feeling and emotion. It was a part of the necessary economy of the new life that there should be a House of the Lord, where the chosen persons were to come by whom the Life was to be developed and perfected. There were to be certain primary elements personalized by those who were to dwell in the House of the Lord, and these elements were wisdom, wifehood, motherhood, meekness and purity of meekness, the element of fatherhood apparently being overlooked in the scheme, unless it was represented by wisdom, which was personalized by the defendant. It appears from what was before stated, that Mrs. Bridges thought for a time that she was to represent motherhood, but afterward the defendant declared her in default, and she herself found that there was too much mortality and perversion in her. The new Spirit was to be the messenger of the new time to abolish mortality and perversion, but when the defendant came to anything definite it was something about the relation of the sexes. The Book of Truth makes numerous allusions to some person who is to fulfill the work of Absolute Life. In the later work these are applied to Mildred Bridges, and, indeed, they would naturally be applied to her. She is described as the chosen one of the defendant; his treasure; the idol of his heart; the wife of his life and the wife of his spirit. That she was the one intended is shown by the statement that the life which she once rejected, which later she tolerated and which afterwards she accepted, had in the last days of the opening of the new dispensation come to be her whole living, her whole way of thought, her whole interest. The book is filled with high-flown effusions having no coherence or sequence, describing her beauty, sweetness and grace, which are just the sort of thing to attract an emotional, impressionable and sentimental girl seventeen years of age at the time of the trial. Much of the discussions of the relations of the sexes is so extremely plain in its language as to make it unsuitable for these pages, but the sex relation is the central idea and 258 - 11 purpose of all of defendant's writings and teachings. Under the head of personality he says: "Whatever has taken place, in the incoming of Absolute Life, that cannot be recorded without being misunderstood by the mortal world, in the midst of which those things must come, will be reported from person to person, among those who have the right to hear and are able to understand. From generation to generation those things shall be known, the deeper truth of God's way being conveyed without subjecting them to the criticism and prejudice of the world." The practice of the defendant was the well known and usual one of those who attempt to inaugurate new and eccentric systems of so-called religions, who collect about them girls and women, not of the coarse, gross or vulgar sort, but of emotional natures, to whom their theories are attractive. Such persons furnish a fertile soil for implanting their doctrines. There was to be a period of incubation in the House of the Lord for five years, and upon the full development of Absolute Life and the coming of the new dispensation the old order of things was to pass away; but it seems that the defendant could hardly have expected that result from nesting in a flat with two girls for a few years. Rather it would appear that he was making a religion for a couple of girls and their mothers than for the world at large. It is immaterial whether the defendant was an impostor or sincere in his beliefs, so far as they did not conflict with the laws of the land. He had a perfect right to believe in any theory of spiritual life that he saw fit and to preach and teach it. Absolute religious liberty is guaranteed to the citizen, but he is not permitted to violate the laws of the land under the guise of a new religion. Whether the defendant was a dissembler, hypocrite, pretender and humbug or the sincere advocate of a new religious doctrine is immaterial to the question of his guilt or innocence. The ultimate object of establishing the home of the work and the House of the Lord and inducing Mil dred Bridges to live there and remain away from her home was the develpoment of the defendant's theories for the production of a new and perfect race. There is no evidence, nor even a suggestion, that this end was to be attained except through him and his immediate disciples and followers, consisting of two girls and their mothers. The evidence was sufficient to show that defendant influenced Mildred Bridges and fascinated her in a way to attract her from her home with the intent forbidden by the statute. The instruction on circumstantial evidence which is given in almost every criminal case was given to the jury and is objected to on the ground that the corpus delicti can not be proved by circumstantial evidence. It has been held that confessions are not sufficient to convict without other proof of the corpus delicti, (Andrews v. People, 117 Ill. 195; Bartley v. People, 156 id. 234;) but it is not the rule that the corpus delicti cannot be proved by circumstantial evidence. (Campbell v. People, 159 Ill. 9; People v. Cotton, 250 id. 338; 12 Cyc. 488; 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,-2d ed.—863; Elliott on Evidence, sec. 3046.) The indictment contained counts charging the defendant with contributing to the delinquency of Mildred Bridges. An instruction was given on the subject, which is objected to because there was no evidence on which to base it. The jury acquitted him of the offense of contributing to delinquency and the instruction did no harm. Two instructions tendered by the defendant were refused and the refusal is complained of. One of them was not the law and it was not error to refuse the other. One of them told the jury that unless every fact in the chain of proof was established beyond a reasonable doubt the entire chain would give way and the verdict should be not guilty, and the other was a cautionary instruction not accurate in its language. The judgment is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. ETHEL M. FOSTER, Admx., Defendant in Error, vs. Opinion filed February 20, 1913-Rehearing denied April 3, 1913. I. TRESPASS-when trespass vi et armis is a proper form of action. Trespass vi et armis is a proper form of action to recover damages for the death of the plaintiff's intestate, caused by the direct and immediate force and violence of the defendant in wrongfully shooting him. 2. HOMICIDE when defendant is not liable for shooting a supposed burglar. One who in good faith shoots and kills another believing it is necessary to prevent the commission of a burglary upon his residence is not liable in damages to the estate of the deceased, even though the supposed attempt at burglary was a mere jest, provided the circumstances are such that other reasonable men would have been alike mistaken as to the purposes of the deceased. 3. SAME-the doctrine of self-defense is applicable to an act in defense of habitation. The doctrine of self-defense, which holds that one threatened with danger may in good faith act upon appearances, and will not be liable for a mistake in the extent of the danger if from all the facts and circumstances it can be seen that other reasonable men would have believed a resort to selfdefense was necessary, is applicable to an act committed in defense of habitation as well as one committed in defense of person. 4. SAME-party may be justified in resorting to force though it was not, in fact, necessary. Where a person is committing acts in or about a dwelling which reasonably and in good faith are believed by the occupant thereof to manifest a felonious intent the latter may resort to force to repel the attack or prevent the felony, and his act may be justifiable under the law of self-defense even though it turns out that no felony was contemplated but the only design was to frighten those in the dwelling. 5. SAME-circumstances must be such as to excite the fears of a reasonable person. In order that a person may be justified in killing another in defense of his habitation, where his act is based entirely upon appearances, the circumstances must be such as to excite the fears of a reasonable person and the act must be the result of such reasonable fears. 6. SAME whether circumstances justified resort to violence is a question for the jury. Whether the killing of one person by an 1 other occurred under circumstances which justified the act under the doctrine of self-defense or was the result of some other motive is a question of fact to be determined by the jury, under proper instructions, from a consideration of the evidence. 7. EVIDENCE—when a statement by deceased as to intention of staying all night at his mother's is not admissible. A statement made by the deceased several hours before he was killed, that he intended to stay all night at his mother's house, is not admissible, there being no act connected with such statement which would make it properly a part of the res gestæ. 8. TRIAL-when excluding testimony does not cure error in admitting it. Error in admitting incompetent evidence is not cured. by the action of the court in subsequently striking it out, where it is apparent from the conduct of counsel that they knew the evidence would have to be stricken out but secured its admission for the evident purpose of getting the benefit from the impression the evidence would make upon the minds of the jurors even though it should be immediately stricken out. 9. SAME it is not error for counsel to refer to facts in the case though they appeal to sympathy of jury. It is not error for counsel, in arguing the case to the jury, to call their attention to facts in the case which they have a right to consider, even though a consideration thereof must appeal to their sympathy. 10. WITNESSES-when defendant may testify in suit by administratrix. Where the administratrix attempts to prove a statement made by the defendant to a third party as being an admission against his interest, the defendant has a right not only to deny making the statement, but also to prove such other parts of the conversation as tend to explain or destroy the admission. II. CORONER'S VERDICT—admissibility of coroner's verdict in a civil suit for damages. In a civil suit for damages for the shooting of the plaintiff's intestate, so much of the coroner's verdict as states that the deceased was killed by a bullet from a gun in the hands of the defendant, "who in our opinion was justified in the act," is admissible as a necessary part of the verdict, but portions of the verdict finding mere evidentiary facts should be excluded. VICKERS and FARMER, JJ., dissenting. WRIT OF ERROR to the Appellate Court for the Third District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Moultrie county; the Hon. W. G. COCHRAN, Judge, presiding. |