Am. Rep. 671; Youngblood v. Birmingham etc. Co., 95 Ala. 521, 36 Am. St. Rep. 245, 12 South. 579, 20 L. R. A. 58; Fink v. Gallivan, 49 Conn. 124, 44 Am. Rep. 210; Cook v. Pierce, 2 Houst. 499; Sandage v. Studebaker Mfg. Co., 142 Ind. 148, 51 Am. St. Rep. 165, 41 N. E. 380, 34 L. R. A. 363; Dillon v. Allen, 46 Iowa, 299, 26 Am. Rep. 145; Pinney v. First Nat. Bank, 68 Kan. 223, 75 Pac. 119; Vanmeter v. Spurrier, 94 Ky. 22, 21 S. W. 337; Durgin v. Dyer, 68 Me. 143; Allen v. Hawks, 13 Pick. 79; Ingersoll v. Randall, 14 Minn. 400 (Gil. 304); Downing v. Ringer, 7 Mo. 585; Jones v. Surprise, 64 N. H. 243, 9 Atl. 384; Covington v. Threadgill, 88 N. C. 186; Thorne v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 80 Pa. 15, 21 Am. Rep. 89; McConnell v. Kitchens, 20 S. C. 430, 47 Am. Rep. 845; Snoddy v. American Nat. Bank, 88 Tenn. 573, 17 Am. St. Rep. 918, 13 S., W. 127, 7 L. R. A. 705; Territt v. Bartlett, 21 Vt. 184. A contract made in furtherance of a business carried on in violation of the common law or of the public policy of the state is void: Thomas v. First Nat. Bank, 213 Ill. 261, 72 N. E. 801.

In the principal case, it was held where a mortgagee, a member of a cattle trust, buys cattle for the mortgagor and in pursuance of the by-laws of the trust, charges fifty cents a head for his services in buying them, the said sum being the minimum allowed by the trust, that the contract to pay such commission is in violation of the anti-trust statute and not merely nonenforceable but absolutely void: State v. Wilson, 73 Kan. 343, ante, p. 479, 84 Pac. 737. Where a statute prohibits the keeping of a ninepin alley appurtenant to a tavern, one who contracts for its construction cannot recover: Spurgeon v. McElwain, 6 Ohio, 442, 27 Am. Dec. 266; and where goods are sold to be smuggled into a country and the seller so packs them and marks them as to assist the buyer in smuggling them, he cannot recover: Briggs v. Lawrence, 3 Term Rep. 454. And where a statute prohibits the killing of game at certain times of the year, and makes it a misdemeanor for any person to have any of the specified game in his possession during the closed season, a contract by a cold storage company to preserve the game during the closed season is void, even though it was the intention of the parties not to dispose of the game before the next open season: Haggerty v. St. Louis Ice etc. Storage Co., 143 Mo. 238, 65 Am. St. Rep. 647, 44 S. W. 1114, 40 L. R. A. 151. A partial assignment of a United States mail contract is illegal: Nix v. Bell, 66 Ga. 664. But a contract by which the mail contractor employs others to execute it is legal: Gordon v. Dalby, 30 Iowa, 223.

But the mere knowledge on the part of the seller that liquor was thereafter to be illegally sold by the keeper of a house of illfame has been held to be no defense to a suit for its purchase price: Washington Liquid Co. v. Shaw, 38 Wash. 398, 80 Pac. 536. And where the lender of money knew that it was to be used for an illegal purpose, but did not participate in the contemplated illegal trans

action, he is not precluded from recovering the loan: Hines v. Union Sav. etc. Co., 120 Ga. 711, 48 S. E. 120. And likewise, the fact that money realized from a note was used to corrupt voters at an election was held not to affect a recovery where the payee did not know that the money was to be so used: Hale v. Harris, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1172, 91 S. W. 660. And it is no defense that the seller of goods knew that the buyer intended to resell them in a state where the sale of such goods was unlawful: Jameson v. Gregory's Exr., 4 Met. (Ky.) 363; Webber v. Donnelly, 33 Mich. 469; Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253, 9 Am. Rep. 205.

XI. Application of the Rule to Various Kinds of Contracts and Agreements.

a.

Contracts in Violation of Statutes, Ordinances or Other Laws of the Land.

1. In General.-Where the making of a contract in regard to a certain transaction is prohibited by statute, the courts will not entertain an action upon it or upon any rights growing out of it: Wilson v. Beach, 11 Ky. Law Rep. 1001. And where one knowingly sells goods to the agent of the enemies of the government to which he owes allegiance, he cannot recover: Oxford Iron Co. v. Spradley, 51 Ala. 171; Tatum v. Kelley, 25 Ark. 209, 94 Am. Dec. 717; Kingsbury v. Flemming, 66 N. C. 524; Sprott v. United States, 20 Wall. 459, 22 L. ed. 371. In Hanauer v. Doane, 12 Wall. 342, 20 L. ed. 439, in refusing to allow a recovery for goods sold in aid of the rebellion, or with knowledge that they were purchased for the Confederate states, the court said: "No crime is greater than treason. He who, being bound by his allegiance to a government, sells goods to the agent of an armed combination to overthrow that government, knowing that the purchaser buys them for that treasonable purpose, is himself guilty of treason or a misprision thereof. He voluntarily aids the treason. He cannot be permitted to stand on the nice metaphysical distinction that although he knows that the purchaser buys the goods for the purpose of aiding the rebellion, he does not sell them for that purpose. The consequences of his acts are too serious and erroneous to admit of such a plea. He must be taken to intend the consequences of his own voluntary act."

But the mere fact that the statute provides a penalty for selling any lot in a town or addition thereto before the plat thereof is recorded does not render a note given for the purchase money of lots so sold void: Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa, 546; Bemis v. Becker, 1 Kan. 226; Strong v. Darling, 9 Ohio, 201. Though the contrary was held in Missouri under a similar statute: Downing v. Ringer, 7 Mo. 585.

Where a statute prohibits the transaction of business in the name of a partner not interested in the partnership and requires that the word "Company" or its abbreviation shall represent an actual part

ner, and provides a penalty for the violation of the statute, it has been held that contracts in violation of the statute are void: Swords v. Owens, 43 How. Pr. 176; O'Toole v. Garvin, 1 Hun, 92; Donlon v. English, 89 Hun, 67, 35 N. Y. Supp. 82.

2. Violation of Sunday Laws or of Laws Against the Selling of Intoxicating Liquors.-Quite frequently the courts have held that a note given for intoxicating liquors illegally sold on Sunday is invalid, even though the sum included in the note was also for other articles legally sold: Wadsworth v. Dunnam, 117 Ala. 661, 23 South. 699; Braitch v. Guelick, 37 Iowa, 212; Gerlach v. Skinner, 34 Kan. 86, 55 Am. Rep. 240, 8 Pac. 257; Ladd v. Dillingham, 34 Me. 316; Cotten v. McKenzie, 57 Miss. 418; Bick v. Seal, 45 Mo. App. 475; Sanderson v. Goodrich, 46 Barb. 616; Widoe v. Webb, 20 Ohio St. 431, 5 Am. Rep. 664. And under a statute providing for the observance of the Lord's day, it has been held that a contract for the services of a band of musicians to play for seven days each week, including the afternoons and evenings of each Sunday, is in violation of the statute, and no recovey can be had for even services performed on secular days: Stewart v. Thayer, 168 Mass. 519, 60 Am. St. Rep. 407, 47 N. E. 420. And likewise a contract by which it is agreed that a party, upon the payment of certain rates for real estate advertising is to take entire charge and control for a certain period of the real estate advertising business in the daily, Sunday and weekly issues of a newspaper, in consideration of being allowed the difference between the rates paid and those received by him for advertising, is an entire and individual contract, so that a taint of illegality by reason of violating the law prohibiting the doing of labor, business or work, except only works of necessity and charity, on Sunday: Handy v. St. Paul Globe Pub. Co., 41 Minn. 188, 16 Am. St. Rep. 695, 4 L. R. A. 466, 42 N. W. 872.

So, also, where the seller of liquors so marks the casks that their contents cannot be ascertained by the revenue officers with the purpose of aiding in their being sold in violation of the laws in regard to the sale of intoxicating liquors, no recovery can be had: Gaylord v. Soragen, 32 Vt. 110, 76 Am. Dec. 154; Aiken v. Blaisdell, 41 Vt. 655. An agreement to pay wages to one who serves as a bartender is invalid where the sale of intoxicating liquors is prohibited: Bixby v. Moor, 51 N. H. 402; Sullivan v. Horgan, 17 R. I. 109, 20 Atl. 232, 9 L. R. A. 110. But in Goodwin v. Clark, 65 Me. 280, the court said: "A person cannot recover for his personal services, portions of which are rendered in an unlawful employment, a part of which employment was to be in selling liquors unlawfully; he can recover nothing upon such a contract or for services rendered in pursuance of it. But if his contract was to render services only in a legal employment, and he seeks to recover for no other, he is not to be debarred therefrom merely because, during the season of his employment, he occasionally as

sisted in the sale of liquors as a gratuitous service to his employers, and not as a part of his contracted services for which he seeks compensation."'

And where one leases premises for the keeping and sale of liquors, and agrees to supply the place with ice to keep the premises cool, if the sale of such liquors is illegal, the tenant cannot recover against the landlord for damages done to the liquors by a failure to keep the premises cool: Kelly v. Courter, 1 Okla. 277, 30 Pac. 372.

3. Violation of Laws Against Gaming.-Money loaned for gaming is often held not recoverable by reason of the purpose for which it is to be used: Viser v. Bertrand, 14 Ark. 267; Reed v. Reeves' Admr., 13 Bush, 447; Emerson v. Townsend, 73 Md. 224, 20 Atl. 984; White v. Buss, 3 Cush. 448; Raymond v. Leavitt, 46 Mich. 447, 41 Am. Rep. 170, 9 N. W. 525; Hall v. Costello, 48 N. H. 176, 2 Am. Rep. 207; Staples v. Gould, 9 N. Y. 520; Critcher v. Holloway, 64 N. C. 526. But it is no defense to a suit to recover for the fitting up and furnishing of a house that the plaintiff knew that the house was to be used for gaming: Michael v. Bacon, 49 Mo. 474, 8 Am. Rep. 138. Nor is it a defense that the vendor or lessor of premises knew that they were to be used for gaming: Brunswick etc. Co. v. Valleau, 50 Iowa, 120, 32 Am. Rep. 119. "A scheme lawful in itself cannot be made a cover for one that is unlawful. The plaintiff's racetrack and grandstand were lawful to be kept, but when it adds to those the gambling booth, and runs them together, and then makes a contract that is appurtenant to either and appurtenant to both, courts will not entertain it merely because in its application it was not limited entirely to the unlawful purpose': St. Louis Fair Assn. v. Carmody, 151 Mo. 566, 74 Am. St. Rep. 571, 52 S. W. 365. One who trains a horse for a race on which money is bet cannot recover for his services, where a horserace is regarded as gaming, but such a trainer may recover money expended for feed and shoes for the horse, since such items are not necessarily a part of the gaming transaction: Mosher v. Griffin, 51 Ill. 184, 99 Am. Dec. 541. Where a broker is privy to the unlawful design of parties to contract for the sale of goods to be delivered in future, the transaetion being merely a sale on margin, he cannot recover for his services rendered for losses incurred by himself on behalf of either in forwarding the transactions: Crawford v. Spencer, 92 Mo. 498, 1 Am. St. Rep. 745, 4 S. W. 713, and monographic note attached thereto.

4. Violation of Laws Requiring a License to Conduct a Certain Business or Occupation.-The question whether contracts made by persons engaged in a business or occupation for the following of which the law requires a license is not free from difficulty. The distinction in the cases seems to be that where the license is re

quired for the protection of the public rather than for the purpose of raising revenue, that the contract will be invalidated by the failure of the person to have the required license: Vermont Loan etc. Co. v. Hoffman, 5 Idaho, 376, 95 Am. St. Rep. 186, 49 Pac. 314, 37 L. R. A. 509; Randall v. Tuell, 89 Me. 443, 36 Atl. 910, 38 Atl. 143. Though the authorities are apparently in accord where the license is required for the protection of the public, they are not in accord where it is merely for the purpose of revenue. Thus the failure of a physician to have the required license will prevent him recovering for his services: Gardner v. Tatum, 81 Cal. 370, 22 Pac. 880; Orr v. Meek, 111 ind. 40, 11 N. E. 787; Thompson v. Hazen, 25 Me. 104; Bailey v. Mogg, 4 Denio, 60; Alcott v. Barber, 1 Wend. 526; Puckett v. Alexander, 102 N. C. 95, 8 S. E. 767, 3 L. R. A. 43; Leman v. Housley, L. R. 10 Q. B. 66. Nor can a physician recover for services to be performed at a medical institute conducted by himself, even though the actual services were to be performed by a licensed physician: Deaton v. Lawson, 40 Wash. 486, 82 Pac. 879, 111 Am. St. Rep. 922, 2 L. R. A., N. S., 392. The same rule has been followed in respect to contracts by attorneys for legal services: Hittson v. Browne, 3 Colo. 304; Sellers v. Phillips, 37 Ill. App. 74; Hughes v. Dougherty, 62 Ill. App. 464; Hall v. Bishop, 3 Daly, 109. And likewise an unlicensed school teacher is precluded from recovering for his services as a teacher: Wells v. People, 71 Ill. 532; Jackson School Tp. v. Farlow, 75 Ind. 118; Ryan v. School District, 27 Minn. 433, 8 N. W. 146. And as a general rule contracts for services as a broker, innkeeper, grocer, plumber or the like, are not enforceable where the person contracting to perform such services has not obtained the license required by law: Dudley v. Collier, 87 Ala. 431, 13 Am. St. Rep. 55, 6 South. 304; Munsell v. Temple, 8 Ill. 93; Hustis v. Pickands, 27 Ill. App. 270; 62 Kan. 217, 61 Pac. 803, 50 L. R. A. 103; Me. 340; Randell v. Tuell, 89 Me. 443, 30 143; Buckley v. Humason, 50 Minn. 195, 26 Am. St. Rep. 637, 52 N. W. 385, 16 L. R. A. 423; Johnston v. Dahlgren, 31 App. Div. 204, 52 N. Y. Supp. 555; Johnson v. Hulings, 103 Pa. 498, 49 Am. Rep. 131; Stevenson v. Ewing, 87 Tenn. 46, 9 S. W. 230; De Witt v. Lander, 72 Wis. 120, 39 N. W. 349. But in several states, under an ordinance imposing a penalty for the failure of a broker to procure a license, it was held that he could recover his commissions: Reickman v. Bergholz, 37 N. J. L. 437; Woodward v. Stearns, 10 Abb. Pr., N. S., 395; Fairly v. Wappoo Mills, 44 S. C. 227, 22 S. E. 108, 29 L. R. A. 215. Of course statutes of the character relate only to professional brokers: O'Neill v. Sinclair, 153 Ill. 525, 39 N. E. 124; Johnson v. Williams, 8 Ind. App. 677, 36 N. E. 167; Pope v. Beals, 108 Mass. 561; Shepler v. Scott, 85 Pa. 329. Where the statute requires the owner of a steam threshing-machine to file a bond conditioned to pay all damages from fire, and makes it un

Denning v. Yount, Harding v. Hagar, 60 Atl. 910, 38 L. R. A.