Opinion of the Court.

236 U.S.

obviate by this provision the undue production of fine coal to the disadvantage of the employer.

By § 5, the Industrial Commission is given power from time to time upon investigation to change the percentage by it ascertained and determined, or fixed by its previous orders.

The only penalty fixed by the law against the employer is contained in § 6, where it is made unlawful for the employer to pass the coal over a screen or other device, for the purpose of ascertaining and calculating the amount to be paid the miner or loader for mining or loading such contents, whereby the total weight of such contents shall be reduced or diminished.

There is nothing in the law to prevent the employer from screening his coal as he sees fit for other purposes, and so as to fit it for the market, in such wise as he may deem advisable. The inhibition on screening is only upon that operation when it is done for the purpose of calculating the amount to be paid to the miner for mining the coal. Moreover, it is important to be considered in this connection that the orders of the Commission are not final, but are subject to review under the statute of Ohio found in 103 Ohio Laws, at page 95, where the orders of the Commission are declared to be only prima facie reasonable, and any employer or other person interested is entitled upon petition to a hearing upon the reasonableness and lawfulness of the order before the Commission, and under § 38 of the law, any employer or other person in interest, being dissatisfied with any order of the Commission, may commence an action in the Supreme Court of Ohio to vacate or amend any such order upon the ground that the same is unreasonable or unlawful, and the Supreme Court is authorized to hear and determine such action and may, in its discretion (§ 41) suspend all or any part of the order of the Commission. The statute makes provision for the prompt hearing of all such actions, in prefer

ence to other civil cases, with some exceptions. It would seem that this system of law, with a right to review in the manner we have stated in the Supreme Court of Ohio, has provided a system ample for the protection of the rights of the employers (see Plymouth Coal Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531). And of course in this, as in other cases, only alleged infractions of constitutional rights of those complaining can be considered in determining the constitutionality of the law. Southern Ry. v. King, 217 U. S. 524, 534; Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260, 271; Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571, 576.

The objection that the law is unconstitutional as unduly abridging the freedom of contract in prescribing the particular method of compensation to be paid by employers to miners for the production of coal was made in the case of McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, in which this court sustained a law of the State of Arkansas requiring coal mined to be paid for according to the run of mine system according to its weight when brought out of the mine in cars. In that case the constitutional objections founded upon the right of contract which are made here were considered and disposed of. This court has so often affirmed the right of the State in the exercise of its police power to place reasonable restraints like that here involved, upon the freedom of contract that we need only refer to some of the cases in passing. Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578; Chicago &c. R. R. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, and cases therein cited and reviewed.

The contention that this law has no reasonable or legal relation to the object to be attained seems to us to be equally without foundation, in view of the recognized right of the legislature to regulate a business of this character, and to determine for itself, in the absence of arbitrary action, the measure of relief necessary to affect the desired purposes. That the law is within the authority

of the Ohio legislature, acting under the constitution of Ohio, there can be no question, in view of the authority conferred by that instrument in § 36, Art. II, which provides that "laws may be passed to provide for the regulation of methods of mining, weighing, measuring and marketing coal, oil, gas and other minerals."

As to the alleged impracticability of the law, because of the impossibility of the Industrial Commission determining the quantity of dirt and other impurities in any coal mined, we can find no force in that objection. Agreements as to the amount of docking for dirt and impurities in the mining of coal have been constantly made, and it is not the province of a court to revise conclusions which men versed in the business have found practicable, certainly not in advance of an attempt to put the law into operation. The consideration of the law already given shows the means enacted to do away with these impurities, and to insure as far as possible the production of clean coal.

As to the objection because of the penalties, this is not a suit to enforce penalties; nor in view of the provisions of the statute can we say that the penalties are so great as to prevent a resort to the courts to ascertain the constitutionality of the law. Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19; Grand Trunk Ry. v. Michigan Railroad Commission, 231 U. S. 457; Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576.

We are unable to discover in the statute any infraction of the constitutional rights of the appellant, and the order denying the temporary injunction is accordingly

Affirmed.

236 U.S.

Syllabus.

PENNSYLVANIA COMPANY v. UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.

No. 591. Argued December 14, 15, 1914.-Decided February 23, 1915.

Section 3 of the Act to Regulate Commerce forbids any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage in favor of any person, company, firm, corporation or locality, and what is such undue or unreasonable preference or advantage is not a question of law but of fact. The courts cannot set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission in regard to interchange of freight by carriers which does not contravene any constitutional limitation and is within the constitutional and statutory authority of that body and is not unsupported by testimony; such an order is only the exercise of the authority vested by the law in the Commission.

Although § 3 of the Act to Regulate Commerce remains in its original form, it must now be read in connection with amendments to, and subsequent provisions of, that Act by which the term transportation covers the entire carriage and services in connection with the receipt and delivery of property transported, including facilities of a terminal character for delivery. As so read, § 3 must be construed with a view to carrying out all the provisions of the Act as it now is and to make every part of it effective in accordance with the intention of Congress.

The Interstate Commission has jurisdiction to require an interstate carrier to receive and transport over its terminals carload interstate freight from one carrier having a physical connection with its lines on the same terms on which it performs such service for other connecting carriers similarly situated.

Such an order is not an appropriation of the terminal property of the carrier in violation of the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment but a regulation of its terminal facilities within the power properly delegated by Congress. Grand Trunk Ry. v. Michigan Railway Commission, 231 U. S. 457, followed; Louis. & Nash. R. R. v. Stock Yards Co., 212 U. S. 132, distinguished.

Congress may so control the terminal facilities of a carrier, and the Interstate Commerce Commission may make such orders, as will

Argument for Appellant.

236 U.S.

prevent creation of monopolies within the prohibitions and limitations of the Anti-trust Act. United States v. St. Louis Terminal, 224 U. S. 383.

214 Fed. Rep. 445, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the validity of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission regarding the establishment of joint and through rates to and from, and regulations as to switching cars at, New Castle, Pennsylvania, by the Pennsylvania Company, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Frederic D. McKenney, with whom Mr. A. P. Burgwin and Mr. Gordon Fisher were on the brief, for appellant:

In the absence of statute there is no principle of established law which requires one carrier to share the use and advantages of its terminals with another carrier, a competitor engaged in like business. As private property, still in the absence of statute, the use of terminals are the subject of contract at the will of their owner who may elect to share their advantages with some carriers while denying them to others. The only statute which concerns the present issue is the Act to Regulate Commerce, which, while forbidding (§ 3), undue or unreasonable preference or advantage "to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic," and though requiring common carriers subject to its provisions "according to their respective powers" to "afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of

property to and from their respective lines and those connecting therewith," expressly declares that "this shall not be construed as requiring any such common carrier to give the use of its tracks or terminal facilities to another carrier engaged in like business," such exception very accurately defining the very object and purpose which the Rochester Company in and by its proceeding before the