CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
1. Commerce clause; power of United States under.
The United States is a Government of limited and delegated powers
but in respect to the powers delegated, including that to regulate
commerce between the States, the power is absolute except as
limited by other provisions of the Constitution. Atlantic Coast
Line R. R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 186.
2. Commerce clause; conflict of state regulation of sales of commodities
moving in interstate commerce.
The fact that commodities in course of transportation in interstate
commerce are dealt in at certain places does not render a state
police statute regulating sales, and imposing stamp tax on records
of transactions thereat, which is otherwise valid, an unconstitu-
tional regulation of interstate commerce. (Hatch v. Reardon,
204 U. S. 502.) Brodnax v. Missouri, 285.
3. Commerce; burden on; effect of state statute regulating receipt of de-
posits of money which may move to other States or foreign countries.
A state statute regulating the receipt of deposits of money is not a
burden on, or regulation of, interstate or foreign commerce sim-
ply because such deposits are likely to be transmitted to other
States.or foreign countries; the deposit is an independent trans-
action preceding the transmission. Engel v. O'Malley, 128.
See Supra, 26;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 8, 9.
4. Contracts; freedom of contract defined.
Freedom of contract is a qualified and not an absolute right. There is
no absolute freedom to contract as one chooses. Liberty implies
the absence of arbitrary restraint-not immunity from reason-
able regulations. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. McGuire, 549.
5. Contract; liberty of; effect to impair, of state statute prohibiting limita-
tion of liability for torts.
A State has power to prohibit contracts limiting liability for injuries
made in advance of the injury received, and to provide that the
subsequent acceptance of benefits under such contracts shall not
constitute satisfaction of the claim for injuries received after the
contract. Such a statute does not impair the liberty of con-
tract guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment; and so held as
to the Iowa statute relative to employés of railway companies.
Ib.
6. Contracts; legislative power to prohibit.
Where the legislature has power to establish a regulation, it has also
power to prohibit contracts in derogation of such regulation. Ib.
7. Contract impairment; effect of act of Congress rendering contracts
invalid.
An act of Congress rendering contracts in regard to interstate com-
merce invalid does not infringe the constitutional liberty of the
citizen to make contracts; and an act, otherwise constitutional, is
not unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment, as taking
private property without compensation, because it invalidates
contracts between individuals which conflict with the public
policy declared in the act. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Mottley,
467.
8. Contract impairment; corporate charter subject to reserved powers of
alteration and repeal; when impaired.
The charter of a corporation which is subject to the usual reserved
powers to alter or repeal is not impaired unless the subsequent
statute deprives it of property without due process of law. Noble
State Bank v. Haskell, 104. See Infra, 66, 67, 81, 82, 83.
9. Due process of law; elements of.
Due process of law requires that there shall be jurisdiction of, and no-
tice to, the parties, and opportunity to be heard; and, subject to
these conditions, the State has power to regulate procedure.
(Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78.) Am. Land Co. v. Zeiss, 47.
10. Due process of law; considerations in determining validity of state
statute under the clause..
In determining the constitutionality of a state statute under the due
process clause, the criterion is not whether any injury to an in-
dividual is possible, but whether the requirements as to notice
and opportunity to protect property rights affected are just and
reasonable.
11. Due process of law; sufficiency of procedure to establish title to real
estate as against unknown claimants.
A state statute, passed after such a catastrophe as visited San Fran-
cisco in 1906 for the purpose of reëstablishing titles to real estate,
which permits an action for that purpose to be brought by parties
who are themselves or by those holding under them, in actual and
peaceable possession of the property described in the summons,
and which requires the plaintiff to make affidavit before the sum-
mons is issued that he does not know and has never been informed
of any adverse claimants not named in the summons, and also
requires summons to be published at least once a week for two
months, posted on each parcel of the property, and to be recorded
and properly indexed in the recorder's office, and served upon all
claimants whose names and whereabouts could be ascertained,
gives an adequate opportunity to all persons interested in the
property to establish their rights and does not deprive unknown
claimants of their property without due process of law. Ib.
12. Due process of law; effect on undisclosed claimants of real estate of
requirement as to establishing title after notice by publication.
Undisclosed and unknown claimants are as dangerous to the stability
of titles to real estate as other classes, and they are not deprived
of their property without due process of law if compelled to estab-
lish their titles by judicial proceeding before a properly con-
stituted tribunal on adequate published notice, if given an op-
portunity to be heard and properly protected in case of fraud. Ib.
13. Due process of law; validity of California statute of June 16, 1906,
for establishment of titles to real estate.
The California statute, c. 59, of June 16, 1906, to establish titles in
case of loss of public records, passed after the earthquake and
fire of April, 1906, as construed by the highest state court, is
within the legislative power of the State, provides adequate no-
tice and protection to unknown claimants, affords opportunity to
be heard and is not unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment as depriving unknown claimants of their prop-
erty without due process of law. Ib.
14. Due process of law; equal protection of the law; validity of legislation
changing rules of evidence.
Legislation providing that proof of one fact shall constitute prima facie
evidence of the main fact is within the general power of govern-
ment to enact rules of evidence; and neither due process of law
nor equal protection of the law is denied if there is a rational
connection between the fact and the ultimate fact presumed, and
the party affected is afforded reasonable opportunity to submit to
the jury all the facts on the issue. Mobile R. R. v. Turnipseed, 35.
15. Due process of law; equal protection of the law; validity of law of
Mississippi relative to prima facie evidence of negligence by railroad..
It is not an unreasonable inference that a derailment of railway cars is
due to negligence in construction, maintenance or operation of the
track or of the train, and the provisions of § 1985 of the Mississippi
Code of 1906, making proof if injury inflicted by the running of
cars or locomotives of a railway company prima facie evidence of
negligence on the part of servants of the company, does not de-
prive the companies of their property without due process of law
or deny to them the equal protection of the law. Such a statute
in its operation only supplies an inference of liability in the ab-
sence of other evidence contradicting such inference. Ib.
16. Due process of law; when statutory presumption raised by prima
facie evidence affords.
While States may, without denying due process of law, enact that
proof of one fact shall be prima facie evidence of the main fact in
issue, the inference must not be purely arbitrary; there must be
rational relation between the two facts, and the accused must
have proper opportunity to submit all the facts bearing on the
issue. Bailey v. Alabama, 219.
17. Due process of law; Fourteenth Amendment and police power of States.
The broad words of the Fourteenth Amendment are not to be pushed
to a drily logical extreme, and the courts will be slow to strike
down an unconstitutional legislation of the States enacted under
the police power. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 104.
18. Due process and equal protection of the law; state regulation of bank-
ing business; classification within police power.
Protection of banking business, especially that transacted in small
amounts (Noble State Bank v. Haskell, ante, p. 104), and with poor
and ignorant immigrants on first arrival in this country is within
the police power of the State; and a state statute imposing special
and proper restrictions on those engaging in that class of banking
is not unconstitutional under the due process or equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it excepts other
banks and bankers engaged in other classes of banking business
or conducting them under other conditions. Engel v. O'Malley,
128.
19. Due process of law; summary procedure not necessarily denial of.
Summary procedure in the assessment and collection of taxes, if not
arbitrary or unequal, and which allows opportunity to be heard
does not deny the property owner due process of law simply be-
cause it is summary. Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 140.
20. Due process of law; forfeiture of land for non-compliance with statute
relative to taxation, not denial of.
A state statute requiring owners to register lands and pay taxes thereon
but which only forfeits them for non-compliance therewith after
judicial proceeding and opportunity to be heard, does not deny
the property owner due process of law. Ib.
21. Due process of law; limitation of actions not denial of; right of State
to limit period for registration of land.
A time not unreasonably short for beginning actions, fixed, in view
of particular conditions, by the legislature, does not deny due
process of law, Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628; and a state statute
of limitations as to actions between individuals cannot affect the
right of the State to determine by statute a reasonable period
within which property owners must register their land, provisions
being made for notice and opportunity to be heard. Ib.
22. Due process of law; opportunity to be heard; sufficiency of.
Where the state court has held that although a sale may be ordered of
an entire tract there is opportunity, if less than the whole is to be
sold, to be heard, and have an ascertainment of the parts to be
sold, the property owner is not deprived of his property without
due process of law. Ib.
23. Due process of law; effect to deny, as to purchaser of real estate after
delinquency, of exercise by State of power of taxation.
The doctrine of innocent purchasers does not apply against the power
of the State to assess and collect back taxes and provide for
registration of titles in favor of one purchasing after delinquencies;
such a purchaser is not deprived of his property without due proc-
ess of law, because the State exercises its rights in a constitutional
manner. (Citizens' National Bank v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 443.) Ib.
24. Due process of law; legislation fixing liability of carriers; effect of
Carmack amendment to Interstate Commerce Act to deny.
Congress has power to prohibit a carrier engaged in interstate com-
merce from limiting by contract its liability beyond its own line,
and the Carmack amendment of January 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34
Stat. 584, 595, to § 20 of the Interstate Commerce Act, making
such carriers liable for loss or damage to merchandise received for
interstate transportation beyond their own lines, notwithstanding
any contract of exemption in the bill of lading, is a valid exercise
of such power, not in conflict with the due process provision of the
Fifth Amendment. Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 186.
25. Due process of law; liberty of contract secured by.
Although the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment se-
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