LETTER L.

OCTOBER, 15 1833.

MR. JEFFERSON professes, in his communications to Congress, to be conscientiously careful of a "just economy;" he assumes to be impartial in all dealings with foreign nations; and scrupulously attentive to national honor. His pretensions in all these respects, may be tested by a single transaction.

The boundaries of Louisiana not having been defined, and Spain being exasperated at the purchase, a state of hostility had arisen with Spain, which Mr. Jefferson hoped to allay by negotiation. Mr. Monroe, the ever-ready diplomatist of Mr. Jefferson, was sent to Madrid, and there passed five months in an humiliating attempt at compromise. He was, at length, bold enough to say, that there were but two modes, arbitration, or war. Spain answered, that she should not choose arbitration.

Mr. Jefferson was compelled to make a communication to Congress, which was confidential, and secret, and wherein he makes known, that the very difficulties, (so far as France and Spain were concerned,) which the federalists had predicted, had actually occurred. This message is dated the 6th December, 1806, and from it the following extracts are made. "A convention was accordingly entered into between our minister of Madrid, and the minister of Spain "for foreign affairs, by which it was agreed, that spoliations "by Spanish subjects, in Spain, should be paid for by that "nation; those committed by French subjects, and carried "into Spanish ports, should remain for further discussion. "Before this convention was returned to Spain with our "ratification, the transfer of Louisiana by France, took "place, an event as unexpected as disagreeable to Spain.

"From that moment, she seemed to change her conduct "and disposition towards us. It was first manifested by "her protest against the right of France to alienate Louis"iana to us; which was, however, soon retracted; and the right confirmed. (How?) Then, high offence was mani"fested at the act of Congress, establishing a collection dis"trict on the Mobile. She now refused to ratify the con"vention, &c."

The message goes on to say, that James Monroe was sent over, to settle boundaries. Spain reserved herself for events." Monroe, after five months' labor, effected nothing; no indemnity for spoliations; no acknowledgment of limits beyond the Iberville; and that "our line to the west was one "which would have left us but a string of land on the Mis

sissippi." Each party was thus left to pursue its own measures. Those which they have chosen to pursue, "authorize "the inference, that it is their intention to advance, on our "possessions, until met by an opposing force." "France "took the ground, that they acquired no right beyond the "Iberville, and meant to deliver us none beyond it.” "The "protection of our citizens, the spirit and honor of our country require, that force should be interposed to a cer"tain degree." "The course to be pursued will require the "command of means, which it belongs to Congress exclusively, to yield, or deny."

Thus we have Mr. Jefferson's own admission that every evil which his political adversaries had foretold, had occurred, so far as they could occur, within the time between his purchase, and the writing of his message. There was certainly "a speck of war;" how this was prevented from enlarging, will be seen by the application of means which Congress could yield or deny. What did Mr. Jefferson really mean by this message? Just what circumstances might make it best to have it mean.

It was no new thing for Mr. Jefferson to express himself

so ambiguously, as to meet any contingency, that might arise. If Congress were willing to go to war, the message was adapted to that end; if Congress were willing to vote money, the message was adapted to that end. The latter was Mr. Jefferson's purpose. Astonishing as the fact may be, Congress did place two millions of dollars at the disposal of Mr. Jefferson, which sum was to be applied to settling the troubles with Spain. The money was not so applied; but it was actually sent to France, in the United States ship Hornet, for no other reason than that France wanted money and must have it; and that there was no other way to avoid a war both with France, and Spain!

The proof of these facts comes from no less a personage than John Randolph, who was then a Jeffersonian; but he was so disgusted with this double dealing, and so shocked at the degradation of the country, that he published a pamphlet signed Decius, in which he tells the truth, as to this transaction. If it be asked, how this is known to have been John Randolph's work, the answer is, that it was ascribed to him at the time, and not denied; that the internal evidence is irresistible, as it states facts which no one but John Randolph, the President, Mr. Madison, (then Secretary of State,) and Mr. Gallatin, (then Secretary of the Treasury,) could have known; and, lastly, the narration in this pamphlet accords with facts publicly known. From this pamphlet the following extracts are made.

Mr. Randolph was chairman of the committee, to whom this message was referred. He says, in his pamphlet: "The chairman of the committee, to whom the confidential

message was referred, immediately waited on the President, " and informed him of the direction which had been given "to it. He then learned, not without surprise, that an "appropriation of two millions was wanted to purchase "Florida. He told the President, that he would never agree to such a measure, because the money had not been

"asked for in the message; that he would not consent to "shift to his own shoulders, or those of the house, the "proper responsibility of the executive; if the money had "been explicitly demanded, he should have been averse to "granting it, because, after a total failure of every attempt

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at negotiation, such a step would disgrace us for ever, because France would never withhold her ill offices, when, "by their interposition, she could extort money from us; "that it was equally to the interest of the United States, to "accommodate the matter by an exchange of territory; (to "this mode of settlement the President seemed much "opposed;) that the nations of Europe, like the Barbary "powers, would, hereafter, refuse to look on the credentials "of our ministers, without a previous douceur, and much more to the same purpose."

"The committee met on the 7th of December. One of "its members, (Bidwell, of Massachusetts,) construed the "message into a requisition of money, for foreign intercourse, "and proposed a grant to that effect; this was overruled. "He himself, when the subject was agitated in the House, "would not avow the same construction of the message, "which he had given in committee. On the 14th of De"cember, the chairman was obliged to go to Baltimore, and "did not return till the 21st. During this interval, the despatches from Mr. Monroe, of the 18th and 25th of "October, were received by government. Previous to the "chairman's departure, having occasion to call on the Secretary of State, (Madison,) he was told by that officer, "that France would not permit Spain to adjust her differences with us; that France wanted money, and that we "must give it to her, or have a Spanish and French war!”

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Mr. Randolph returned from Baltimore on the 21st, and convened the committee. As they were assembling, he goes on to say, "the Secretary of the Treasury, (Mr. "Gallatin,) called him aside, and put into his hands a paper

The

"headed Provision for the purchase of Florida.' "chairman declared he would not vote a shilling; he expressed himself disgusted with the whole of this procedure, "which he could not but consider as highly disingenuous; "that the most scrupulous care had been taken to cover the "reputation of the administration, while Congress were ex"pected to act as though they had no character to lose; "that whilst the official language of the Executive was con"sistent and dignified, (quoting the words of the message,)

Congress was privately required to take upon itself the "odium of shrinking from the national honor, and national "defence, and of delivering the public purse to the first cut"throat that demanded it. From the official communica"tions-from the face of the record it would appear, that "the executive had discharged his duty, in recommending "manly and vigorous measures, which he had been obliged "to abandon-and had been compelled by Congress, to

pursue an opposite course, when, in fact, Congress had "been acting, all the while, at executive instigation. The "chairman further observed, that he did not understand this "double set of opinions, and principles; the one ostensible,

to go upon the journals, and before the public; the other "the efficient, and real motives to action; that he held true "wisdom, and cunning, to be utterly incompatible in the "conduct of great affairs: that he had strong objections to "the measure itself, but in the shape in which it was pre"sented, his repugnance to it was insuperable. In a subse66 'quent conversation with the President himself, in which "those objections were recapitulated, he declared that he “too had a character to support, and principles to maintain, "and avowed his determined opposition to the whole "scheme."

Mr. Randolph proceeds to state that a proposition, the avowed object of which was to enable the President to open a negotiation for Florida, now came upon the table. Mr.