42 Minn. 440, 44 N. W. 317; Bunson v. Berry (Miss.), 7 South. 322; Harding v. Wright, 138 Mo. 11, 39 S. W. 456; Epperson v. Epperson, 161 Mo. 577, 61 S. W. 853; Sellwood v. Henneman, 36 Or. 575, 60 Pac. 12; Elder v. First Nat. Bank, 91 Tex. 423, 44 S. W. 62; Avery v. Hunton, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 353, 56 S. W. 210; Land Mortgage Bank v. Nicholson, 24 Wash. 258, 64 Pac. 156; Baxter v. Tanner, 35 W. Va. 60, 12 S. E. 1094; Fischer v. Laack, 85 Wis. 280, 55 N. W. 398; Ingles v. Merriman, 96 Wis. 400, 71 N. W. 368. Mistakes in the description of property insured are also reformable: Home Ins. Co. v. Myer, 93 Ill. 271; German Fire Ins. Co. v. Gueck, 130 Ill. 345, 23 N. E. 112, 6 L. R. A. 835; Maher v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 67 N. Y. 283.

2. Correction of Street Numbers, Blocks, Lots, Corners, Quarter Sections, Boundary Lines and Field-notes. In accordance with the general rule announced in the preceding subdivision, courts of equity correct erroneous street numbers mentioned as the premises leased: Kelly v. Galbraith, 186 Ill. 593, 58 N. E. 431; also erroneous lot numbers: Skerrett v. Presbyterian Soc., 41 Ohio St. 606; Avery v. Hunton, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 353, 56 S. W. 210. Thus even though a party to a deed knew it described the property as lot 4, yet if both of the parties to the transaction thought that the instrument was a reconveyance of a certain lot, which was a lot of another number, the deed may be reformed: Metcalfe v. Lowenstein (Tex. Civ. App.), 81 S. W. 362. So, also, where two lots numbered 4 and 5 were inclosed by one fence, lot 4 being sixty-six feet wide and lot 5 being forty-nine and one-half feet wide, and the owner sold the west half of the inclosure, describing it as lot 4, and both of the parties believing the lots to be of equal width and putting a stake to indicate the equal division of the inclosed land, equity will reform the deed so as to conform the description to the real transaction: Thompson v. Ladd, 169 Ill. 73, 42 N. E. 174. A court of equity will correct a block number which is erroneously described in a conveyance: Bussey v. Moraga, 130 Cal. 586, 62 Pac. 1081; it will also correct an erroneous description of a corner: Moye v. Lane (Ky.), 12 S. W. 154; Eberle v. Heaton, 124 Mich. 205, 82 N. W. 820; or a misdescription of a quarter section: Thalheimer v. Lockhart, 76 Ark. 25, 88 S. W. 591; Epperson v. Epperson, 161 Mo. 577, 61 S. W. 853; McCormick H. M. Co. v. Woulph, 11 S. Dak. 252, 76 N. W. 939. And where a deed conveyed the west half of a section instead of the north half, which latter was the only land in the section owned by the grantor, and the grantee took possession of the north half, reformation will be allowed: Moore v. Crump, 84 Miss. 612, 37 South. 109. So, also, where a boundary line erroneously describes the land intended to be conveyed, equity will grant reformation: Monogue v. Bryant, 15 App. D. C. 245; Le Comte v. Freshwater, 56 W. Va. 336, 49 S. E. 238. And where land is described by the use of field

notes which by a mistake are reversed so as to make a misdescription of the land, equity will allow a reformation: Hill v. Kuhlman, 87 Fed. 498, 31 C. C. A. 87.

3. Mistakes by Which Land is Omitted Which was Intended to be Included.-Where, by a mistake of the parties, lands which were to have been conveyed or mortgaged are omitted from the instrument, equity will reform the instrument so as to include them: Stevens v. Holman, 112 Cal. 345, 53 Am. St. Rep. 216, 44 Pac. 670; Stonesifer v. Kilburn, 122 Cal. 659, 55 Pac. 587; Smith v. Schweigerer, 129 Ind. 363, 28 N. E. 696; Brinson v. Berry (Miss.), 7 South. 322; Ezell v. Peyton, 134 Mo. 484, 36 S. W. 85; Slack v. Craft (N. J. Eq.), 57 Atl. 1014; Abbott v. Flint's Admr., 78 Vt. 274, 62 Atl. 721; Land Mortgage Bank v. Nicholson, 24 Wash. 258, 64 Pac. 156; Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U. S. 417, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 239, 35 L. ed. 1063. And where one person agrees to mortgage all of his land not exempt, but both himself and the mortgagee believe that a certain tract is exempt, and accordingly omit such tract, it has been held that reformation would be allowable to include it: Lear v. Prather, 89 Ky. 501, 12 S. W. 946. And where a title bond provided for a "lien upon" without stating what property, it was held that the bond would be reformed by adding the words "the said property above described," where the lien was agreed to be upon the property set forth in the forepart of the bond and was omitted in the latter part of the bond by mistake: Smith v. Brunt, 14 Colo. 75, 23 Pac. 325.

4. Mistakes by Which Land is Included Which was Intended to be Excluded. And where, by a mistake of the parties, lands which were not to be included in a conveyance or mortgage are nevertheless included in the instrument, equity will correct the instrument by excluding them from it: Perry v. Sadler, 76 Ark. 43, 88 S. W. 832; Thompson v. Ladd, 169 Ill. 73, 48 N. E. 174; Keeley v. Sayles, 217 Ill. 589, 75 N. E. 567; Jordan v. Walters (Iowa), 80 N. W. 530; Conlin v. Masecar, 80 Mich. 139, 45 N. W. 67; Benesh v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 14 N. Dak. 39, 103 N. W. 405; Stites v. Widener, 35 Ohio St. 555; American etc. Co. v. Pace, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 222, 56 S. W. 377; Baxter v. Tanner, 35 W. Va. 60, 12 S. E. 1094. And where a release of a mortgage was intended merely to be a partial release, but by a mistake of the scrivener purports to be a full release, equity will reform the instrument: Kane v. Williams, 99 Wis. 65, 74 N. W. 570.

k. Mistakes in Regard to the Omission or Inclusion of Easements, Exceptions, Reservations or Conditions in Deeds or Other Contracts, or in Omitting to Place a Seal on the Instrument.-Equity will correct an imperfectly conveyed easement: State v. Lorenz, 22 Wash. 289, 60 Pac. 644. Hence it will insert an easement which has been omitted by the mistake of the parties: Blakeman v. Blakeman, 39

Conn. 320; Schantz v. Keener, 87 Ind. 258; Howard v. Britton, 67 N. H. 484, 41 Atl. 269. A deed may be reformed so as to include an exception of a certain lease: Arthur D. Jones & Co. v. New England etc. Co., 38 Wash. 637, 80 Pac. 796. And a conveyance may be reformed so as to except from its operation certain short straw timber growing thereon, which had been previously conveyed to a certain lumber company: King v. Hobbs, 139 N. C. 170, 51 S. E. 911. And a clause "reserving to the tenants in possession their legal rights" may be reformed so as to preserve the rights of a tenant claiming under a contract void by the statute of frauds where such was the agreement of the parties: Young v. Miller, 10 Ohio, 85. An omitted reservation of the right to use water from a certain spring may be inserted in the deed by reformation: Brown v. Lamphear, 35 Vt. 252. Omitted reservations, such as of timber (Smith v. Wakeman, 114 Mich. 611, 72 N. W. 599), or of coal (Cook v. Liston, 192 Pa. 19, 43 Atl. 389), or of growing crops (Warrick v. Smith, 137 Ill. 504, 27 N. E. 709; Hendrickson v. Ivins, 1 N. J. Eq. 562), may be corrected by a court of equity. A reservation inserted by mistake may be corrected: Stockbridge v. Hudson Iron Co., 107 Mass. 290. An omitted reservation clause in a right of way conveyance to a railroad company, requiring the railroad company to construct a crossing under its tracks to permit the passage of cattle and loaded wagons, may be inserted by reformation proceedings: Owens v. Carthage etc. Ry. Co., 110 Mo. App. 320, 85 S. W. 987.

The omission of a clause providing for a vendor's lien may be reformed: Worley v. Tuggle, 4 Bush, 168. Likewise an agreed condition in a deed of gift that the grantee should sell to a certain person at a price named may be inserted by way of reformation: Rice v. Hall (Ky.), 42 S. W. 99. And an indorsement of a note may be reformed to show that it is without recourse: Stafford v. Fetters, 55 Iowa, 484, 8 N. W. 322. An option to purchase may be inserted in a lease by reformation: Butler v. Threlkeld, 117 Iowa, 116, 90 N. W. 584. Clauses whereby the grantee of a deed assumes a mortgage may be inserted by a court of equity where it was agreed that the mortgage should be assumed or stricken out where it was not so agreed: Williams v. Everham, 90 Iowa, 420, 57 N. W. 901; Jones v. Price (Iowa), 86 N. W. 219; Adams v. Wheeler, 122 Ind. 251, 23 N. E. 760; Stephenson v. Elliott, 53 Kan. 550, 36 Pac. 980. The omission of a clause deducting the amount of a mortgage from the purchase price of the land is reformable: Burns v. Caskey, 100 Mich. 94, 58 N. W. 642.

An omitted seal from a contract required to be under seal may be placed on the instrument by a court of equity if it has been omitted by mistake: Allen v. Elder, 76 Ga. 674, 2 Am. St. Rep. 63; Henkleman v. Peterson, 154 Ill. 419, 40 N. E. 359; Gaylord v. Pel

land, 169 Mass. 356, 47 N. E. 1019; Lebanon Sav. Bank v. Hollenbeck, 29 Minn. 322, 13 N. W. 145; Conover v. Brown, 49 N. J. Eq. 156, 23 Atl. 507; Chase v. Peck, 21 N. Y. 581; Bullock v. Whipp, 15 R. I. 195, 2 Atl. 309; Probate Court v. May, 52 Vt. 182.

BAUM v. HARTMANN.

[226 Ill. 160, 80 N. E. 711.]

THE RELATION of Guardian and Ward Continues as long as the estate of the latter is in the hands of the former. (p. 249.)

WHERE A PARENT is Guardian of His Child, though the latter has attained the age of majority, any transaction between them whereby the former obtains an advantage at the loss of the latter will be regarded with the highest degree of suspicion. The presumption against the transaction is so strong that it is hardly possible to overcome it. (pp. 249, 250.)

GUARDIAN AND WARD-Constructive Fraud.-From the confidential relations existing between guardian and ward, who are also parent and child, all transactions between them prejudicially affecting the interests of the ward are constructively fraudulent. (p. 250.)

GUARDIAN AND WARD, Dealings Between Shortly After Termination of the Relation.-Where the Guardianship has Ceased by the Majority of the Ward, the courts will not permit transactions between the guardian and the ward to stand, even when they occurred after the minority, if the intermediate period was short, unless the circumstances demonstrate, in the highest sense of the term, the fullest deliberation on the part of the ward and the most abundant good faith on the part of the guardian. (p. 250.)

GUARDIAN AND WARD-Presumption of Undue InfluenceBurden of Proof.-Whenever a transaction between guardian and ward, prejudicial to the latter, is brought before a court of equity, there is a strong presumption that the transaction resulted from the undue influence of the former on the latter, and the guardian must assume the burden of proving to the satisfaction of the court that the act proceeded from the independent and uninfluenced will of the ward. (p. 250.)

GUARDIAN AND WARD-Gratuitous Receipt.-Where it appears that a ward a short time after attaining her majority was brought before a probate court by her guardian, who was also her father, and after informing the judge that she had received no part of the estate, executed a receipt stating that she had received the whole thereof, such judge fully advising her of the effect of the receipt, and she, notwithstanding his admonitions, insisting on executing it, and the judge thereupon enters an order of discharge, a presumption arises that her action was the fruit of the undue influence of her father, and his sureties still remain liable on their official bond if they have in no way been misled into changing their position by the alleged statement. (p. 251.)

Miller, Winkelmann & Ogle, for the plaintiff in error.

L. D. Turner and Barthel & Klingel, for the defendants in

error.

163 VICKERS, J. Maria C. Baum filed a bill in the St. Clair circuit court to set aside an alleged settlement made with her by her father as her guardian, and to vacate and annul the order of the probate court of St. Clair county approving his final report and discharging Simon Baum as guardian. Bernhard Hartmann and Jacob Spies were sureties on the guardian bond of Simon Baum. Hartmann and the administratrix of the estate of Jacob Spies were made parties defendant to the bill, in which was a prayer for an accounting as to the money claimed to be due complainant and that a decree be entered for the complainant for the amount found to be due against the sureties on the guardian bond. Answers were filed by the defendants, and the cause was heard upon the bill, answers, replications and proofs heard in open court and a decree entered dismissing the bill for want of equity, to reverse which a writ of error was sued out from the appellate court for the fourth district. The appellate court affirmed the decree of the circuit court, and the complainant below has sued out this writ of error to bring said decree into review before this court.

The evidence heard shows that at the August term, 1894, of the probate court of St. Clair county, Simon Baum was appointed guardian for his two minor children, Charles W. Baum and Maria C. Baum, and that he executed the usual statutory guardian bond in the penal sum of six thousand eight hundred dollars, with Bernhard Hartmann and Jacob Spies as sureties, and that he received as such guardian, soon after his appointment, the sum of three thousand four hundred dollars which his wards inherited from their mother's father. It is not controverted that Simon Baum invested his wards' money in real estate and took the conveyance to himself, personally. Simon Baum then executed a mortgage upon said real estate to the sureties on his guardian 164 bond, reciting an indebtedness of three thousand four hundred dollars, but it is admitted that the mortgage was merely an indemnity against possible liability on the guardian's bond. Plaintiff in error attained her majority on the first day of June, 1899. She was then working out in St. Louis. Her father wrote her a letter requesting her to come to Belleville,