Papers in Game TheorySpringer Science & Business Media, 9. 3. 2013 - Počet stran: 260 This volume contains twelve of my game-theoretical papers, published in the period of 1956-80. It complements my Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation, Reidel, 1976, and my Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations, Cambridge University Press, 1977. These twelve papers deal with a wide range of game-theoretical problems. But there is a common intellectual thread going though all of them: they are all parts of an attempt to generalize and combine various game-theoretical solution concepts into a unified solution theory yielding one-point solutions for both cooperative and noncooperative games, and covering even such 'non-classical' games as games with incomplete information. SECTION A The first three papers deal with bargaining models. The first one discusses Nash's two-person bargaining solution and shows its equivalence with Zeuthen's bargaining theory. The second considers the rationality postulates underlying the Nash-Zeuthen theory and defends it against Schelling's objections. The third extends the Shapley value to games without transferable utility and proposes a solution concept that is at the same time a generaliza tion of the Shapley value and of the Nash bargaining solution. |
Obsah
On the Rationality Postulates Underlying the Theory of Coopera | 20 |
A Simplified Bargaining Model for the nPerson Cooperative | 44 |
A New Rationale | 73 |
A New Proof | 96 |
Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian | 115 |
Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian | 139 |
Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian | 154 |
Uses of Bayesian Probability Models in Game Theory | 171 |
An EquilibriumPoint Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Pro | 187 |
A New General Solution Concept for Both Cooperative and Non | 211 |
Rule Utilitarianism Rights Obligations and the Theory | 235 |
255 | |
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act-utilitarian agreement assume assumption attribute vector bargaining game basic probability distribution Bayesian game best reply c₁ c₂ called canonical equilibrium point cardinal utility choose coalition component game cooperative game corresponding decision rule defined denotes equation equilibrium point equilibrium strategy expectations final payoff vector game B G game G game theory games with incomplete given game given I-game given player Harsanyi I-game G imputation incomplete information Lemma mathematical maximization mixed strategy moral n-person n-pure n-tuple Nash solution noncooperative game normal form normalized strategy outcome P₁ parties payoff function payoff proposal payoff vector player i's possible postulate probability mass function problem Proof pure strategies rational behavior reactive strategies REINHARD SELTEN rule-utilitarian satisfying Shapley value solution concept stable sets stage stationary set strategy combination subgame subjective probability distributions Suppose syndicate Theorem tion tracing procedure two-person U₁ U₂ utilitarian variables vote voters