the certificate on its face indicates that the court below was not in a state of mind which required the instruction of this court, but was merely desirous of provoking a direct decision by this court, to avoid the delay and the public inconvenience which otherwise might result. Second, because the certificate is so broad as simply to refer the whole case to this court for decision instead of presenting definite propositions of law for solution. While it may be that these suggestions find possible support, considering the record in a detached way, we think when the certificate is considered as a whole and the subject with which it deals is properly weighed the suggestions are without merit. We therefore pass to a consideration of the questions propounded.

It is apparent that the substantial considerations involved in the questións certified are embraced in the following, a, the authority of the State to deal with the subject with which the statute is concerned; b, upon the hypothesis of the existence of power, the sufficiency of the safeguards provided in the statute; c, upon the like hypothesis the adequacy of the proceedings had in the particular cause with which the certificate deals. We shall consider these subjects separately.

As to the power of the State.

The conditions which led to the legislation in question were stated by the Supreme Court of California in Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, Judge, 150 California, 289, 305. The court said:

"It is also a matter of common knowledge that in the city and county of San Francisco, at least, if not in other counties, the disaster of April last worked so great a destruction of the public records as to make it impossible to trace any title with completeness of certainty. That some provision was necessary to enable the holders and owners of real estate in this city to secure to themselves such evidence of title as would enable them, not only to

defend their possession, but to enjoy and exercise the equally important right of disposition, is clear."

As it is indisputable that the general welfare of society is involved in the security of the titles to real estate and in the public registry of such titles, it is obvious that the power to legislate as to such subjects inheres in the very nature of government. This being true, it follows that government possesses the power to remedy the confusion and uncertainty as to registered titles arising from a disaster like that described by the court below. We might well pursue no further the subject of the power of the State to enact the law in question, and thus leave its authority to depend upon the demonstration necessarily resulting from the obvious considerations just stated. As, however, the question of power is intimately interwoven with the sufficiency of the procedure adopted, and as a clear comprehension of the scope of the power will serve to elucidate the question of procedure, we shall briefly refer to some of the leading cases by which the elementary doctrine of power over the subject of titles to real estate and the application of that doctrine to a case like the one in hand is settled beyond question. That a State has the power, generally speaking, to provide for and protect individual rights to the soil within its confines and declare what shall form a cloud on the title to such soil was recognized in Clark v. Smith, 13. Pet. 195. So, also, it is conclusively established that when the public interests demand the law may require even a party in actual possession of land and claiming a perfect title to appear before a properly constituted tribunal and establish that title by a judicial proceeding. Such was the method employed by the United States in settling as between itself and claimants under Mexican grants the title to property in California. Barker v. Harvey, 181 U. S. 481; Mitchell v. Furman, 180 U. S. 402; Botiller v. Dominguez. 130 U. S. 238; More v. Steinbach, 127 U. S. 70.

219 U.S.

Opinion of the Court.

The question of what authority a State possesses over titles to real estate, and what jurisdiction over the subject it may confer upon its courts, received much consideration in Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316. It was there held that, even as to ordinary controversies respecting title to land arising between rival claimants, the State possessed the power to provide for the adjudication of titles to real estate not only as against residents, but as against non-residents, who might be brought into court by publication. In the course of the opinion the court said (p. 320):

"It [the State] has control over property within its limits; and the condition of ownership of real estate therein, whether the owner be stranger or citizen, is subject to its rules concerning the holding, the transfer, liability to obligations, private or public, and the modes of establishing titles thereto. It cannot bring the person of a non-resident within its limits-its process goes not out beyond its borders-but it may determine the extent of his title to real estate within its limits; and for the purpose of such determination may provide any reasonable, methods of imparting notice. The well-being of every community requires that the title to real estate therein shall be secure, and that there be convenient and certain methods of determining any unsettled questions respecting it. The duty of accomplishing this is local in its nature; it is not a matter of national concern or vested in the general government; it remains with the State; and as this duty is one of the State, the manner of discharging it must be determined by the State, and no proceeding which it provides can be declared invalid, unless it conflict with some special inhibitions of the Constitution, or against natural justice."

Manifestly, under circumstances like those here presented, the principle applies with equal force in the case of unknown claimants. Undisclosed and unknown claim

ants are, to say the least, as dangerous to the stability of titles as other classes. This principle received recognition and was applied in Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256, where it was held to be competent for a State to make provision for promptly ascertaining, by appropriate judicial proceedings, who has succeeded to property upon the death of a person leaving such property within the State. It was said (p. 275):

"If such proceedings are had, after actual notice by service of summons to all known claimants, and constructive notice by publication to all possible claimants who are unknown, the final determination of the right of succession, either among private persons, as in the ordinary administration of estates, or between all persons and the State, as by inquest of office or similar process to determine whether the estate has escheated to the public, is due process of law; and a statute providing for such proceedings and determination does not impair the obligation of any contract contained in the grant under which the former owner held, whether that grant was from the State or from a private person."

The application of the doctrine of governmental power, as just stated, to a condition like the one here in question was aptly pointed out by the Supreme Court of Illinois in Bertrand v. Taylor, 87 Illinois, 235, where, in considering the Illinois Burnt Record Act, the court said:

"It was demanded as a matter of safety in a great emergency. It was not calculated to take any reasonable being by surprise. It was known throughout the civilized world that a large part of the city of Chicago had been destroyed by fire and that the records of courts and the records of deeds were all destroyed. This naturally commanded the attention of all reasonable persons everywhere, and called upon them to attend and see what means would be adopted to mitigate the evils and dangers incident to the destruction. This legislation was not done

in a corner, but before the observation of a civilized world. We cannot doubt the power of the general assembly to pass the act."

The Supreme Court of California, in the Kerrigan case, supra, addressing itself to the same subject, pertinently observed (pp. 313, 314):

'Applying the principles which have led the courts in cases like Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, and Perkins v. Wakeham, 86 California, 580, to sustain judgments quieting titles against non-residents upon substituted service, why should not the legislature have power to give similar effect to such judgments against unknown claimants where the notice is reasonably full and complete? The validity of such judgments against known residents is based upon the ground that the State has power to provide for the determination of titles to real estate within its borders, and that, as against non-resident defendants or others, who cannot be served in the State, a substituted service is permissible, as being the only service possible. These grounds apply with equal force to unknown claimants. The power of the State as to titles should not be limited to settling them as against persons named. In order to exercise this power to its fullest extent, it is necessary that it should be made to operate on all interests, known and unknown. As was said by Holmes, C. J., in Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Massachusetts, 71, in speaking of a statute which, in the particular under discussion, was similar to ours: 'If it does not satisfy the Constitution, a judicial proceeding to clear titles against all the world hardly is possible; for the very meaning of such a proceeding is to get rid of unknown as well as known claimants-indeed, certainty against the unknown may be said to be its chief end-and unknown claimants cannot be dealt with by personal service upon the claimant.'"

The power exerted by the act being then clearly within