action. Section 31 makes "all administrative, special, or stamp provisions of law, including the laws in relation to the assessment of taxes, not heretofore specifically repealed," applicable to the act. Within "administrative" provisions must be included those which relate to the collection of the taxes imposed. For the administration of the statute may well be taken to embrace all appropriate measures for its enforcement, and there is no substantial reason for assigning to the phrase which is used in the section quoted a narrower interpretation. It therefore compréhends the authority conferred by § 3213 of the Revised Statutes in the following words:

"And taxes may be sued for and recovered in the name of the United States, in any proper form of action, before any circuit or district court of the United States for the district within which the liability to such tax is incurred, or where the party from whom such tax is due resides at the time of the commencement of the said action."

This provision authorizing suit, with the sanction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Rev. Stat., § 3214),

was originally enacted in 1866 (act of July 13, 1866, c. 184; 14 Stat., p. 111) as an amendment of the Internal Revenue act of June 30, 1864, chapter 173 (13 Stat. 239), and included within its scope the stamp taxes then in force. It must be deemed applicable also to the taxes imposed by the act of 1898.

Upon these grounds we conclude that the United States was entitled to maintain this action and that the demurrer should have been overruled. The judgment is therefore Reversed.

HOUSE v. MAYES, MARSHAL OF JACKSON
COUNTY, MISSOURI.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.

No. 597. Argued December 13, 14, 1910.-Decided January 9, 1911.

The following fundamental principles are not open to dispute: The Government created by the Federal Constitution is one of enumerated powers, and cannot by any of its agencies exercise an authority not granted by that instrument either expressly or by necessary implication.

A power may be implied when necessary to give, effect to a power expressly granted.

While the Constitution of the United States and the laws enacted in pursuance thereof, together with treaties made under the authority of the United States, constitute the supreme law of the land, a State may exercise all such governmental authority as is consistent with its own, and not in conflict with the Federal, Constitution. The police power of the State, never having been surrendered by it to the Federal Government, is not granted by or derived from, but exists independently of, the Federal Constitution.

One of the powers never surrendered by, and therefore remaining with, the State is to so regulate the relative rights and duties of all within its jurisdiction as to guard the public morals, safety and health, as well as to promote the public convenience and the common good.

219 U. S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

It is within the power of the State to devise the means to be employed to the above ends provided they do not go beyond the necessities of the case, have some real and substantial relation to the object to be accomplished, and do not conflict with the Constitution of the United States.

A State may enact a regulation as to sale and delivery of a commodity by actual weight and prohibit arbitrary deductions under rules of associations, without depriving the members of such associations of their liberty of contract or of their property without due process of law. The State may, without violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, regulate the conduct of boards of trade or exchanges which have close and constant relations with the general public, by such means as are not arbitrary or unreasonable. Such regulations are not interferences with liberty of contract beyond the police power of the State to protect the public and promote the general welfare.

The statute of Missouri of June 8, 1909, to prevent fraud in the purchase and sale of grain and other commodities and which prohibits arbitrary deductions from actual weight or measure thereof under custom or rules of boards of trade, is a valid exercise of the police power of the State and is not unconstitutional as a deprivation of property, interference with liberty of contract, or denial of equal protection of the law.

227 Missouri, 617, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the constitutionality of an act of the State of Missouri to prevent fraud in the purchase and sale of grain and other commodities, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Frank Hagerman, with whom Mr. Kimbrough Stone was on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

The act denies to plaintiff in error the right to contract. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, freedom of contract is guaranteed. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 390; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 53; Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 172.

While freedom of contract must yield to the police

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

219 U.S.

power of the State, there is a limit to the exercise of that power. In the end the court must decide the question. Mugler v. Kansas City, 123 U. S. 623, 661; State v. Tie Co., 181 Missouri, 536, 559; State v. Cantwell, 179 Missouri, 245, 263; State v. Loomis, 115 Missouri, 307, 316. There must be some reasonable grounds for the legislative interference, or it cannot be justified. Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wisconsin, 193, 203; State v. Redmon, 134 Wisconsin, 89, 110; Harding v. People, 160 Illinois, 459.

On the ground of unreasonable interference with the liberty of contract, the courts have condemned legislative acts prescribing maximum hours of labor, Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45; making unlawful contracts of employment forbidding membership in labor unions, State v. Julow, 129 Missouri, 163; People v. Marcys, 189 N. Y. 257; Gillespie v. People, 188 Illinois, 176; Coffeyville B. & T. Co. v. Perry, 69 Kansas, 297; State v. Bateman, 7 Ohio N. P. 487; Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wisconsin, 530; Goldfield Mines Co. v. Miners' Union, 159 Fed. Rep. 500; requiring stipulations in contracts for public work that none but union labor be employed, Atlanta v. Stein, 111 Georgia, 789; Marshall Co. v. Nashville, 109 Tennessee, 495; Adams v. Brennan, 177 Illinois, 194; Holden v. Alton, 179 Illinois, 318; Fiske v. People, 188 Illinois, 206; Furniture Co. v. Toole, 26 Montana, 22; Lewis v. Board of Education, 139 Michigan, 306; Rodgers v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 59; making it criminal to discharge an employé because he is a member of a labor organization, Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161; requiring contractors to pay certain minimum wages, Street v. Electrical Supply Co., 160 Indiana, 338; State v. Norton, 5 Ohio N. P. 183; regulating the time of payment of wages in defiance of contract, Leep v. Railway Co., 58 Arkansas, 407; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Illinois, 66; Railway Co. v. Wilson (Tex.), 19 S. W. Rep. 910; Republic I. & S. Co. v. State, 160 Indiana, 379; Commonwealth v.

219 U. S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

Isenburg, 4 Pa. Dist. R. 579; Bauer v. Reynolds, 3 Pa. Dist. R. 502; prohibiting payment of laborers otherwise than in money, State v. Loomis, 115 Missouri, 307; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431; State v. Hann, 61 Kansas, 146; Jordan v. State, 51 Tex. Crim. 531; Avent Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 96 Kentucky, 218; prohibiting mine owners from dealing in supplies, provisions, etc., Froer v. People, 141 Illinois, 171; forbidding sale of supplies to employés at greater price than to others, State v. Fire Creek Co., 33 W. Va. 118; forbidding deduction of wages because of defective work, Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Massachusetts, 117; or for any reason except for actual cash advanced, Kellyville Coal Co. v. Harrier, 207 Illinois, 624; requiring employers to give discharged employés written reasons for discharge, Wallace v. Railway Co., 94 Georgia, 732; New York Ry. Co. v. Schaffer, 65 Oh. St. 414; requiring a day's labor to consist of eight hours, Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Nebraska, 127; requiring sleeping car companies, upon request of occupant of lower berth, to raise upper berth if not occupied, State v. Redmon, 134 Wisconsin, 89, 110; requiring all contractors for erection of buildings to give bond for benefit of material men, Montague & Co. v. Furness, 145 California, 205; forbidding cigar making in tenement houses, In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98; regulating weight of loaves of bread, Buffalo v. Collins Baking Co., 39 App. Div. (N. Y.) 432; giving state board power to refuse or grant nurseryman's license as it might think applicant financially responsible or not, Hawley v. Nelson (S. D.), 115 N. W. Rep. 93; requiring certain bonds to be secured by surety companies as sureties, McKell v. Robins, 71 Ohio, 273; prohibiting location of laundry without consent of certain property owners, Ex parte Sing Lee, 96 California, 354; Laundry Ordinance Case, 13 Fed. Rep. 229; or unless permitted by board of supervisors, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 373; requiring production of cerVOL. CCXIX-18