criminal laws" implies prior knowledge and intent on the part of local law enforcement officers. Additionally, there was preenactment discussion as to whether discovery of a federal criminal element in a local law enforcement matter, subsequent to death or injury, would make the death or disability compensable under the Act and the opinion expressed was that it would not. 11 Therefore, in keeping with the language of section 8191 and the legislative intent behind the enactment of this section, the Board has held that later discovery of a federal crime or potential federal crime arising out of local police activity during which a police officer is injured does not in itself bring the injury within the scope of section 8191.12

Appellant testified at his February 3, 1988 hearing that his sole purpose in stopping Mr. Snell on December 26, 1986, the date of his injury, was for a violation of Texas traffic laws. Appellant stated: "I noticed that one of the tail lamps was not working properly and that constitutes a traffic violation in the State of Texas. So that was the basis of the stop." Thus, appellant's testimony establishes that he was injured while investigating a purely local police matter, a traffic violation. Appellant further testified that he was unaware that, at the time he stopped Mr. Snell for a traffic violation, Mr. Snell was a federal fugitive and that he only later became aware of this fact. This testimony clearly establishes that appellant could not have formed any intent to apprehend Mr. Snell on the basis that Mr. Snell was sought by a federal law enforcement agency for the commission of a federal crime. Accordingly, the evidence of record overwhelmingly supports that appellant's injury occurred while he was engaged in purely local police matter and it

"Note the following interchange between Congressman Eilberg, one of the sponsors of H.R. 11816, and Congressman Cahill at the September 11, 1967 House of Representatives session. Congressman Eilberg: "My own feeling would be that if the apprehension were for a particular crime, then if that crime happened to be a federal crime the individual or his survivors would benefit. But if it is not discovered until after the police officer's death or injury that the man had committed a federal crime, he would not be covered. That is my personal feeling." Congressman Cahill: "For the purpose of legislative history, then it is the thought of the sponsor of the bill that the crime for which the person was being apprehended would be controlling in making a determination as to whether or not the death resulted from the commission of a federal crime?" Congressman Eilberg: "I would agree with the statement of the gentleman." Cong. Rec. September 11, 1967, p. 24942.

12 See Donald Rios, 36 ECAB 425 (1984) (The Board found no FECA coverage because claimant police officer was injured while pursuing a suspect in a possible mugging, a local crime, and it was not until one month after the suspect's arrest that the police officer discovered the suspect was an illegal alien); Rocco A. Ranaudo, supra note 2 (The Board found no FECA coverage because claimant police officer was injured while investigating a possible traffic violation and it was not until later that the police officer discovered the perpetrator to be an illegal alien.); William P. McNamara, 34 ECAB 617 (1983) (The Board found no FECA coverage because the claimant police officer was injured while investigating a burglary, a local crime, and it was not until after the injury that the police officer discovered that his assailant could have committed what was potentially a federal crime.); Edward Jackson, 31 ECAB 550 (1980) (The Board found no FECA coverage because, at the time of his injury, the claimant officer was involved in the arrest of two prostitutes and it was later discovered that his assailant, the prostitutes' pimp, was a federal offender.).

was only later discovered that this activity involved a federal criminal element. As heretofore noted, this situation does not give rise to a compensable claim under section 8191. Appellant therefore failed to discharge his burden of proof in establishing that his injury occurred under circumstances within coverage of section 8191(1)(B).

The decision of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs dated April 11, 1988 is hereby affirmed. 13

13 The Board notes that Michele von Kelsch who participated in the hearing held on May 11, 1989 was not an Alternate Board Member after January 8, 1990 and she did not participate in the preparation of this decision and order.

In the Matter of DEBRA S. JUDKINS and DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT, Anniston, Ala.

Docket No. 89–1638; Submitted on the Record;
Issued April 11, 1990

Before MICHAEL J. WALSH, GEORGE E. RIVERS,
WILLIE T.C. THOMAS

The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof in establishing that she sustained an employment-related injury on December 12, 1987 resulting in bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.

On December 17, 1987, appellant, then a 29-year-old heavy mobile equipment repairer helper, filed a notice of traumatic injury and claim for compensation (Form CA-1) alleging injury to both forearms consisting of pain and swelling which she attributed to a December 12, 1987 injury. She indicated that she had injured herself by "lifting [40-pound] valve bodies out of basket to table." Appellant initially sought medical treatment at the employing establishment's dispensary on December 14, 1987. She was treated by a Dr. Grow who diagnosed her condition as "overusage myalgia"; Dr. Grow recommended a treatment of Ace bandages and Tylenol and indicated that appellant should not lift weights greater than 10 pounds for a period of 48 hours. Appellant was seen again by Dr. Grow on December 16, 1987 at which time her medical restrictions were lifted and she was returned to regular duty. Appellant continued to work during this period. Appellant again sought treatment at the employing establishment's dispensary on January 15, 1988. She was treated by Dr. Charles W. Miller who noted appellant's

prior complaint and diagnosed her condition as "overuse syndrome." Dr. Miller prescribed Motrin and recommended that appellant refrain from heavy lifting. Appellant was seen again on January 19, 1988 by Dr. Miller; his report of that date indicates that appellant's condition was unchanged from the previous examination and notes "[Questionable] overuse syndrome.'

On January 19, 1988, appellant was referred by Dr. Miller to the Orthopedic Clinic at Noble Army Hospital, Fort McClellan, Alabama where she was examined by a Dr. Burns. In his report of January 19, 1988, Dr. Burns noted appellant's occupation; he further noted tight volar compartments bilateral, a positive Tinel's sign in the right wrist, tender pronators in the right wrist and pain from resisted muscle fiber flexion in the right wrist. He diagnosed "exertional compartment syndrome vs. pronator syndrome ([medial nerve] entrapment in forearm)" and recommended decreased lifting and an electromyogram and nerve conduction velocity testing for both arms. On January 25, 1988, appellant was again referred to the Orthopedic Clinic at Noble Army Hospital by Dr. Miller and was examined by Dr. Paul F. Moore on January 26, 1988. In his report of January 26, 1988, Dr. Moore indicated a positive Tinel's sign in the right wrist and a positive Phalen's sign; he further reported an impression of carpal tunnel syndrome in the right wrist and recommended an electromyogram and nerve conduction velocity (NCV) testing. On January 29, 1988, appellant was examined by Dr. Chandra K. Gehi, a neurologist, who performed nerve conduction velocity testing and an electromyogram on the same day. In an undated report, Dr. Gehi indicated that "NCV shows bilat[eral] carpal tunnel Rt. [greater than] Lt." On that same day, appellant was examined by Dr. Miller who indicated in a journal entry dated January 29, 1988 a diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome.

By letter dated February 3, 1988, the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs requested that appellant submit additional factual and medical evidence in support of her claim for carpal tunnel syndrome.

Appellant was seen again on February 22, 1988 by Dr. Moore at Noble Army Hospital. Dr. Moore's report of that date notes a negative Tinel's sign and a positive Phalen's sign; his report further notes that the nerve conduction velocity tests and the electromyogram show carpal tunnel syndrome.

On March 3, 1988, appellant sought medical treatment from Dr. John R. Payne, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon. In his report of March 3, 1988, Dr. Payne noted the previous tests done by Dr. Gehi and further noted a positive Tinel's sign and a positive Pha

len's sign. His assessment of appellant's condition was carpal tunnel syndrome; he treated appellant with medication and recommended that she be placed on light duty for two weeks commencing March 7, 1988. Appellant was also seen on March 3, 1988 by Dr. Miller who noted the recommendations of Dr. Payne and reiterated his diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome.

In a March 9, 1988 letter to the Office in support of her claim, appellant described her job duties, work schedule and level of production. Appellant noted that her job as a heavy mobile equipment repair helper required her to disassemble and reassemble transmissions. She noted that she worked on valve bodies and was required to lift the valve body from a basket, hand carry it for cleaning, wash it in a vat and assemble it at a work station. Appellant indicated that a fully assembled valve body weighed approximately 65 pounds. Following assembly, the valve is hand carried for inspection. Appellant indicated that she builds 6 to 10 valve bodies a day. Also in support of her claim, appellant filed a CA-20 report by Dr. Payne dated March 9, 1988 indicating a diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome.

In a March 16, 1988 report, Dr. Payne reiterated his earlier diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome and indicated that appellant had been scheduled for right carpal tunnel decompression. In a March 23, 1988 report, Dr. Payne indicated that appellant had undergone surgery for right carpal tunnel decompression on that date and in reports dated April 1, 1988 and April 8, 1988, Dr. Payne indicated that appellant was seen on those dates for post-surgical evaluation.

By letter dated April 14, 1988, the Office accepted fact of injury and advised appellant that a condition of "strain, both forearms" had been accepted as being job related and advised appellant that payment for treatment of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome could not be considered.

On April 22, 1988, the Office referred the case record and the medical reports to an Office medical adviser for his opinion and evaluation of appellant's claim. In a report dated April 25, 1988, the medical adviser indicated that while the lifting of valve bodies by appellant may have evoked symptoms of carpal tunnel syndrome, this activity, in and of itself, did not "cause, aggravate, precipitate nor accelerate the development of the carpal tunnel syndrome." He noted that carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by any space occupying lesion in the carpal tunnel causing compression on the radial nerves. The medical adviser also stated that recognized causes of the syndrome are chronic inflammatory thickening of the tendon sheath as in rheumatoid arthritis, osteoarthritis of the

wrist, post-fracture thickening, pregnancy, menopause and birth control pills. The medical adviser noted that the bilateral symmetrical nature of the carpal tunnel syndrome diagnosed in appellant's case "suggests an etiology quite common in this condition-that of the habit of sleeping with the wrists in a flexed position causing pressure on the median nerve . . . during sleep." The medical adviser concluded:

"[Slymptoms of pain, tingling and numbness are evoked by wrist action in cases of [carpal tunnel syndrome], but there is no evidence that this wrist action alters the underlying pathology. A similar condition would be an abscess on the forearm. Any movement of the wrist would cause pain; certainly the wrist action did not cause the abscess." (Emphasis in original)

In a report dated April 28, 1988, Dr. Payne noted appellant's job duties of rebuilding and working on transmissions and that appellant stated that she spent most of her day lifting and doing strenuous work with her hands. Dr. Payne stated:

"[O]ne of the most common causes of carpal tunnel syndrome is heavy strenuous work causing inflammation and swelling of the carpal tunnel area, resulting in pressure on the medial nerve. She has no other known cause for carpal tunnel syndrome and it would be my assessment that most likely her heavy work is the cause of her carpal tunnel syndrome."

By compensation order dated June 3, 1988, which incorporated a memorandum summarizing the evidence, the Office rejected appellant's claim for compensation on the basis that appellant's condition of carpal tunnel syndrome was not causally related to the work injury of December 12, 1987.

By letter dated September 12, 1988, appellant requested reconsideration of her claim. In a letter dated November 15, 1988, the Office requested that appellant submit additional evidence in support of her request for reconsideration. In response, appellant submitted progress notes from Dr. Payne representing the dates of treatment from April 1, 1988 through June 17, 1988; a CA-20a (attending physician's supplemental report) detailing the claimant's condition on August 2, 1988; and a medical report of Dr. Payne dated June 28, 1988 in which he states that "it is our assessment now as it has been in the past. . . that most likely her carpal tunnel [syndrome] is secondary to the heavy strenuous work that she was involved in."