applied by the Mississippi court in this case is unobjectionable. It is not an unreasonable inference that a derailment of railway cars is due to some negligence, either in construction or maintenance of the track or trains, or some carelessness in operation.

From the foregoing considerations it must be obvious that the application of the act to injuries resulting from "the running of locomotives and cars," is not an arbitrary classification, but one resting upon considerations of public policy arising out of the character of the business. Judgment affirmed.

HERENCIA v. GUZMAN.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR PORTO RICO.

No. 46. Submitted November 29, 1910.-Decided December 19, 1910.

It is not the province of this court on writ of error to reverse if dissatisfied with the verdict of the jury; if there was evidence proper for the consideration of the jury, objection that the verdict was against the weight of evidence or that excessive damages were allowed cannot be considered.

An amendment to a bill of exceptions, after bond on appeal had been given and approved, so as to make the record conform to the fact as to the conditions under which certain testimony introduced by plaintiff in error on the trial was given, held not error, as it was not unjustified or objected to and the exception related simply to the inclusion of such testimony in the record.

A judgment cannot be set aside on an exception to the refusal of the trial court to allow an expert to testify where the record does not show what testimony the witness was expected to give or that he was qualified to give any.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

219 U. S.

Opinion of the Court.

Mr. Willis Sweet for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Frederick L. Cornwell for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the court.

This action was brought in the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from the fall of a portion of the building owned by the plaintiff in error which it was alleged he had negligently allowed to remain in a dangerous condition. It was tried by a jury who gave a verdict against plaintiff in error for the sum of $9,000. Judgment was entered accordingly and the case comes here on writ of error.

The argument on behalf of the plaintiff in error proceeds upon the assumption that this court may review the evidence as to negligence and as to the damages recoverable, and may reverse the judgment if the court is dissatisfied with the findings of the jury. This, however, is not the province of the court upon writ of error. As there was evidence proper for the consideration of the jury the objection that the verdict was against the weight of evidence or that the damages allowed were excessive cannot be considered. Express Company v. Ware, 20 Wall. 543; New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company v. Winter's Administrator, 143 U. S. 60, 75; Lincoln v. Power, 151 U. S. 436-438; Humes v. United States, 170 U. S. 210.

Nor was any exception taken by the plaintiff in error to the instructions which the trial court gave to the jury. The only questions which are properly before us for review are as to certain rulings upon the admissibility of testimony.

Error is assigned in admitting the testimony of a physician, Dr. Joaquin Martinez Guasp, "as correct," and it is further urged that the court "erred in changing the record

relative thereto after the bond on appeal had been given and approved." It appears that the witness was appointed by the court to examine the plaintiff below in order to ascertain his condition at the time of the trial, and that this action was taken with the consent of the counsel for the defendant (the plaintiff in error). The examination was made and the witness subsequently testified without objection. In fact, the counsel for the plaintiff in error conducted the direct examination, and there was no cross-examination. No question, therefore, is presented with respect to the admissibility of this testimony. The bill of exceptions was amended so as to show that the court stated, when the testimony was introduced, not only that the physician's examination had been made by consent, but that counsel had "agreed that his evidence should be considered as correct." This amendment, as the District Judge states, was to conform the record to the fact. Assuming, as we must, that the statement was made by the court, it does not appear that it was unjustified or that it was objected to. The exception of the plaintiff in error is simply to its inclusion in the record.

It is further insisted that the court erred in refusing to allow one Dr. Gonzalez to testify. As to this the record merely sets forth that counsel "offered to present the testimony of one Dr. Gonzalez, as an expert, which testimony is not allowed by the court and to which ruling of the court counsel for defendant thereupon noted an exception." Manifestly the judgment cannot be set aside because of this ruling, for it does not appear what testimony the witness was expected to give, or that he was qualified to give any.

We have examined the other rulings of which plaintiff in error complains, with respect to the striking out of certain testimony, and we find no error.

Judgment affirmed.

219 U.S.

Syllabus.

AMERICAN LAND COMPANY v. ZEISS.

CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

No. 230. Argued October 14, 17, 1910.—Decided January 3, 1911.

The general welfare of society is involved in the security and registry of titles to real estate, and those subjects are within the police power of the State.

A State, in the exercise of its inherent power to legislate in regard to title to the soil within its confines, may, without violating the Federal Constitution, require parties owning and in possession of land to establish title by judicial proceedings before properly constituted tribunals, and this power extends to non-resident owners of land who may be brought before such tribunals by publication.

A State possesses, and, after such a disaster to a community as befell San Francisco, California, by fire and earthquake in 1906, in which nearly all the public records of registered titles to real estate were destroyed, may exercise, the power to remedy the confusion and uncertainty arising from the catastrophe.

Undisclosed and unknown claimants are as dangerous to the stability of titles to real estate as other classes, and they are not deprived of their property without due process of law if compelled to establish their titles by judicial proceeding before a properly constituted tribunal on adequate published notice, if given an opportunity to be heard and properly protected in case of fraud.

A state statute, passed after such a catastrophe as visited San Francisco in 1906 for the purpose of reëstablishing titles to real estate, which permits an action for that purpose to be brought by parties who are themselves or by those holding under them, in actual and peaceable possession of the property described in the summons, and which requires the plaintiff to make affidavit before the summons is issued that he does not know and has never been informed of any adverse claimants not named in the summons, and also requires summons to be published at least once a week for two months, posted on each parcel of the property, and to be recorded and prop

Statement of the Case.

219 U. S.

erly indexed in the recorder's office, and served upon all claimants whose names and whereabouts could be ascertained, gives an adequate opportunity to all persons interested in the property to establish their rights and does not deprive unknown claimants of their property without due process of law.

The Fourteenth Amendment does not operate to deprive the States of their lawful power; the due process clause of that Amendment only restrains such exertions of power as are so unreasonable and unjust as to impair or destroy fundamental rights and, therefore, not really within lawful power of the State.

This court in determining the constitutionality of a state statute is bound by the construction given to it by the highest court of the State and will treat it as exacting whatever the state court has declared that it exacts either expressly or by implication.

In determining the constitutionality of a state statute under the due process clause, the criterion is not whether any injury to an individual is possible, but whether the requirements as to notice and opportunity to protect property rights affected are just and reasonable.

It being within the power of the State to determine how title to real estate shall be proved, it is also within the legislative competency of that State to establish the method of procedure.

Due process of law requires that there shall be jurisdiction of, and notice to, the parties, and opportunity to be heard; and, subject to these conditions, the State has power to regulate procedure. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78.

The California statute, c. 59, of June 16, 1906, to establish titles in case of loss of public records, passed after the earthquake and fire of April, 1906, as construed by the highest state court, is within the legislative power of the State, provides adequate notice and protection to unknown claimants, affords opportunity to be heard and is not unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment as depriving unknown claimants of their property without due process of law.

As a result of the conditions caused in San Francisco by the great calamity of earthquake and fire, which befell that city in April, 1906, an extraordinary session of the legislature of California was convoked. One reason stated for the call was the necessity of providing for restoring the record title to land in San Francisco. An act to ac