faith of the United States, and without violating any national engagements, or consenting to any innovation on the internal regulations for preserving peace and neutrality, which had been deliberately and justly adopted, or surrendering the rights of the American Government."

These Envoys met in Paris, October, 1797. They were received with no better spirit than had been exhibited towards Mr. Pinckney when he represented the United States at the French Court. The occurrences which followed were in all respects the most novel and singular, as well as exciting, that have ever been brought to light amidst the variety and peculiarities of diplomatic history. They were presented to M. Talleyrand on the 8th of the same month, and doubtlessly used energy and promptness in the discharge of the duties devolved upon them. For the first time in the history of our foreign relations, was attempted that high-handed system of corruption that has too often stained and darkened the proceedings of European courts; not only evasion and equivocation, but the most direct principle of bribery. This, if practiced by courts of the Old World, could find no favor with the honest citizen Ministers of this Republic; and it was in answer to the propositions, as well as the demand for a douceur, that Pinckney exclaimed, in the fervor of his patriotism and with a blaze of indignation, "millions for defence, but not a cent for tribute!" which not only rang like the spirit of honest defiance in the ear of European diplomacy, but found a cheerful and welcome response in the breast of every American.

When the American Envoys were introduced to M. Talleyrand, they were informed that he was making a report for the Directory, on French and American affairs. They retired on that occasion without saying anything more in reference to their mission. The French Minister took no other official notice of our Envoys: they complained, as they had a right to do, of official disrespect. The French Minister replied, by a complaint that he had not been called upon by them since the first interview. This was not only discourteous, but unfair; when they were informed upon their first visit that the French Minister was preparing a report, they withdrew, not only with the understanding of an exchange of cards of hospitality, but that the report would be shown to them.

Z., who was at that time private secretary to the French Minister, and who turned out to be Mr. Hauteval, informed

them that as they had not been received by the Directory, the Minister of Foreign Affairs could not act with them officially. This might be true, but why hold out to them the belief that he would act and receive them, to the extent of his powers of official negotiations, before their recognition by the Executive Directory?

Z. had previously informed them that Talleyrand was not only favorably disposed towards the American Government, but had expected to see the Envoys in their private capacity. Were they in a private capacity to receive propositions from the Minister? Why the proposition of a douceur? Was this ex-officio, if the proposition had been favorably received?

Pinckney and Marshall excused themselves from visiting the French Minister, on the ground of etiquette. Gerry felt no such scruples; he had a previous acquaintance with Talleyrand, consequently he called upon him on an appointed day. Nothing of consequence or importance resulted from the interview of Talleyrand with Mr. Gerry.

*

October 18th, a gentleman called on General Pinckney, and informed him a Mr. X. was in Paris, that the gentleman had seen him, and that he might place great confidence in him. This was but to indicate to Pinckney that he might expect to see or hear something from Mr. X., who on the same day called upon Pinckney, desiring a private interview, which was immediately afforded him.

X. told him he was ready to make a proposition from M. Talleyrand, who was anxious to effectuate amicable relations with the United States. X.† informed Pinckney that the Directory, especially two members, (not naming them,) were very much irritated by the address of Mr. Adams at the opening of Congress, at its special session in May last, that they wished his language modified; and, he added, the Directory would require a large sum of money, at least fifty thousand pounds sterling; the money to be placed at the direction of M. Talleyrand, who was to have the disposal of it. At the same time, he said he did not communicate with M. Talleyrand directly, but through a third person and confidential friend, who turned out to be Y., Mr. Bellamy. Next day X. and Y. called on the Envoys; Y. said the Minister could not

* Vide Amer. State Papers, vol. iv. Diplo. Cor.

†X. was Hottinguer. Gerry divulged the names of Y. and Z. Y. was Mr. Bellamy, Z. Mr. Hauteval. Amer. State Papers, vol. iv. p. 177.

see them himself, because they were not then received by the Directory, but that he was authorized to communicate certain propositions: and repeated nearly the same propositions that had been made by X., assuring the Envoys that the French Minister, who was possessed of enormous influence, would intercede with the Directory for the consummation of the treaty, and closed his conversation with the frequent remark,—" İL FAUT DE L'ARGENT; IL FAUT BEAUCOUP D'ARGENT."

Whilst these very remarkable conversations were going on, Gerry, by appointment, held a conversation with Talleyrand. Talleyrand said the Directory had passed an arrêté, which he handed to him; it was almost tantamount to what the Envoys had learned from the conversation with X. and Y., with the alteration of the word loan.* The artful and intriguing Minister of Foreign Relations was so inflated with the idea of a loan, as the price of peace, that he even entered into details to show the Commissioners how it might be done without the knowledge of England; the idea still hanging like an incubus upon his mind that this country favored and designed assisting England. The plan was, that it was to be paid in supplies for France; to be furnished after the war, at St. Domingo, in such things as France might desire.†

It appears by a letter accompanying the correspondence of the Envoys and Minister communicated to the Department of State, dated April 3, 1798, that the Minister supposed Messrs. Marshall and Pinckney had taken their congé by that time, a desire being intimated to that effect by the Minister's letters. Gerry answered that his colleagues expected to leave France, and that it was impossible for him to be the medium of communication or take any action which would be disagreeable to his colleagues; and moreover said,—“You have proposed, citizen Minister, the 5th or 7th of this decade for me to resume (reprendre) our reciprocal communications upon the interest of the French Republic and of the United States. To resume this subject would be unavailing, because the measure, for the reasons I then urged, is utterly impracticable. I can only then confer informally and unaccredited on any subject respecting our mission, and communicate to the Government of the United

The reader is referred to Gar. Life of Ran., chapter xix. vol. i., and to Amer. Stat. Papers, Diplo. Cor., vol. iv.

† Vide Cor. of the American Envoys.

States the result of such conferences, being in my individual capacity unauthorized to give them an official stamp.'

Marshall and Pinckney left Paris soon after the 4th of April. Gerry remained a short time after their departure. Several unimportant communications were exchanged respecting the lengthy letter of the Minister (concerning which some misunderstanding existed) which throw, however, no light upon this subject. Gerry addressed a note to the Minister dated June 25, 1798, asking for such papers as were necessary to enable him to depart for the United States.

Thus terminated, in the most unsuccessful manner, this effort to bring about reconciliation between the United States and France. The friendly position and sentiments of Mr. Adams were manifest. It was equally clear to every one then, as history makes apparent now, that justice and right were on the side of the United States. There was an apparent desire on the part of Talleyrand to negotiate on terms of fairness, but with his accustomed art and duplicity, to which he directed his quick and powerful mind. In his willingness to negotiate, he yet denied what he knew to be true, and whilst he wielded at desire the action of the Directory in all affairs pertaining to his department under the Government, and appeared desirous that the Government should recognize the Envoys of the United States, yet they were not received. He appeared desirous to negotiate with these very men, and at one and the same breath made offers for negotiation and denied his power to do so. If the impure purposes of the French Minister had found favorable reception with the honest-hearted Envoys, the Directory would soon have received them, and the perfidious Frenchman would have had no hesitancy in recommending them. It is manifest what were his intentions, though proposed through the medium of the most mystic agency and in a manner new to the science of diplomacy. Language, said he on one occasion, was given to us to conceal, not to make known our thoughts. It was this talent for deceit and this policy that made him, perhaps, the most powerful and successful diplomatic agent ever known to the world. It was this talent and this policy that cheated Europe for years, and held her wisest statesmen in doubt and perplexity; and it was this policy that defeated

* American State Papers, vol. iv. p. 140.

every effort at negotiation between the Minister of Foreign Affairs under the French Directory and the wise, strongminded, honest men, who represented the Government of the United States at the French Court.

The correspondence of the times and the page of just history will exhibit the one caught in that element in which he had previously excelled in cunning, avarice, and duplicity, whilst will be held up to the admiration of the world the firm patriotism and honest purpose of the other, that defied all threatening, and despised alike duplicity and avarice, fraud and bribery.

A popular outburst of indignation poured over the country when the dispatches were published, which increased in intensity when it was known that money had been exacted. The sentiment of Pinckney was responded to by every tongue, and every freeman was ready to prove that he would give "millions for defence, but not a cent for tribute."

I have previously related the preparation made by Congress in anticipation of war with France. The excitement became contagious; the majority of the people belonged to the war party, and few there were to oppose it. The rights and the dignity of the nation had been invaded, our national character insulted, whilst wrong and outrage were added to wounded honor, by a continued depredation upon our commerce. The peace-like temper of Adams yielded to the national spirit of the times, and whilst looking to the welfare and prosperity of his country, he yet hesitated not to make preparation to avenge her wrongs.

France had feared, though unjustly, a favorable inclination on the part of America towards England. Whilst this excitement was prevailing, that France might catch the sight, could be seen upon the brow of Americans the Black Cockade of England, an emblem of hostility to the tricolor of France; and persons were encouraged to wear it as the American Cockade. This may seem idle at this remote time. actors have fallen one by one into the grave, and it has gone into history with the great men of its day; but the excited passion of an offended nation is never an idle feeling; its fervent development is never gasconade, but the evidence and the symbol of abiding and determined patriotism.

July, 1778.

The

It was determined by Congress that the treaty made with France in 1778, which had been recognized on our part, and faithfully obeyed for ten years, was