strong reasons to believe, from the representations of Miranda, that the Government was secretly giving him encouragement and support. A resolution passed the House by a large majority, a few of the Federalists voting to the contrary,asserting their belief that there existed no reason or evidence to sustain these unjust imputations on the Government.

It is a memorable fact, notwithstanding the resolution of the House, that Ogden and Smith were acquitted by a jury, on the ground that the Government had countenanced the enterprise. The cabinet Ministers at Washington were summoned as witnesses. The President interposed his authority to prevent, and did prevent them from attending, upon the ground that they were needed in the cabinet, and could not leave Washington. These facts were calculated to make an impression on the people, as it did, that the Executive had connived at this undertaking. It is clear, however, beyond dispute, that Miranda obtained no money from this Government, but that the funds were furnished by the British Ministry.*

That it was an object of cupidity with the British 1806. Ministry, is evident from the fitting out of an expedition, after the failure of Miranda, which, under Sir Home Popham, entered the La Plata on the 25th of June. The object of this expedition was not to assist the Colonists to revolt, but to subjugate the country; the commanders, in their instructions from Wyndham, were directed to discourage any other hope than that of their being annexed to the English Crown. The justice and policy of this question, as far as the United States Government was interested, were obviously an entire avoidance of everything connected with it, especially as hostile feelings were rife between the two countries, without the further addition of a most unjustifiable outrage, had it ever taken place. The philanthropist must ever wish the disinthrallment of a nation from the hands of tyranny; and doubtless the President gave Miranda his sympathy; beyond that no evidence exists to attach even the slightest blame to the Executive.

The wishes and feelings of the cotemporaries of Jefferson were decidedly in favor of Miranda's earlier schemes, and were in correspondence with him,-especially Hamilton and

History of Spanish America, by Niles, p. 90.

Ibid., and the Trial of Popham, and the documents annexed to the Trial of Whitlock.

Knox; the correspondence shows the feeling of those men at the time of an earlier visit Miranda made to this country, which was about the year 1797.*

1806.

The difficulties existing between England and the United States continued a source of much excitement and interest. The Executive was not free from fearful anxiety in reference to the influence of the disaffected wing of the Republican party. The disaffection of Randolph, which manifested itself in a strong partiality for England, created serious apprehension on the mind of the President in reference to an amicable adjustment of our foreign affairs. "A majority of the Senate," says Jefferson, "means well. But Tracy and Bayard are too dexterous for them and have very much influenced their proceedings.***Seven Federalists, voting always in phalanx, and joined by some discontented Republicans, some oblique ones, some capricious, have often made a majority, so as to produce very serious embarrassment to the public operations; and very much do I dread submitting to them at the next session any treaty which can

As a matter of history perhaps but little known, it may not be improper to notice the letters of Miranda at that time, which indicate the opinions of those addressed as well as the writer. April 6th, 1798, Miranda wrote to Alexander Hamilton,-"This, my dear and respected friend, will be handed to you by my countryman, Don who is charged with dispatches of the highest importance to the President of the United States. He will tell you confidentially all that you wish to know on this subject. The only danger which I foresee, is the introduction of French principles, which would poison our liberty in its cradle, and would finish by destroying yours." Whilst this exploit was being agitated, it is remarkably strange that in July, 1798, Generals Hamilton, Pinckney, and Knox, were appointed Major-Generals in the standing army raised that summer, nominally for the purpose of repelling a French invasion at a moment when France had not a ship-of-war on the ocean, and whilst British squadrons were hovering on her whole coast. October 19th, 1798, Miranda again wrote to Hamilton,-"Your wishes are in some sort already accomplished. Seeing it has been agreed here on one side not to employ in the operations on land English troops; seeing that the auxiliary land forces are to be exclusively American, while the naval force shall be purely English,-everything is smooth, and we wait only the fiat of your illustrious President to depart like lightning." To General Knox he wrote on the same day, in which he expresses his delight at Knox's nomination for General in the Continental army,-"It would appear," he says, "that your wishes are at length accomplished, and that every possible circumstance is united at this moment in our favor." These parties have all passed from the stage of life, and the question is no longer of moment; yet it is surprising that the administration of John Adams should be connected with such an enterprise. Miranda addressed Mr. Adams, but it does not appear that he ever made an answer. (Vide Memoirs of Burr, vol. ii. p. 379.)

be made with either England or Spain, when I consider that five joining the Federalists can defeat a friendly settlement of our affairs."*

The Senate consisted at this time of thirty-four members; two-thirds were necessary to the ratification of a treaty, which required twenty-three. There were in the Senate seven Federalists, and the union of five disaffected Republicans could defeat any treaty the Executive might make. The grounds of difficulty the President had to encounter with the Republican party were in reference to the course to be pursued towards England and Spain. The feelings of the President inclined warmly to France. Many who had espoused her cause as that of civil liberty had lost their ardor after Napoleon had exercised the prerogative of Emperor, under the title of first Consul. But when he threw aside the form and name of a Republican, and when all France bowed in humble acquiescence, the hopes, the admiration, and the feelings of many of the American people were turned to hatred and disgust. The outrages England had committed, and was committing, had excited the Executive as well as the American people. The angry contentions and distractive war between England and France could not fail to enlist partisans in America, though we were a neutral people. The many excesses of the French alienating the affections of the Americans, produced an alteration of feeling which, as it was increased towards France, was equally inclined towards England.

Spain, too, had to be conciliated; we had been on the verge of war with her. The President saw the policy of maintaining friendly relations with France, whose language was,-"A last friendly settlement with Spain is proposed to be made at Paris under the auspices of France." To effect which treaty the President appointed Messrs. Boudoin and Armstrong (both then at Paris) joint Commissioners, the former being then Minister to Spain. Armstrong's nomination was not confirmed by the Senate. The commission would have resulted in no good if it had been, the two Commissioners being of opposite sentiments, and Armstrong particularly obnoxious to the French, an open rupture would have taken place between the two Commissioners.

The most pressing engagement upon the Government at

* Letter to W. C. Nicholas, April 13, 1806; Jefferson's Works, vol. iv. p. 47. Letter to W. C. Nicholas, March 24, 1806; Jefferson's Works, vol. iv. P. 46.

this time was the negotiation with England. The death of Pitt in January of this year, and Fox, the leader of the Whig party, being then in the Ministry, induced Jefferson to entertain more brilliant hopes of an amicable adjustment of our difficulties. Fox was always inclined to amicable relations with the world, and often devoted the great powers of his mind to a general peace in Europe. Jefferson knew him personally and spoke in the highest terms of his honesty; and said, "While he shall be in the Administration, my reliance on that Government will be solid." To carry out the wishes of the Government and secure a favorable negotiation with England, the President associated with Monroe, then Minister to England, William Pinckney, of Maryland. This appointment was highly judicious; no one enjoyed a higher reputation not only as a diplomatist, but as a lawyer, a statesman, and orator, than William Pinckney. Amidst this detail of history it is pleasant and instructive to turn to a general view of the political parties of this day, and the embarrassments they sought to throw around the Executive. By Pinckney the President had an opportunity of communicating freely and fully with Monroe, to whom he addressed a long communication.

He alludes to the desertion of Mercer, a member of Congress from Virginia, who soon became identified with the Federalists. Randolph, he said, was in the same track, whose disaffection produced momentary astonishment and even dismay, but for a moment only. He indicates to Monroe that Randolph is advocating his pretentions to the Presidency, but warns him against his friendship.

The change in the Ministry became highly favorable to our Government. He clearly indicates the opinion he entertains in reference to the policy of the two countries, none having so many points of common interest as England and the United States. The only rivalry that can arise being on the ocean: "England may by petty larceny thwartings check us on that element a little, but nothing she can do will retard us there one year's growth. We shall be supported there by other nations, and throw into their scale to make a part of the great counterpoise to her navy. If, on the other hand, she is just to us, conciliatory, and encourages the sentiment of family feelings and conduct, it cannot fail to befriend the security of both. We have the seamen and materials for fifty ships of the line, and half that number of frigates, and

were France to give us the money and England the dispositions to equip them, they would give to England serious proofs of the stock from which they are sprung. *** Were, on the other hand, England to give the money and France the dispositions to place us on the sea in all our force, the whole world out of the continent of Europe might be one joint monopoly. We wish for neither of these scenes.

This letter, whilst it is not in conflict with Jefferson's known partiality for France, clearly indicates the advantages resulting from a treaty of amity with England, as preferable to the United States, to a friendly alliance with any other people whatsoever.

The American Commissioners were instructed to make no treaty which did not secure American vessels on the high seas against the visitation of English vessels. The Commissioners were instructed by the Secretary of State to contend that the right of impressment existing by mere municipal law could bear no authority beyond the jurisdiction of Great Britain.

The British Commissioners contended that the King had the right to require against his maritime enemies the services of all his subjects, especially if they were seafaring people, as well as the right to seize such by force everywhere, except within the territorial limits of another power; and that the high seas were extra-territorial; that merchant-vessels navigating thereon did not carry any foreign jurisdiction to protect British subjects from the authority of the King. In this they were sustained by the Board of Admiralty, and they stated that they could not give it up. The British Commissioners were yet willing to negotiate satisfactorily with the American Commissioners, with the exception of the relinquishment of the right of impressment, and Monroe and Pinckney were requested to point out anything short of such relinquishment, but this they could not do.

The American Commissioners insisted upon an absolute relinquishment. On the other hand, it was proposed to them that laws should be enacted by both nations, making it penal for British commanders to impress American citizens, and also penal for any officer of the American Government to grant British subjects certificates of citizenship. This the American Commissioners were compelled to refuse. It would

* Jefferson's Letter to Monroe, whilst the latter was Minister to England; Jefferson's Works, vol. iv. p. 51.