the provisions of the statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor in anti-saloon territory. So far as this record shows, it was not a bona fide club organized for the purpose, as stated in the application for a charter, of maintaining club rooms for social purposes. The record discloses the name of no person exercising any control over the management of the club except plaintiff in error and a steward, who, as an employee, was paid a salary of $15 per week, and who performed substantially the same duties as are usually performed by a bar-tender in an ordinary dramshop. The evidence of plaintiff in error concerning the method of conducting the club and the manner in which members obtained the supplies of liquor which were consumed by them is not corroborated by any of the other alleged officers or directors of the club or by any of the members or other persons interested in the club. So far as the evidence shows, the club had no constitution or bylaws and held no stated meetings, and a formal application, which does not seem to have required the approval of any one connected with the club except plaintiff in error or the steward, and the payment of $2 for keys to the door of the club room and to a locker, were all that was required to constitute an applicant a member of the club. If the club had a president, plaintiff in error made no reference to such fact in naming the officers of the club. Neither did he enumerate any duties which Coyle, as secretary, performed. The payment of membership dues does not seem to have been one of the requirements of this club, and it is hardly probable that the revenues derived from the sources mentioned by plaintiff in error could have been sufficient to meet the expenses of the club, which amounted to over $185 per month, his testimony being that the membership had at no time exceeded 170. Neither can plaintiff in error's testimony relating to the method by which members obtained liquor in the club room, nor his statement that no liquor

was sold in the club room, be reconciled with the testimony of the witnesses for the People. If the testimony of Morgan is to be taken as true, the case of beer ordered by him, instead of being shipped from Bushnell, was in the city of Galesburg at the time he signed the order, as it would have been impossible, as plaintiff in error admitted in his testimony, to have transmitted this order to Bushnell and to have received the case of beer in Galesburg the same afternoon. Neither can his testimony that no liquor was kept at the Heidelburg Club except such as belonged to individual members of the club be reconciled with the testimony of Morgan and Avery that persons obtained beer and whisky from the bar-tender (or, as he was termed by plaintiff in error, the steward,) without the formality of exchanging that taken from a locker for that kept behind the bar, nor with the testimony of Castle that he paid the porter for a bottle of whisky which he and his companions obtained and drank in the club room. The jury were justified in believing, from the evidence, that plaintiff in error, under the pretense that the Heidelburg Club was maintaining a club. room in the rear of his cigar store, was, in fact, engaged in selling intoxicating liquor in that room in violation of the statutes of this State. The trial court did not err in refusing to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence.

The tenth and eleventh instructions offered by plaintiff in error were properly refused because both assumed as a fact that Frohlich & Nerdlinger, wholesale liquor dealers at Bushnell, sold the case of beer to Morgan which Morgan testified he obtained at the Heidelburg Club room on July 6, 1911, and that the only question for the jury to decide was whether plaintiff in error in this transaction was acting as the agent for Morgan or for the wholesale liquor firm. As hereinbefore pointed out, if Morgan's testimony to the effect that he found the beer in his locker within two or three hours after he signed the order is true, then Froh

lich & Nerdlinger did not sell that beer to Morgan, and the jury had the right to believe from this circumstance, together with the other circumstances appearing from the evidence, that the real seller of the case of beer to Morgan was plaintiff in error. For this reason it would have been error for the court to have given either the tenth or eleventh instruction offered by plaintiff in error.

Complaint is made of the refusal of the seventh instruction, which would have advised the jury that when a person exchanges a bottle of his own liquor for another bottle of his own liquor it is not a violation of the statute making it an offense to exchange intoxicating liquor. Some of the counts of the information charged plaintiff in error with the unlawful exchange of intoxicating liquor. The jury did not find him guilty under any of these counts, and the error, if any, in refusing this instruction was therefore not prejudicial.

It is finally urged that the fifth instruction offered by plaintiff in error should have been given. This instruction would have advised the jury that "the evidence of a private detective upon questions of disputed fact arising in criminal cases should always be received with a large degree of caution," etc., being the same instruction set out in Needham v. People, 98 Ill. 275, but which was not there either discussed or approved. In the subsequent case of Hronck v. People, 134 Ill. 139, we held that such an instruction does not contain a correct proposition of law and that it is not error to refuse it. For the reasons given in the case last mentioned the court did not err in refusing this instruction. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

LEVI S. CORRELL, Appellee, vs. HUGH M. GREIDER, Appellant.

Opinion filed April 19, 1913-Rehearing denied June 4, 1913.

1. PLEADING—when a bill to reform a deed sufficiently alleges mutual mistake. Where a bill to reform a deed sets out the agreement of all the parties that the deed should be so drawn as to convey a base fee to the complainant's wife conditioned upon her surviving the complainant, an allegation that by the mistake of the scrivener the agreement was not incorporated in the deed is broad enough to permit proof of the mistake of fact and that it was mutual and common to all the parties.

2. STATUTE OF FRAUDS-Statute of Frauds is no defense to bill to reform a deed. The Statute of Frauds cannot be pleaded as a defense to a bill to reform a deed for a mutual mistake of fact.

3. MISTAKE what does not prove that there was no mistake in deed. The fact that the person to whom a deed was made conveying the fee executed a will, which was probated, disposing of the property as her own, does not prove that there was no mutual mistake in drawing the deed to convey a fee simple absolute instead of a base fee conditioned upon her outliving her husband, where it appears the wife was not of sound mind when she made the will.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. JAMES A. Creighton, Judge, presiding.

THOMAS L. JARRETT, for appellant.

ALBERT SALZENSTEIN, and T. J. CONDON, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE COOKE delivered the opinion of the court: On August 3, 1905, appellee, Levi S. Correll, filed his bill in the circuit court of Sangamon county for the correction of a deed. The bill alleged that on January 19, 1900, appellee purchased from Samuel D. Scholes a farm consisting of eighty-seven acres, in Sangamon county; that under the terms of purchase appellee was to pay $7423.30 for said real estate, of which $4023.30 was paid in cash and a note and mortgage given to secure the balance; that

it was agreed between appellee and Scholes that the latter should convey the premises to the wife of appellee, Annie E. Correll, and in the event that she pre-deceased him the premises to go to him, and that this was to be so written in the deed; that appellee made the cash payment out of his own money and estate and also subsequently paid the mortgage indebtedness; that through some mistake or oversight of the scrivener, unknown to Scholes and appellee, the deed was so drawn as to convey the premises to said Annie E. Correll in fee simple, instead of conveying to her a base or qualified fee subject to being defeated upon her dying before appellee; that neither appellee nor said Scholes discovered this mistake until after the death of said Annie E. Correll, which occurred on October 16, 1904; that Annie E. Correll left surviving her as her only heirs, appellee, her husband, and appellant, Hugh M. Greider, a son of a deceased sister; that she died testate, and her last will and testament has been duly admitted to probate in the probate court of Sangamon county. By her will, which was dated October 14, 1904, and is set out in the bill in hæc verba, Mrs. Correll bequeathed certain items of personal property to various persons and devised to appellee a life estate in said real estate, and directed that at his death the same should be sold and the proceeds distributed, $2500 to appellant, $1000 to another devisee named, and the balance to be divided equally among the brothers and sisters of appellee or their bodily heirs. The bill then alleged that until after the probate of said will appellee had always been under the impression and believed that the deed to said premises had been executed according to the agreement between himself and Scholes, and that he then applied to Scholes for a correction thereof, but on account of the death of his said wife and the execution of her will Scholes refused to correct the deed except through court proceedings; that since the death of his wife and the probate of her will all of the brothers and sisters of appellee, and the