LAMAR and DAY, JJ., dissenting. 236 U.S. ing to be transported by him for purposes of such business. To hold otherwise would make the law of conspiracy a sword with which to punish those whom the Traffic Act was intended to protect. The fact that prostitutes and others have used this statute as a means by which to levy blackmail may furnish a reason why that should be made a Federal offence, so that she and they can be punished for blackmail or malicious prosecution. But those evils are not to be remedied by extending the law of conspiracy so as to treat the enslaved subject of transportation as a guilty actor in her own transportation; and then punish her because she agreed with her slaver to be shipped in interstate commerce for purposes of prostitution. Such a construction would make every willing victim indictable for conspiracy. Even that elastic offence cannot be extended to cover such a case. There are no decisions dealing directly with the question as to whether a woman assisting in her own illegal transportation can be prosecuted for conspiracy. There are, however, a number of authorities dealing with somewhat analogous subjects. For example, in prosecutions for abortion "the woman does not stand legally in the situation of an accomplice, for although she no doubt participated in the immoral offence imputed to the defendant, she could not have been indicted for the offence. The law regards her as the victim rather than the perpetrator." Dunn v. People, 29 N. Y. 523; Commonwealth v. Wood, 11 Gray, 85; State v. Hyer, 39 N. J. Law, 598; State v. Murphy, 27 N. J. Law, 112, 114; Commonwealth v. Follansbee, 155 Massachusetts, 274; State v. Owens, 22 Minnesota, 238, 244; Watson v. State, 9 Tex. App. 237; Keller v. State, 102 Georgia, 506, 510 (seduction). Contra apparently in England and Colorado. Queen v. Whitchurch, 24 Q. B. D. 420; Solander v. People, 2 Colorado, 48. So, too, a person who knowingly purchases liquor from one 236 U.S. LAMAR and DAY, JJ., dissenting. unauthorized to sell it is not guilty of a criminal offence and is not an accomplice. State v. Teahan, 50 Connecticut, 92, 100; Commonwealth v. Pilsbury, 12 Gray, 127; People v. Smith, 28 Hun, 626; affirmed on opinion below, 92 N. Y. 665; State v. Baden, 37 Minnesota, 212. Where the purchaser of liquor sold in violation of law was prosecuted for inducing the seller to commit a crime, the court said: "Every sale implies a purchaser; there must be a purchaser as well as a seller, and this must have been known and understood by the legislature. Now, if it were intended that the purchaser should be subject to any penalty, it is to be presumed, that it would have been declared in the statute, either by imposing a penalty on the buyer in terms, or by extending the penal consequences of the prohibited act, to all persons aiding, counselling or encouraging the principal offender. There being no such provision in the statute, there is a strong implication, that none such was intended by the legislature." Commonwealth v. Willard, 22 Pick. 479. United States v. Dietrich, 126 Fed. Rep. 667, though not directly in point sheds light on the subject. There two persons were indicted under Rev. Stat. 5440 for conspiring to violate that law of the United States (Rev. Stat. 1781) which makes it a criminal offence to agree to give or to receive a bribe. The court held that agreeing to give or receive a bribe was the substantive offence and not a conspiracy. For when an offence, as bigamy or adultery, requires for its completion the concurrence of two persons, "the Government cannot evade the limitations by indicting as for a conspiracy." And in Queen v. Tyrrell, 1 Q. B. 711 (1894), where a girl under 15 years of age was prosecuted for inciting a man to commit adultery with her, one of the judges considered that she could not be found guilty because she was under the age of consent, and the other said that the statute did not apply because "there is no trace in the LAMAR and DAY, JJ., dissenting. 236 U.S. statute of any intention to treat the woman or girl as criminal." Applying these cases, it appears that under the White Slave Traffic Act there must be a woman who is transported and a person who compels or induces her to be transported or who aids her in such transportation. "There is no trace in the statute of any intention to treat the women or girls as criminals" for being transported, nor for agreeing that they will be transported, nor for aiding in the transportation. And if, as said in Commonwealth v. Willard, 22 Pick. 479, Congress had intended that they should be subject to indictment for conspiracy "it would have so declared by extending the penal consequences of the prohibited act to all persons aiding, counselling or encouraging the principal offender. There being no such provision in the statute, there is a strong implication that none such was intended by the legislature." To this may be added the practical consideration, that any construction making the woman liable for participation in the transportation will not only tend to prevent her from coming forward with her evidence, but in many instances she will be in position to claim her privilege and can refuse to testify on the ground that she might thereby subject herself to prosecution for conspiracy in that she aided in the violation of the law, even though it was intended for the protection of her unfortunate class. The woman, whether treated as the willing or an unwilling victim of such transportation for such business purpose, cannot be found guilty of the main offence nor punished for the incidental act of conspiring to be enslaved and transported. Indeed, if she could be so punished for conspiring with her slaver, the fundamental idea that makes the act valid would be destroyed. She would cease to be an object of traffic; and instead of being the subject of illegal transportation would-not be transported by a slaver as an object of interstate commerce, so as to be subject to regulative prohibitions under the Commerce Clause-but would be voluntarily traveling on her own account, and punishable by the laws of the State for prostitution practiced after her arrival. I am authorized to say that MR. JUSTICE DAY concurs in this dissent. WILMINGTON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY v. RAILROAD COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. No. 369. Argued December 15, 16, 1914.—Decided February 1, 1915. The mere existence of Federal power does not, while dormant, preclude the reasonable exercise of state authority as to those matters of interstate or foreign commerce which are distinctly local in character in order to meet the needs of suitable local protection until Congress does act. Congress may regulate interstate transportation by ferry as well as other interstate commercial intercourse; but, until it does, a State may prevent unreasonable charges for ferriage from a point of departure within its borders. A State may, in the absence of any action by Congress, prevent through proper orders of its Railroad Commission exorbitant charges for transportation having both origin and termination within the State and none of it being within any other State although a part of it may be over the high seas. 166 California, 741, affirmed. THE facts, which involve the power of the State Railroad Commission of California to regulate rates of trans Opinion of the Court. 236 U. S. portation between intrastate points where part of the transportation is on the high seas, are stated in the opinion. Mr. Edward E. Bacon, with whom Mr. James A. Gibson was on the brief, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Max Thelen, with whom Mr. Douglas Brookman and Mr. Allan P. Matthew were on the brief, for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the court. The Wilmington Transportation Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of California, is engaged as a common carrier of passengers and goods by sea, between San Pedro, on the mainland, and Avalon, on Santa Catalina Island, both places being within the County of Los Angeles in that State. Merchants at Avalon, insisting that the rates charged for this transportation were unreasonable, presented their complaint to the Railroad Commission of the State of California and asked that reasonable rates be fixed under the Public Utilities Act of 1911. Stats. (Cal.) 1911, Ex. Sess., p. 18. The Transportation Company challenged the authority of the Commission upon the ground that the business was subject exclusively to the regulating power of Congress. The Commission overruled the contention and its authority to prescribe reasonable rates between these ports of the State was sustained on writ of review by the state court. 166 California, 741. The case has been brought here on error. The vessels of the plaintiff in error, in their direct passage between the ports named, must traverse the high seas for upwards of twenty miles. Adopting the statement of the Commission, the Supreme Court of the State puts the case thus: "They do not touch at any other port, |