statute in question is not directed against interstate commerce. Nor is it within the meaning of the Constitution a regulation of commerce, although it controls, in some degree, the conduct of those engaged in such commerce. So far as it may affect interstate commerce, it is to be regarded as legislation in aid of commerce and enacted under the power remaining with the State to regulate the relative rights and duties of all persons and corporations within the limits. Until displaced by such national legislation as Congress may rightfully establish under its power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, the validity of the statute, so far as the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States is concerned, cannot be questioned." It was also contended that the statute, if enforced according to its terms, would make rapid transportation difficult, if not impossible, and that to compel an interstate train to conform to its provisions would be a wholly unnecessary burden on interstate passengers. After observing that possible inconveniences could not affect the question of the power in each State to make such regulations for the safety of passengers on interstate trains as in the judgment of the State, all things considered, were reasonable, appropriate or necessary, this court said (165 U. S. 633): "Inconveniences of this character cannot be avoided so long as each State has plenary authority within its territorial limits to provide for the safety of the public, according to its own views of necessity and public policy and so long as Congress deems it wise not to establish regulations on the subject that would displace any inconsistent regulations of the State covering the same ground." In reference to the contention that the statute denied the equal protection of the laws, as prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the court said (p. 633): "This contention is based upon that clause of the statute declaring that it shall not apply to railroads less than fifty 219 U. S. Opinion of the Court. miles in length. No doubt the main object of the statute was to provide for the safety of passengers traveling on what are commonly called trunk or through lines, connecting distant or populous parts of the country, and on which the perils incident to traveling are greater than on short, local lines. But, as suggested in argument, a road only fifty miles in length would seldom have a sleeping car attached to its trains; and passengers traveling on roads of that kind do not have the apprehension ordinarily felt by passengers on trains regularly carrying sleeping cars or having many passenger coaches, on account of the burning of cars in case of their derailment or in case of collision. In any event, there is no such discrimination against companies having more than fifty miles of road as to justify the contention that there had been a denial to the companies named in the act of the equal protection of the laws. The statute is uniform in its operation upon all railroad companies doing business in the State of the class to which it is made applicable." The principles announced in the above cases require an affirmance of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas. It is not too much to say that the State was under an obligation to establish such regulations as were necessary or reasonable for the safety of all engaged in business or domiciled within its limits. Beyond doubt, passengers on interstate carriers while within Arkansas are as fully entitled to the benefits of valid local laws enacted for the public safety as are citizens of the State. Local statutes directed to such an end have their source in the power of the State, never surrendered, of caring for the public safety of all within its jurisdiction; and the validity under the Constitution of the United States of such statutes is not to be questioned in a Federal court unless they are clearly inconsistent with some power granted to the General Government or with some right secured by that instrument or unless they are purely arbitrary in their VOL. CCXIX-30 Opinion of the Court. 219 U.S. nature. The statute here involved is not in any proper sense a regulation of interstate commerce nor does it deny the equal protection of the laws. Upon its face, it must be taken as not directed against interstate commerce, but as having been enacted in aid, not in obstruction, of such commerce and for the protection of those engaged in such commerce. Under the evidence, there is admittedly some room for controversy as to whether the statute is or was necessary; but it cannot be said that it is so unreasonable as to justify the court in adjudging that it is merely an arbitrary exercise of power and not germane to the objects which evidently the state legislature had in view. It is a means employed by the State to accomplish an object which it is entitled to accomplish, and such means, even if deemed unwise, are not to be condemned or disregarded by the courts, if they have a real relation to that object. And the statute being applicable alike to all belonging to the same class, there is no basis for the contention that there has been a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Undoubtedly, Congress in its discretion, may take entire charge of the whole subject of the equipment of interstate cars, and establish such regulations as are necessary and proper for the protection of those engaged in interstate commerce. But it has not done so in respect of the number of employés to whom may be committed the actual management of interstate trains of any kind. It has not established any regulations on that subject, and until it does the statutes of the State, not in their nature arbitrary, and which really relate to the rights and duties of all within the jurisdiction, must control. This principle has been firmly established, and is a most wholesome one under our systems of government, Federal and state. In addition to the cases above cited, Mobile Co. v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691; G., C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98; W. U. Tel. Co. v. James, 162 U. S. 656; Chicago &c. R. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 27; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137; and M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, may be consulted. Judgment affirmed. LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY v. MOTTLEY. ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY. No. 246. Submitted January 9, 1911.-Decided February 20, 1911. The intent of Congress is to be gathered from the words of the act according to their ordinary acceptation, and the act should be construed in the light of circumstances existing at the time it was passed. Personal hardships cannot be considered, nor can the court mold the statute to meet its views of justice in a particular case. The court must have regard to all the words used by Congress in a statute and give effect to them as far as possible; and the introduction of a new word into a statute indicates an intent to cure a defect in, and suppress an evil not covered by, the former law. The prohibition of the act of February 4, 1887, c. 104, § 2, 24 Stat. 379, as amended by the act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, against a carrier charging a different compensation from that specified in its published tariff extends to the granting of interstate transportation by carriers as compensation for injuries, services, advertising or property; the statute means that transportation shall be paid for by all alike and only in cash. The purpose of Congress in enacting the amendatory act of June 29, 1906, was to cut up by the roots every form of discrimination in rates, not specially excepted, and the act applied to existing contracts and rendered those which were discriminatory illegal. The court cannot on equitable grounds add an exception to the classes to which a statute clearly applies if Congress forbears to do so. The power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States and with foreign nations is complete and unrestricted except by limitations in the Constitution itself, and extends to rendering impossible Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 219 U. S. the enforcement by suit of contracts between carriers and shippers although valid when made. The power of Congress to act in regard to matters delegated to it is not hampered by contracts made in regard to such matters by individuals; but contracts of that nature are made subject to the possibility that even if valid when made Congress may by exercising its power render them invalid. An act of Congress rendering contracts in regard to interstate commerce invalid does not infringe the constitutional liberty of the citizen to make contracts; and an act, otherwise constitutional, is not unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment, as taking private property without compensation, because it invalidates contracts between individuals which conflict with the public policy declared in the act. After the enactment of the act of June 29, 1906, it was unlawful for a carrier to issue interstate transportation in pursuance of a prior existing contract to do so as compensation for injuries received, and, even though valid when made, such a contract cannot now be enforced against the carrier by suit. 133 Kentucky, 652, reversed. THE facts, which involve the construction of provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act relating to payment of fares on railways, are stated in the opinion. Mr. Henry L. Stone for plaintiff in error: The object of the act of June 29, 1906, was to prevent discrimination, and to place all passengers and shippers on the same level, with equal rights and privileges. While Congress may not pass an act for the purpose of impairing the obligation of specific contracts, it may in the due exercise of the powers expressly conferred upon it, incidentally do so. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 550; Bullard v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 10 Montana, 168. See also 8 Cyc. 997; Newport News Co. v. McDonald Brick Co., 109 Kentucky, 408; Fitzgerald v. Construction Co., 59 N. W. Rep. 862; Southern Wire Co. v. St. Louis Bridge Co., 38 Mo. App. 191; Fitzgerald v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co. (Vt.), 22 Atl. Rep. 76, 77. These foregoing decisions |