the engineer recommends that part of it shall be tiled and part of it be an open ditch. The petition failing to describe, in any manner, the character of the drain, does not comply with the provisions of the statute. While the location of the starting point, terminus and proposed route could readily be more accurately described than they are, we are not prepared to say that, taking the plat in connection with the description in the petition on these points, the petition in these particulars does not comply with the statute. In stating this we assume that the location of the depression called the "Tennessee," and the Jackson branch, referred to in the petition, could readily be located on the land.

It is further insisted that the description of the lands to be affected by the proposed drain is not sufficiently definite to comply with the provisions of the statute. Section 2 of the Levee act provides that the petition shall give “a general description of the lands proposed to be affected, with the names of the owners, when known," etc. We think, fairly construed, that this means that such a description of the lands shall be given in the petition that a person familiar with real estate descriptions could, if necessary, locate the tracts and fix the boundaries of the district with reasonable accuracy. In view of our holdings in this case we do not think it necessary in this opinion to decide as to the sufficiency of certain of these legal descriptions alleged to be defective. The same may be said as to other questions which have been raised as to the legality of certain orders entered by the trial court in continuing the cause from time to time, and also as to an order amending the record.

For the errors indicated the judgment of the county court will be reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

FRANK J. BURNS et al. Appellees, vs. THE Illinois CenTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.

Opinion filed April 19, 1913.

I. APPEALS AND ERRORS-what necessary to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction on ground that a constitutional question is involved. To give the Supreme Court jurisdiction upon the ground that a constitutional question is involved such question must really exist and be presented in the case and be one which has not been previously settled.

2. SAME when constitutional question is not involved. A constitutional question is not involved unless there is a debatable question as to the validity of the statute attacked, and after such question has been once presented to the Supreme Court and considered and decided it cannot be said to be debatable.

3. SAME-when the Supreme Court will not assume jurisdiction of a direct appeal. If it appears that the only constitutional question involved has been settled and is no longer open to doubt or debate, the Supreme Court will not assume jurisdiction of the appeal merely to refer to its former decisions.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-validity of Attorney's Lien law is not a debatable question. The validity of the Attorney's Lien law was determined in the case of Standidge v. Chicago Railways Co. 254 Ill. 524, and is no longer a debatable question.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Kankakee county; the Hon. CHARLES B. CAMPBELL, Judge, presiding.

HUNTER & SCHNEIDER, (JOHN G. DRENNAN, of counsel,) for appellant.

FRANK J. BURNS, for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE VICKERS delivered the opinion of the court:

A suit was brought by Joseph Lococo against the Illinois Central Railroad Company to recover damages for personal injury. A verdict and judgment for $600 were recovered and the amount has been paid. Lococo was under twenty-one years of age, and it appears that the amount of the verdict was in pursuance of a compromise agreement

which had before that time been entered into with Lococo through his next friend, and that the suit was commenced and verdict rendered because the plaintiff, being a minor, did not have the capacity to bind himself by a settlement out of court. Savary & Ruel filed the declaration and represented Lococo in the court proceedings. Afterwards Frank J. Burns and James T. Burns, another law firm dóing business as Burns & Burns, claiming that they had been employed to represent Lococo, filed a petition in the circuit court of Kankakee county against the Illinois Central Railroad Company for the purpose of establishing a lien against said company for their fees under the Attorney's Lien law. The court, upon a hearing of the petition, rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners for $200. The railroad company prayed for and obtained an appeal direct to this

court.

Among other errors assigned is one questioning the validity of the Attorney's Lien law. In the brief and argument filed there is some criticism of said law, and an argument is submitted as to how it should be construed. If this court has jurisdiction of this cause by direct appeal it is because the constitutionality of the Attorney's Lien law of 1909 is directly involved. To give this court jurisdiction of an appeal directly from the trial court on the ground that a constitutional question is involved, such question must really exist and be presented in the case and one that has not been previously settled. It is not enough merely to assign an error that a law is unconstitutional or to present such question in an argument when such question has been previously settled by this court. (City of Virden v. Allan, 107 Ill. 505.) A constitutional question cannot be said to be involved unless there is a debatable question as to the validity of the statute, and a question cannot be said to be debatable after it has been once presented to this court, considered and decided. (Beach v. Peabody, 188 Ill. 75; Griveau v. South Chicago City Railway Co. 213 id. 633.)

Where this court can see that the constitutional question raised has been settled and is no longer open to doubt or debate, we will not assume jurisdiction of a direct appeal merely for the purpose of referring to our former decision. (Boylan v. Chicago Title and Trust Co. 240 Ill. 413.) In the late case of Standidge v. Chicago Railways Co. 254 Ill. 524, the validity of the Attorney's Lien law was presented to this court and determined. So far as the jurisdictional question is concerned, appellant's brief is merely an invitation to this court to re-trace its steps and overrule the Standidge case.

This court has no jurisdiction of this appeal. There being no debatable constitutional question involved in this case this court is without jurisdiction. The appeal should have gone to the Appellate Court.

The clerk of this court will transfer the record to the Appellate Court for the Second District.

Appeal transferred.

ROBERT PRINCE et al. Appellees, vs. GEORGE R. PRINCE,

Appellant.

Opinion filed April 19, 1913.

1. DEEDS―manual delivery not essential to constitute delivery of deed. While delivery of a deed is necessary to pass title it is not essential that there be an actual manual delivery, as the test of delivery is the intent with which the acts relied upon as equivalent to actual delivery were done, and this intent is to be gathered from the conduct of the parties and all the surrounding circumstances. 2. SAME when deed will be regarded as delivered. Where the grantor executes a deed to his son during the latter's absence in a foreign State, reserving a life estate in the grantor and his wife, and the grantor at the same time causes a receipt in the same amount as the consideration named in the deed to be prepared as being in full of all claims of the son against the grantor for wages or otherwise, which receipt he has the son sign upon his return, it must be held, in the absence of clear proof to the contrary, that

the grantor intended the deed to presently pass title, even though he subsequently claims that the deed was recorded without his knowledge or consent by the third party having its custody and it is shown that the grantee never had manual possession thereof.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Henry county; the Hon. EMERY C. GRAVES, Judge, presiding.

ANDERSON & ANDREWS, for appellant.

JOHN T. CUMMINGS, for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court: This action was begun by appellees, who were complainants in the court below, filing a bill in chancery at the November, 1910, term of the circuit court of Henry county against appellant, defendant below, to set aside as a cloud upon their title a certain deed of conveyance made and executed by them on September 5, 1908, purporting to convey to appellant, subject to a life estate reserved to complainants and the survivor of them, the following described real estate: The south-east quarter of the south-east quarter of section 25, the north-west quarter of the south-east quarter of section 25, and the north-east quarter of the south-east quarter of section 36, all in township 16, north, range 5, east of the fourth principal meridian, in Henry county, Illinois.

Appellees, Robert Prince and Dell Prince, are husband and wife, and appellant is the son of Robert Prince by a former marriage. Robert Prince had another son, named Oscar, and three daughters, by said former marriage but no children by his present wife, Dell Prince. Several years before the deed sought to be set aside was made, Oscar Prince left home and never thereafter lived with or rendered any services for his parents. Appellant lived with his father and worked on his father's farm which is the subject of this litigation, until about the fall of 1909, when

258 - 20