objection, that the reason he did so was that he did not regard the testator as competent to make a will. This was improper. The witness should have been limited to a statement of the facts, and then to the expression of an opinion, based upon those facts, as to the mental capacity of the testator at the time the will was drawn.

We have thus reviewed the most important facts developed by the testimony in so far as they throw light on the mental condition of the testator when the will was executed. The testator lived seven years after the date of his will. He was about ninety years old at the time of his death. After he had the small-pox, in 1907, and the stroke of apoplexy, there is abundant proof that his mind failed and that he was a sufferer from senile dementia. This testimony we have not thought important to consider, since, whatever his condition may have been from 1907 up to the time of his death, that condition is not inconsistent with testamentary capacity in 1904. We have not attempted to review in detail all of the testimony or to refer to that given by each witness on either side. We have, however, read the entire testimony and considered it carefully, and when the proper testimony bearing upon the mental capacity of the testator at the date of the execution of the will is considered, there is not enough testimony tending to sustain appellees' contention to raise a suspicion in our minds that the testator was of unsound mind at that time. The record in this case will be searched in vain for a well established act of the testator, prior to the time the will was executed, that is inconsistent with his testamentary capacity. The testator was an uneducated farmer. He had lived and moved within the radius of a comparatively small circle. His life was of that simple, frugal character that one would expect of a man in like circumstances. He worked upon his farm, grew crop after crop and marketed the same, did a little banking business, and his other business transactions were limited to the usual and ordinary

transactions which became necessary in the course of his farming business. He was devoted to his invalid wife, whom he watched over and nursed tenderly until she was taken from him. Some of the witnesses say that they noticed a change in the testator after his wife died. This is not surprising. This aged couple had lived together as husband and wife for more than sixty years. They were devoted to each other. It was nearly forty years since the last of their children had married and moved away. When his wife died the testator was eighty-three years of age. After she was taken from him he was left alone. The evidence shows that he was very much depressed after his wife died; that he frequently said that "she has gone and I do not care how soon I may follow her." While under the shadow of a grief so appalling it is not surprising that this old man would occasionally pass persons on the roadway without recognizing them. It was after the death of his wife that he purchased the phonograph which afforded him so much entertainment. His interest in the phonograph, as well as other manifestations of a change in his life and conduct, is readily explainable by the fact that he had lost his life partner. The evidence, however, shows that he recovered to a great extent from the effect of his bereavement. As already pointed out, he spent much of his time among his neighbors and friends and became cheerful. In the spring of 1905, after the will was executed, he went to the bank, drew out $160, bought a new suit of clothes and went to Greeley, Colorado, to visit his son. There can be no doubt that he was entirely rational at this time. He made his plans and preparations for the trip, purchased his ticket and went alone. He consulted no one and received no assistance. During the entire summer and fall that he was at Greeley his conduct was that of a man in the full possession of his faculties. There was no suspicion that he was not entirely able to take care of himself and attend to his own affairs then as well as at any previous time in

his life. If he had been suffering from senile dementia, which is known to be an incurable and a progressive disease, in November, 1904, it is inconceivable that he would be able to make the long trip to Colorado alone; that he would during the entire summer of 1905 be able to go about looking at mountain scenery, taking his grandchildren with him to attend Frontier day at Cheyenne,—in short, to do all of the things that any reasonable and rational man under like circumstances would have done. These facts are not disputed by anyone, and we have the testimony of Dr. Fuqua, who knew him very intimately, that there was nothing in the conduct or appearance of the testator in 1905 to indicate that he had any symptoms of senile dementia. This testimony, when considered in connection with that given by the two Webbers, who saw the testator and conversed with him on the day the will was executed and whose opportunity to form an opinion as to his mental capacity on that day was much better than that of any of the other witnesses who have testified, removes every doubt of the soundness of the testator's mind on the day the will was executed.

Appellants have assigned numerous errors upon the rulings of the court in giving and refusing instructions and upon the admission of the testimony. Under the view that we have of the merits of this controversy it is not necessary to notice these assignments of error. The verdict of the jury is so clearly against the evidence that the decree based thereon cannot stand, regardless of all other questions. The evidence is not sufficient, in our opinion, to raise a well grounded suspicion that the testator was of unsound mind on the day he executed his will.

The decree of the circuit court of Champaign county is reversed and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff in Error, vs. ALBERT SHAYNIN, Defendant in Error.

Opinion filed February 20, 1913-Rehearing denied April 3, 1913.

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-a city has power to prohibit conducting of museum of anatomy. Under clause 75 of section I of article 5 of the Cities and Villages act, authorizing a city to declare what shall be a nuisance and abate the same, a city has power to prohibit the conducting of a museum of anatomy, even though it is operated in connection with a place where medical treatment is offered for profit.

2. SAME business conducted indecently may be prohibited under police power of a city. A city has power, under clause 66 of section I of article 5 of the Cities and Villages act, to prohibit the conduct of a business in a manner which is indecent and against good morals.

3. SAME when city's determination that a thing is a nuisance is final. Even though it may be doubtful whether an exhibition or business tends to immorality and there may be an honest difference of opinion as to whether such exhibition or business should be suppressed, the declaration of the city that it is a nuisance is final.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ordinance tending to preserve public morals is constitutional. An ordinance prohibiting an exhibition or business which is against decency and good morals is not in violation of section 1 of article 2 of our constitution nor of section of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal constitution.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. HENRY C. BEITLER, Judge, presiding.

WILLIAM H. SEXTON, Corporation Counsel, (LEON HORNSTEIN, of counsel,) for plaintiff in error.

JOHN A. SWANSON, AARON HEIMS, and DANIEL BYRNES, for defendant in error.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a quasi criminal proceeding brought against defendant in error for violation of an ordinance of the city of Chicago passed February 19, 1912, prohibiting the con

ducting or operating of any exhibition commonly known as a museum of anatomy. Jury was waived and the cause was submitted to the court. After hearing, the court held the ordinance invalid and discharged defendant in error. Thereupon the trial judge certified that the validity of a municipal ordinance was involved, and that in his opinion. the public interest required that the case should be brought directly to this court.

Section 1 of this ordinance, which is the only one necessary to be considered, reads as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to own, conduct or operate any exhibition commonly known as a museum of anatomy, or other exhibition, show or place of amusement which is open to the general public, whether admission thereto is restricted by sex and age or not, or whether a fee for admission thereto is charged or not, wherein the principal part of the exhibition is illustrative of the human anatomy, or wherein are exhibited any books, pamphlets, circulars, pictures, charts, diagrams, models, casts or other articles, paintings, drawings or designs of any kind illustrating or describing the genital organs, or containing any other obscene, lewd, indecent or immoral exhibition of any kind, when such museum or other exhibition is conducted for gain or profit, either directly or indirectly, or for the purpose of advertising or in connection with a place where medical treatment is offered or medicine is sold, or for any immoral purpose whatever."

From the record it appears that the defendant in error was manager of a free museum of anatomy in Chicago at the time of his arrest; that the place contained models showing various diseases at different stages, such as syphilis, gonorrhea, leprosy and gleet; that the principal feature of the exhibition was illustrative of the human anatomy; that there was a sign in front stating that no one under twenty-one would be admitted and that no women or children were allowed in the place; that it was conducted in