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tion's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (2d ed. 1984). Dr. Lehman examined appellant on August 11, 1986 and, in a report of the same date, disclosed findings upon examination and estimated appellant's impairment to be 50 percent but indicated that he did not use the AMA Guides in computing this percentage.

By letter dated November 20, 1986, the Office again requested Dr. Lehman to evaluate appellant for permanent impairment sustained due to tendinitis of her right thumb. Dr. Lehman examined appellant on December 15, 1986 and in a report dated December 16, 1986, disclosed findings upon examination and advised that appellant's condition was permanent and stationary but did not compute the percentage of her impairment. Dr. Lehman enclosed with his report a work restriction evaluation form of the same date in which he set forth appellant's work tolerance limitations and advised that appellant was capable of only working two hours a day and stated that she would benefit from vocational rehabilitation.

By letter dated January 6, 1987, the Office advised appellant that the medical reports indicated that vocational rehabilitation may be of benefit to her and that it was authorizing her to undergo vocational testing at the expense of the Office and submitted the name of a vocational rehabilitation counselor whom appellant was to contact.

In a report dated February 6, 1987, the rehabilitation counselor reported that he had contacted appellant and that she advised that she was not interested in vocational rehabilitation. The counselor reported in relevant part as follows: "I was informed by [appellant] that she is not interested in vocational rehabilitation at this time and that she has essentially retired and 'I am not coming out of retirement and I don't want any more of these calls.''

On April 17, 1987, an Office medical adviser reviewed the clinical findings of Dr. Lehman as set forth in his December 15, 1986 report and, applying the relevant tables of the AMA Guides determined that appellant has 63 percent permanent impairment of the right thumb.

By letter dated May 1, 1987, the Office requested Dr. Lehman to explain the discrepancy between his December 3, 1985 work restriction evaluation form in which he advised that appellant was capable of working an eight-hour day and his December 16, 1986 work restriction evaluation form in which he advised that appellant was capable of working only two hours a day.

By letter dated May 9, 1987, Dr. Lehman advised that the eighthour workday was correct and submitted a revised work restriction evaluation form also dated May 9, 1987, in which he set forth ap

pellant's work tolerance limitations and stated that she was capable of working an eight-hour day.

By letter dated September 29, 1987, the Office advised appellant that pursuant to the provisions of section 8113(b) of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act and section 10.124(f) of Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the Office had the right to reduce appellant's monetary compensation on the basis of her refusal to undergo vocational rehabilitation, as directed by the Office, and failure to show good cause for such refusal. The Office requested that within 30 days from the date of its letter, appellant either make a good faith effort to participate in vocational rehabilitation or advise the Office in writing of the reason for her refusal to undergo vocational rehabilitation. The record indicates that appellant did not respond to this letter.

By letter decision dated November 13, 1987, the Office reduced appellant's monetary compensation payments to $0.00 effective November 22, 1987 on the basis that the evidence of record indicated that she was capable of gainful employment at eight hours a day. The Office further stated as follows:

"Your failure to undergo the essential preparatory effort of vocational testing does not permit this Office to determine what would have been your wage-earning capacity had you in fact undergone the testing and rehabilitation effort. Therefore, under the provisions of section 10.124(f) of the regulations, it is assumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the vocational rehabilitation effort would have resulted in your return to work with no loss of wage-earning capacity, i.e., a return to work at the same or higher wages than [that received] for the position you held when injured."

The Office further advised appellant that the reduction in monetary compensation would continue until she made a good faith effort to undergo the directed vocational rehabilitation or showed good cause for failure to comply with such direction.2

On March 23, 1988, appellant formally filed a claim for a schedule award.

By letter dated June 6, 1988, the Office advised appellant that due to her failure to cooperate with rehabilitation efforts, no compensation would be paid, including schedule awards, until she fully cooperated with the Office's directive.

"The record indicates that appellant was placed on the civil service retirement annuity rolls effective November 23, 1987.

The Board finds that the Office properly reduced appellant's monetary compensation by 100 percent on the basis that the evidence of record indicated that she would have sustained no loss of wage-earning capacity had she undergone vocational rehabilitation as directed by the Office.

Section 8113(b) of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act 3 provides as follows:

"If an individual without good cause fails to apply for and undergo vocational rehabilitation when so directed under section 8104 of this title, the Secretary, on review under section 8128 of this title and after finding that in the absence of the failure the wage-earning capacity of the individual would probably have substantially increased, may reduce prospectively the monetary compensation of the individual in accordance with what would probably have been his wage-earning capacity in the absence of the failure, until the individual in good faith complies with the direction of the Secretary."

Section 10.124(f) of Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the implementing regulations of 5 U.S.C. § 8113(b), further provides as follows:

"Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8104(a), the Office may direct a permanently disabled employee to undergo vocational rehabilitation. If an employee without good cause fails or refuses to apply for, undergo, participate in, or continue participation in a vocational rehabilitation effort when so directed, the Office will, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 8113(b), reduce prospectively the employee's monetary compensation based on what would have been the employee's wage-earning capacity had there not been such failure or refusal. If an employee without good cause fails or refuses to apply for, undergo, participate in, or continue participation in the early but necessary stages of a vocational rehabilitation effort (i.e., interviews, testing, counseling and work evaluations) the Office cannot determine what would have been the employee's wage-earning capacity had there not been such failure or refusal. It will be assumed, therefore, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the vocational rehabilitation effort would have resulted in a return to work with no loss of wage-earning capacity and the Office will reduce the employee's monetary compensation accordingly. Any reduction in the

35 U.S.C. §§ 8101 et seq.; see 5 U.S.C. § 8113(b).

employee's monetary compensation under the provisions of this paragraph shall continue until the employee in good faith complies with the direction of the Office."4 (Emphasis added)

Pursuant to the foregoing regulatory provision, the Office properly reduced appellant's monetary compensation by 100 percent. Appellant's physician, Dr. Lehman, advised the Office by letter dated May 9, 1987, which was accompanied by a work restriction evaluation form of the same date, that appellant was capable of working an eight-hour day. Although Dr. Lehman recommended vocational rehabilitation for appellant and the Office authorized vocation rehabilitation services and directed appellant to undergo vocational testing, appellant refused to do so. The record shows that by letter dated September 29, 1987, the Office requested appellant to either undergo vocational testing or submit her reason in writing for her failure or refusal to submit to such testing but appellant neither underwent the testing nor offered the Office any reason for her failure to do so.

Accordingly, as the record was devoid of any evidence indicating that vocational rehabilitation would not have resulted in appellant's return to work at a wage equal to or higher than that she was earning at the time of her employment injury, the Office properly applied the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 8113(b) in finding that appellant had no loss of wage-earning capacity and in reducing her monetary compensation accordingly.5

On appeal appellant alleges that her cervical injury prevents her from participating in vocational rehabilitation. The Board may not consider this argument on appeal. The Board's jurisdiction is limited to consideration of only that evidence which was before the Office at the time it rendered its final decision. Accordingly, since appellant did not present this argument to the Office prior to issuance of the November 13, 1987 decision, it may not be considered by the Board.

6

On appeal appellant also requests that the Board regard as a final decision the Office's letter of June 6, 1988 which denied appellant action on her schedule award claim because of her refusal to undergo vocational rehabilitation. The Board does not have jurisdiction to address the matter covered by the Office's June 6, 1988 letter because the June 6, 1988 is not a final decision of the Office

20 C.F.R. § 10.124(f).

'See Hattie Drummond, 39 ECAB 904 (1988) (where the Board found that the Office properly applied 5 U.S.C. § 8113(b) in basing appellant's wage-earning capacity on the position of barber because the evidence established that had appellant undergone vocational training as directed, she would have been employable as a barber). *See 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c).

and cannot be treated as such by the Board. Section 10.130 of Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides that a final decision of the Office shall contain findings of fact and a statement of reasons and shall be accompanied by appeal rights. Under these requirements, the June 6, 1988 letter is not a final decision and is not reviewable by the Board. Appellant should therefore request that the Office issue a formal decision on her schedule award claim.

The decision of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs dated November 13, 1987 is hereby affirmed.

'See 20 C.F.R. § 10.130; see also Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2-Claims, Chapter 2-1400(2).

In the Matter of JOHN H. SMITH and DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, Directorate of FACILITIES ENGINEERING, Fort Campbell, Ky.

Docket No. 89-1756; Submitted on the Record;
Issued January 31, 1990

Before GEORGE E. RIVERS, DAVID S. GERSON,
WILLIE T.C. THOMAS

The issue is whether appellant has more than a 22 percent permanent loss of use of his left lower extremity for which he received a schedule award.

On December 1, 1977, appellant, then a 51-year-old high voltage electrician, filed a notice of traumatic injury and claim for compensation (CA-1), alleging that on that date he sustained an injury to his left knee when he fell in the performance of duty. On the date of the injury appellant was examined by R.L. Viall, a physician's assistant,1 who diagnosed "new inflammation to left knee from twisting-osteoarthritis." Appellant returned to work on light duty and did not incur any lost time.

On May 2, 1978 appellant filed a second notice of traumatic injury and claim for compensation (CA-1), alleging that he sustained an injury to his left knee when he twisted his left knee in the performance of duty. On the date of injury appellant was examined by Dr. William P. Titus, a Board-certified family practitioner, who diagnosed a left knee sprain and referred appellant to Dr.

'The Board notes that a physician's assistant is not a "physician" within the meaning of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, and thus this diagnosis is of no probative value.

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