Frontiers of Game TheoryK. G. Binmore, A. P. Kirman, Piero Tani MIT Press, 1993 - Počet stran: 351 seventeen contributions reflecting the many diverse approaches in the field todayThese seventeen contributions take up the most recent research in game theory, reflecting the many diverse approaches in the field today. They are classified in five general tactical categories - prediction, explanation, investigation, description, and prescription - and wit in these along applied and theoretical divisions. The introduction clearly lays out this framework. |
Obsah
Famous Gamesters | 1 |
On the Fair and CoalitionStrategyproof Allocation of Private | 13 |
Cognition and Framing in Sequential Bargaining for Gains | 27 |
Constituency Constraints on Sophisticated | 49 |
The Dynamics of Learning in NPerson Games with | 71 |
Stationary Equilibria for Deterministic Graphical Games | 95 |
The General Nucleolus and the ReducedGame Property | 117 |
Some Thoughts on Efficiency and Information | 133 |
Unraveling in Games of Sharing and Exchange | 195 |
Does Evolution Eliminate Dominated Strategies? | 213 |
Equilibrium Selection in Stag Hunt Games | 237 |
Variable Universe Games | 255 |
Aspects of Rationalizable Behavior | 277 |
Normative Validity and Meaning of von NeumannMorgenstern | 307 |
DeBayesing Game Theory | 321 |
Contributors | 341 |
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absorbing sets agents assume axioms backward induction bargaining Bayesian behavior beliefs best response Binmore Blockmarking choice choose coalition structure core consecutive game consider convergence cooperative correlated d₁ decision maker defined denote DGT game differential games district dynamic Econometrica Economic efficient equilibrium offers equilibrium selection example expected explanation Figure finite game theory game-theoretic given Harsanyi I-type incentive compatible information search iterative Kirman learning legislator losses lottery matrix games mechanism mutations Myerson Nash equilibrium node noncooperative nonempty nucleolus observed optimal outcome p₁ P₂ payoff play player preferences probability problem proposition pure strategy R-type rational rationalizable strategies reduced game reelection rejected result S₁ sequential sequential equilibrium solution concept sophisticated voting Stag Hunt stochastic Stochastic Games strategyproofness strictly dominated subgame subjects subset theorem tion truncated games unique University utility function vector vote sincerely VU-game weakly dominated strategies