ment should be required for judging those under 18 and not those over 18 years of age. The claim that everyone over 18 years possesses it does not bring about the degree of development required. It were altogether wrong to create special privileges for juvenile criminals. Every person who has the ability to act and understand the natural consequences of his act should be held legally responsible. This capacity usually develops with the tenth year of age, and so that age should be accepted as the lowest limit for legal prosecution. The law must take into consideration that between the ages of 10 and 16, the usual period of adelescence, a certain sensibility and increased activity of the emotions and intellect exist which should affect the measure of punishment. The law must, therefore, give judges the right to punish children according to their discretion. However, they should not be allowed to exceed the term of two years' imprisonment for crime and six months for transgression. The trial could be made of allowing children to serve the sentence in a reformatory instead of prison."

It is not our purpose to examine these propositions, against which the most serious objections arise. It is evident that the objectors fall into the same error which they attack. Conditions of increased sensibility, the greater activity of the emotions and intellect ascribed to the period of 10 to 16 years and justifying extensive privileges for youth at that age, are frequently found among adults as consequences of natural endowments and influences of the most varied events upon soul and body. In fact, they occur oftener among adults than among children who have completed their tenth year of age but who have not passed the period of puberty. And yet there are those who would justify leniency of judgment with regard to the young and deny it to adults.

When the state refrains from criminal punishment in cases of children and youthful persons deficient in mental and moral development so that they do not recognize the culpability of their acts nor appreciate the consequences of criminal punishment, the reason is that in such cases the purpose of punishment would be thwarted, and the state in pronouncing its sentence would be acting contrary to its highest duty. So long as there is a possibility of developing, by education and training, the moral character and power of resistance required to transform a young and immature person guilty of a violation of law into a useful member of society the state should not make the task more difficult by punishment, but should provide for appropriate training to rescue juvenile wrongdoers from ruin. The age to which this possibility is confined varies greatly with individuals, and can not be determined by a general proposition for all. The criminal code presupposes that persons of sound mind who have completed their eighteenth year are sufficiently developed intellectually to distinguish between a guilty act and one not so, and can consequently recognize their culpability. They are fully responsible before the law. It can hardly be supposed that a person of sound mind, 18 years old, is ever so deficient in judgment as not to understand the culpability of his acts. Even if, as general opinion demands, the criminal code is changed in so far as to preclude from sentence juveniles having this understanding but lacking the necessary development of mind and character for comprehending the moral and social significance of the culpable act and its punishment, this age limit will still be retained. In the majority of cases those who have passed it will possess at least sufficient development of moral character to be held accountable for their actions by the state. However, as most frequently happens, development of moral insight must not be confused with moral force. The measure of moral force possessed by different individuals varies greatly. It forms the vital essence of human character difficult to apprehend. Consequently it is also impossible to give an "abstract standard of moral force" by which that of individuals may be measured. The

state naturally requires a certain degree of moral force the power to resist criminal impulses. However, all who commit culpable acts lack this measure of moral force, and just because it is wanting in them the state makes them legally responsible and condemns them. Maturity of moral character in the above sense of the term may be acquired and cultivated by education, of course to a variable degree. The comprehension to know that a common transgression of crime is not only culpable, but also morally reprehensible; that it is a violation of law and rebellion against social order which must be upheld; that criminal punishment is not only an outward hardship, but that it also brands the wrongdoer, a fact which may have a momentous effect on his whole life, can be lacking in persons of sound mind and over 18 years old only in rare instances. In the rare cases in which an adult is as undeveloped as a minor without being diseased in mind the state can not withhold punishment, as punishment can no longer be replaced by education. The purpose of punishment, then, is to give the wrongdoer the insight and moral earnestness in which he has been lacking. This deficiency can only influence the kind and extent of punishment to which he must be sentenced.

CHAPTER X.

GRAMMAR AND VOCABULARY OF THE HLINGT
LANGUAGE OF SOUTHEASTERN ALASKA.

By WILLIAM A. KELLY and FRANCES H. WILLARD.

Training School, Sitka, Alaska.

PREFACE.

The authors are aware that the scientific orthography, in which the vowels have their continental sounds and the consonants their English pronunciation, is now in general use by ethnologists.

But as this grammar is intended for colloquial use only, we have adhered mainly to the Websterian orthoepy and phonetic principles of spelling.

To assist the student in acquiring the pronunciation of difficult sounds we have made use of a few extra diacritical points.

The student should aim at mastery of the Hlingit pronunciation.

He must drill, drill, drill, until he acquires facility in intonation, enunciation, and pronunciation.

The ear must be accustomed to hear and the tongue to express the native sounds. Hlingit is a harsh, guttural language, and requires much practice to train the organs of speech to new positions.

The tongue is used breadth-wise as well as length-wise.

Go slowly from the easy to the hard.

Do not attempt too much at first.

Leave all hard words and forms of expression until a good command of easy words and sentences has been gained.

X. Adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections.

XI. The sentence, questions and phrases

XII. Money values

XIII. Hymns, portions of scripture, etc

XIV. English-Hlingit vocabulary..

XV. HlingIt-English vocabulary..

Page.

716

718

719

722

725

727

731

737

741

744

747

748

749

752

758

The letters b, f, m, p, r, and v are wanting. Only the hard sound of g and e is used; viz, go, get, car, cat; k is always guttural.

(For guttural sounds of g see opposite page.)

KEY TO PRONUNCIATION.

The mark indicates the obscure sound shě, blood; tě, stone.

ē-ē represents a prolonged sound of long e. It has no equivalent in English. Hlingit example, yê-ē, your. To frequently forms the termination of certain guttural sounds, such as the German CH and guttural g's. This combination of sounds is indicated thus: CHO, go, go, etc. Pronounce the guttural, but hold the lips in position as if to give the oo sound. Examples: szücí, hat; sì-äg`∞, bitter.

CONSONANT COMBINATIONS.

All the consonant sounds and their combinations occurring in Hlingit may be divided into four classes, viz: guttural, palatal fortis, dental fortis, and lateral fortis sounds. The true pronunciation of these sounds must be learned from a native, as there are no English equivalents.

Guttural sounds, or sounds made by the root of the tongue and the soft palate, using little breath. There are six kinds of this class, and are marked as follows: } k, 'h, ġ, ÿ, q.