cused are within the definition, and if the court has jurisdiction
its judgment cannot be reviewed on habeas corpus. Ib.

3. Functions of writ; not available to review action of police court having
jurisdiction of offense.

The police court of the District of Columbia has jurisdiction to try
persons charged on information of violating § 1177 of the Re-
vised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia prohibiting
engaging in gift enterprises, and the judgment of that court de-
termining that the acts of accused fell within the definition of
gift enterprise is not reviewable on habeas corpus proceedings. Ib.

HAWAII.

See APPEAL AND ERROR;
BONDS, 6;

LOCAL LAW.

HEALTH.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 79, 80.

HOMICIDE.

See EVIDENCE.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See EVIDENCE.

IMMIGRANTS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 18.

IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT OBLIGATION.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7, 8, 66, 67.

INJUNCTION.

1. Appeals; effect on continuance of injunction.

The force and effect of a decree dismissing a bill and discharging an
injunction is neither suspended nor annulled as a mere conse
quence of an appeal to this court, even if supersedeas is allowed;
but the Circuit Court has power to continue an injunction during
such an appeal by virtue of its inherent equity power. Equity
Rule 93. Merrimack River Savings Bank v. Clay Center, 527.

2. Appeals; effect of violation of injunction pending appeal as contempt
of court.

While the Circuit Court has not only the power to continue an in-

junction in order to preserve the status quo pending an appeal but
to take cognizance of violations of such injunction, it does not
follow that violating the injunction is not also contempt of appel-
late jurisdiction of this court; that question not now decided. Ib.
3. Same.

Irrespective of an actual injunction order, the willful destruction or
removal beyond the reach of this court of the subject-matter of
litigation pending an appeal to this court is a contempt of the
appellate jurisdiction of this court; and this is so even though it
may also be a violation of the injunction below. Ib.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 5.

Goods actually destined for export are necessarily in interstate, as
well as in foreign, commerce, when they actually start in the
course of transportation to another State or are delivered to a
carrier for transportation, Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 577; this is the
same whether the goods are shipped on through bills of lading
or on an initial bill only to the terminal within the same State
where they are to be delivered to a carrier for the foreign destina-
tion. Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm., 498.
2. Congress; power to regulate; impairment of contract obligation.
The power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States and
with foreign nations is complete and unrestricted except by
limitations in the Constitution itself, and extends to rendering
impossible the enforcement by suit of contracts between carriers
and shippers although valid when made. Louisville & Nashville
R. R. Co. v. Mottley, 467.

3. Act of June 29, 1906; intent of Congress; contracts within applica-
tion of.

The purpose of Congress in enacting the amendatory act of June 29,

1906, was to cut up by the roots every form of discrimination in
rates, not specially excepted, and the act applied to existing con-
tracts and rendered those which were discriminatory illegal. Ib.

4. Compensation which carrier may receive for transportation.
The prohibition of the act of February 4, 1887, c. 104, § 2, 24 Stat.
379, as amended by the act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat.
584, against a carrier charging a different compensation from that
specified in its published tariff extends to the granting of inter-
state transportation by carriers as compensation for injuries,
services,' advertising or property; the statute means that trans-
portation shall be paid for by all alike and only in cash. Ib.

5. Compensation prescribed by act of June 29, 1906. Transportation
under contract, valid when made, invalid under act.

After the enactment of the act of June 29, 1906, it was unlawful for a
carrier to issue interstate transportation in pursuance of a prior
existing contract to do so as compensation for injuries received,
and, even though valid when made, such a contract cannot now
be enforced against the carrier by suit. Ib.

6. Compensation prescribed by act of June 29, 1906; exchange of trans-
portation for advertising prohibited.

Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Mottley, ante, p. 467, fol-
lowed to effect that under the act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34
Stat. 584, amending the act of February 4, 1887, c. 104, § 2, 24
Stat. 379, a carrier cannot accept any compensation other than
cash for interstate transportation, and the delivery of such trans-
portation in exchange for advertising is a violation of the act;
and it is no defense that such a transaction is permitted by a
state statute. Chicago, Ind. & L. Ry. Co. v. United States, 486.

7. Interstate passengers' right to protection of local laws.
A State is under an obligation to establish necessary and reasonable
regulations for the safety of all engaged in business or domiciled
within its limits, and passengers on trains of interstate carriers
are entitled while within a State to the same protection of valid
local laws as are citizens of the State. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Arkansas, 453.

8. State regulation of railroads; validity of Arkansas "full crew" law.
A state statute prescribing a not unreasonable number for the crews

of freight trains is not an obstruction to, or burden on, interstate
commerce, but an aid thereto; and so held that the "full crew"

act of Arkansas is not unconstitutional under the commerce
clause of the Federal Constitution, Congress not having acted in
regard thereto. Ib.

9. State's right to regulate in absence of action by Congress.
While Congress may in its discretion take under its charge the sub-
ject of equipment of interstate trains, until it does so the States
may prescribe proper police regulations in regard thereto without
violating the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Ib.
See CARRIERS, 3;

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 7, 24, 26;

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 1.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT.

Attorney's fee authorized by § 8; application of provision.

Section 8 of the act to regulate commerce of February 4, 1887, c. 104,
24 Stat. 379, 382, does not authorize the taxing of an attorney's
fee in an action to recover damages for loss to goods which does
not result from a violation of the act. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.
Co. v. Riverside Mills, 186.

See CARRIERS, 4;

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 24.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

1. Preferences; traffic within jurisdiction of.

Where a means of interstate transportation is used to give one shipper
an undue preference, the traffic comes under the jurisdiction of
the Interstate Commerce Commission. Southern Pac. Terminal
Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm., 498.

2. Powers of; regulation of charges of terminal company.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has jurisdiction to regulate

charges of a terminal company which is part of a railroad and
steamship system and operates terminals such as those of the
Southern Pacific Terminal at Galveston, Texas. Ib.

3. Same; when terminal company deemed engaged in interstate com-

merce.

Verbal declarations cannot alter facts; and although the different
parts of a system may be separate as regards their charters, each
forms a link in the chain of transportation. One of the separate
links in a system controlled by a holding company such as the
Southern Pacific Company cannot escape regulation by the Com-
mission, because designated as a wharfage company; its property

is necessarily employed in the transportation of interstate com-

merce.

Ib.

4. Same; links in interstate commerce; arrangement amounting to dis-

crimination.

All shippers must be treated alike; and, under the facts in this case, an
arrangement, involving the lease of a wharf at a stipulated rental,
between the shipper and a corporation whose wharves and ter-
minal facilities thereon form links in a chain of interstate trans-
portation, amounts to an unlawful or undue preference under the
Interstate Commerce Act, the Commission having found the
facilities amounted to an absolute advantage to the favored
shipper, and that similar facilities could not be given to other
shippers. Ib.

5. Validity of order; enforcement of void order enjoined.

An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, made in conse-
quence of assumption of powers not possessed by it, is void, and
its enforcement should be restrained by the courts. Southern
Pacific Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm., 433.

6. Powers of; rate regulation; considerations governing.

The powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission do not extend to
regulating and controlling the policy of the owners of railroads in
fixing rates, and it cannot substitute for a just and reasonable
rate, a lower rate, either on the ground of policy or on the ground
that the railroad was by its former conduct estopped from charg-
ing a reasonable rate. Ib.

7. Powers of; rate regulation; considerations governing.

Where the shippers do not complain of a new and higher rate because
it is intrinsically an unreasonable one, but because, although rea-
sonable, the railroads are estopped to advance it on account of
having maintained the lower rate for a considerable period, it is
beyond the power of the Commission to direct a restoration of the
old rate; and so held in regard to the Willamette Valley lumber
rates. Ib.

8. Order restoring rate; presumption as to reasons for.

Where the Commission makes an order restoring a rate that shows on

its face it was made on the ground that the railroad was estopped
to increase it, the order will not be presumed to have been made
for the purpose of establishing a reasonable rate, if it excludes a
section from the benefit of the restored rate which amounts to a
discrimination against that section. Ib.