the mortgagors as of Crawford county, foreclosure is authorized 228 upon attempting "to remove from said county" the encumbered property. By "said county" was meant the one previously named, and this would not be obviated by the omission to write the name of such county in the blank left for that purpose. But location of the property as in the county with a description of the owner as of that county is not sufficient to impart notice: Muir v. Blake, 57 Iowa, 662, 11 N. W. 621; Warner v. Wilson, 73 Iowa, 719, 5 Am. St. Rep. 710, 36 N. W. 719; Barrett v. Fisch, 76 Iowa, 553, 14 Am. St. Rep. 238, 41 N. W. 310. It is also to be noted that though the Kuhneses execute the mortgage, it does not assert the ownership to be in any one or all of them. As A. A. Kuhnes was, in fact, the owner, this omission cannot affect the validity of the instrument (McGarry v. McDonnell, 82 Iowa, 732, 47 N. W. 866), but it does not have an important bearing in the determination of whether the recording of the mortgage imparted constructive notice of its existence. No one could tell from the record whether some one or all or none of them owned the property: Everett v. Brown, 64 Iowa, 420, 20 N. W. 743; Warner v. Wilson, 73 Iowa, 719, 5 Am. St. Rep. 710, 36 N. W. 719; State Bank v. Felt, 99 Iowa, 532, 61 Am. St. Rep. 253, 68 N. W. 818; Syck v. Bossingham, 120 Iowa, 363, 94 N. W. 920.

Nor was there anything therein to advise a creditor of Kuhnes of its location or in whose possession it might be found. These have been the controlling circumstances in many cases. Thus in Brock v. Barr, 70 Iowa, 399, 30 N. W. 652, a somewhat indefinite description was aided by adding that the property was in the possession of the mortgagor in a particular county. In Shellhammer v. Jones, 87 Iowa, 520, 54 N. W. 363, it was said that the mortgagor was of the county from which the property was not to be removed, and he certified that he was the owner. He had no other stallions of like description. Preston v. Caul, 109 Iowa, 443, 80 N. W. 522, was much like the last case, in that the instrument indicated the mortgagor's ownership of the interest covered and that the stallion was in the county. In the case at bar the description is indefinite. True, there were but two other outfits in the county and these were of different number and style. But the number was not inserted in the 229 mortgage and there is nothing in the record to show in what

respects the style differed or whether such difference was in the matter of description contained in the mortgage. Aside from this, however, the defendant was not bound at his peril to search the county to ascertain whether there were other like machines therein, in the absence of any assertion in the mortgage that this was the only one. There was nothing in the mortgage to suggest such an inquiry, and without this a purchaser was not charged with notice of such fact. The case falls within those cases where the mortgages describe property in a general way; that is, in such indefinite terms that any number of articles or animals may well fall within its terms. Thus in Hayes v. Wilcox, 61 Iowa, 732, 17 N. W. 110, a description of "one oscillating thresher, size 6, 30-inch cylinder and also one Chicago, Pitts 10-horse power” was held insufficient. Other analogous cases are Ormsby v. Nolan, 69 Iowa, 130, 28 N. W. 569; Plano Mfg. Co. v. Griffith, 75 Iowa, 102, 39 N. W. 214; State Bank v. Felt, 99 Iowa, 532, 61 Am. St. Rep. 253, 68 N. W. 818; Gilchrist v. McGhee, 98 Iowa, 508, 67 N. W. 392. The rule regarding the certainty of description of property in a mortgage is that if it contains. enough to so direct the mind of the searcher of the record to facts from which he may ascertain the property with reasonable certainty, it is sufficient: Shellhammer v. Jones, 87 Iowa, 520, 54 N. W. 363; City Bank v. Ratkey, 79 Iowa, 215, 44 N. W. 362.

This was too indefinite to meet this requirement, and the trial court's ruling to this effect is approved.

Affirmed.

The Sufficiency of the Description of the Property in Chattel Mortgages to impart constructive notice is considered in the note to Barrett v. Fisch, 14 Am. St. Rep. 239. For recent decisions on this question, see Commercial State Bank v. Interstate Elevator Co., 14 S. Dak. 276, 86 Am. St. Rep. 760; Reynolds v. Strong, 10 N. Dak. 81, 88 Am. St. Rep. 680.

CURTIS v. BARBER.

[131 Iowa, 400, 108 N. W. 400.]

COTENANCY-Ouster-Adverse Possession.-A sheriff's deed

of the interest of one cotenant followed by possession does not amount to an ouster of the other cotenant so that title by adverse possession can be acquired against him, even though the grantee of the sheriff had no knowledge of the cotenant's interest. (p. 426.)

COTENANCY-Ouster.-As between co tenants, actual notice of claim of title and hostile acts done under such claim are prime requirements to an ouster. (p. 428.)

COTENANCY-Ouster.-As between cotenants, actual notice on the part of one of a claim of ownership of the whole property cannot arise from the fact that he, with the knowledge of his cotenant, makes occasional use of the property for storage purposes, and otherwise assumes to rent it for a nominal rental insufficient in amount to pay the taxes. Such conduct does not constitute an ouster. (p. 428.)

Action to quiet title, in which Adaline A. Shepherd intervened claiming the indorsed one-half of the property. By the decree she and the plaintiff were adjudged to be owners as tenants in common and the title of each was quieted against the other. Plaintiff appealed.

E. L. Smalley, for the appellant.

Long, Hageman & Farwell, for the appellee.

401 BISHOP, J. The property in question is a lot, fortyfour feet in width, situated in the city of Waverly, Bremer county, and on November 25, 1881, was owned by one W. F. Barker. On that date Barker conveyed by deed to L. L. Lush and the intervener Shepherd, each an undivided onehalf. This deed was never recorded and has been lost. In September, 1887, a sheriff's deed conveying in terms all the right, title, and interest of Lush in and to the property was executed and delivered to plaintiff, Curtis, and this deed was at once recorded. It is the contention of plaintiff that at the time of the sheriff's deed Lush was in the sole occupancy of the property; that upon receiving his deed, and without knowledge of any rights or interests on the part of intervener, he (plaintiff) entered into sole possession, which he has retained ever since, claiming to be the owner, paying the taxes, and taking the rents and profits; and his demand for a decree as against intervener is predicated upon the assumption that his taking possession amounted to an ouster

which he asserts has been followed by possession adverse to intervener for the statutory period and under claim of title. On the other hand, it is the contention of the intervener that there was no ouster; that the possession of plaintiff has been that of a tenant in common, and not adverse, with full knowledge of her rights in the premises.

That under the Barker deed intervener and Lush became tenants in common of the property is conceded; that the possession of one tenant in common is the possession of the other is a rule well settled in law; and there can be no disseisin in favor of the one as against the other, such as will set the 402 statute of limitations running without an actual ouster. Now, while a conveyance by one tenant in common of the whole estate to a stranger will ordinarily amount to an ouster (Kinney v. Slattery, 51 Iowa, 353, 1 N. W. 626, and Fielder v. Childs, 73 Ala. 567, cited and relied on by appellant) still there is no warrant on reason or authority for saying that a mere relinquishment, voluntary or involuntary, by one tenant of his interest in the property can be given such effect. In such case there is no more than a substitution of tenants: 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 707. Thus, in the case of a simple quitclaim to a stranger by one tenant in common of his right and interest in the property, the rights of the cotenant remain unaffected thereby. There is no ouster such as will put the statute in motion: Hume v. Long, 53 Iowa, 299, 5 N. W. 193. And as a purchaser at sheriff's sale gets only the interest which the execution debtor had in the property, that being all that the sheriff has right and authority to sell, the situation is precisely as if the debtor had made a voluntary relinquishment by quitclaim: Weaver v. Stacy, 93 Iowa, 683, 62 N. W. 22. It makes no difference that the purchaser at execution sale has no notice, actual or constructive, of the interests of a person other than the judgment debtor. As said Mr. Justice Dillon in Hamsmith v. Espy, 19 Iowa, 444: "In making a sale under execution, the sheriff or other public officer professes to sell only the interest or estate of the judgment debtor. He gives no warranty. The law proclaims in the ears of all who propose to buy: 'Caveat emptor; and look out, take notice, beware, of the title for which you bid'": See, also, Holtzinger v. Edwards, 1 Iowa, 383, 1 N. W. 600; Matless v. Sundin, 94 Iowa, 111, 62 N. W. 662.

Having concluded, as we must, that the sheriff's deed had no effect to deprive intervener of her rights and interests in the property, or to put the statute in motion as against her, we proceed to inquire whether anything appears in the subsequent relations of the parties that should be given such effect. 403 The evidence shows the lot to be of the value of about four thousand dollars. Saving the presence of an old and somewhat dilapidated building, and a sidewalk at the street line, the property is unimproved. At the time of the sheriff's deed the building was actually occupied by a tenant for storage purposes, and such tenant continued a few months, paying to plaintiff thirty dollars as rent. Thereafter, and down to 1893, plaintiff and a firm of which he was a member used the property from time to time for storage purposes as their convenience suggested, the firm making no accounting for rent. From 1893 down to the commencement of this action, a period of about ten years, the property was rented by plaintiff to one Hodges, but for what purpose does not appear. Hodges paid rent in labor at the rate of five dollars per annum. Plaintiff paid the taxes and has kept the sidewalk in repair. No other improvements have been made. It is the testimony of plaintiff that the rentals of the property have not been sufficient to pay the taxes and the expense of keeping the sidewalk in repair. Intervener knew of the occupancy of the property, and says that, knowing the rentals would not pay the taxes and keep the property in repair, she made no objections thereto. Plaintiff insists that he first learned that intervener had an interest in the property in June, 1893, the information coming through a letter from Lush stating that she (intervener) was owner of an undivided half. Plaintiff went to the husband of intervener with the letter, and the subject matter was talked over. There is some dispute between them as to what was said, but we think it fairly appears that Mr. Shepherd, who says he had charge of all his wife's business, declared for her interest in the property and for a recognition of her rights by plaintiff. Moreover, that plaintiff admitted in substance that, it being true that intervener was named as grantee in the deed from Barker, she would be entitled to a half interest in the property. Except as above indicated, plaintiff did not thereafter give notice to intervener of a claim on his part of sole ownership, and she was advised of such claim only by the