Pyne, 3 Bing. 285, contract was made for 24 numbers of a periodical work, to be delivered monthly, at a guinea a number. Although the contract was held void because not reduced to writing, a recovery was permitted for the numbers actually delivered at the rate fixed by the contract. It is true that the court treated the contract as divisible, but it was nevertheless a void contract at its inception, and could not have been enforced, nor would a recovery have been allowed if defendant had refused to accept under it. In Ham v. Goodrich, 37 N. H. 185, defendant, in consideration that plaintiff would go with his family, and reside with deceased on his farm, take care of defendant, and cultivate the farm during his life, promised that he would convey the farm. Plaintiff complied, and at defendant's death presented a claim against the estate for his services. The court held that no action could be maintained upon the contract, but say: "The jury were instructed by the court that they might take into consideration the agreement, and all the circumstances under which the plaintiff went to reside with his father; and under the instructions they could, had they seen fit, have given damages equal to the value of the farm. But for the court to have gone further, and said that the value of the farm must be the measure of damages, that the jury were controlled by that, would have been giving, in one respect, full effect to the agreement, and would have made it the foundation of the verdict. The agreement was only evidence which the jury could consider, in connection with the other testimony, as showing the circumstances under which the services were performed, which was sought to be recovered under the general counts; and to give it a conclusive effect as fixing the damages would be to make it a binding contract, obligatory upon the parties, as much so as if it were in writing." The case was approved in the subsequent case of Emery v. Smith, 46 N. H. 151. The same rule is announced in Burlingame v. Burlingame, 7 Cow. 92, and King v. Brown, 2 Hill, 485, both of which were cases where the agreement was to compensate for the services by conveyances of land. Our own cases do not conflict with this rule. It has been said by this court that a contract void under the statute of frauds is a mere nullity, and cannot be used for any purpose whatever. From an examination of these cases, however, it will be found, that the rule has been applied only in cases where the contract was a naked verbal contract, not only at its inception, but so continued; an executory contract, resting entirely in parol, unsupported by subsequent acts in recognition thereof. Chamberlain v. Dow, 10 Mich. 319, and Grimes v. Van Vechten, 20 Mich. 410, were actions based upon verbal orders for goods exceeding $50 in value, and the court held that there had been no binding acceptance. Hall v. Soule, 11 Mich. 494, was brought up on a verbal promise to pay the debt of another. In Colgrove v. Solomon, 34 Mich. 494, Solomon had agreed with Mrs. Colgrove to convey to her a piece of land in satisfaction of an existing indebtedness, and before acceptance of the deed she repudiated the agreement. In Hillebrands v. Nibbelink, 40 Mich. 646, the father was indebted to the son for services rendered, acknowledged the debt, and promised that the son should have the farm. In Liddle v. Needham, 39 Mich. 147, a father had agreed to give a note upon the conveyance of certain lands to his son. The court held that the verbal promise to convey the land furnished no consideration for the promise to give the note. The evidence tended to show that the son had never accepted the conveyance, and that the father had made no promise after the execution of the deed. In Sutton v. Rowley, 44 Mich. 112, 6 N. W. 216, the claim was based upon the contract, and the court say: "There is no claim that this agreement was in writing. and there is nothing to indicate that it could be enforced on account of facts taking it out of the operation of the statute." The other cases wherein the rule contended for is laid down will be found to rest upon the same principle. In all of these cases the contracts were not susceptible of enforcement at law or in equity, and the application of the rule is based upon that fact. This is made clear by the language of the same court in Holland v. Hoyt, 14 Mich. 238, and Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. 418. In Holland v. Hoyt the parties agreed to exchange lands. Holland delivered his deed to Hoyt. The latter refused to deliver his deed unless Holland gave his note for $1,000. Holland, protesting, gave his note, and in a suit upon the note set up want of consideration. It was insisted that. the original agreement being within the statute, the subsequent transaction must control. Mr. Justice Campbell, speaking for the court. says: "The entire transactions prior to the deeds were verbal, and, of course, if no deeds had been made, could not have been the ground of relief at law or in equity. But when a verbal contract is performed by the conveyance of land on the one part, there can be no difficulty in compelling the equivalent from the other contracting party. A court of equity can decree specific performance, if that is needed, and a court of law can allow a recovery of the purchase money if that is all that is sought. Thomas v. Dickinson, 12 N. Y. 364. If Mr. Hoyt himself accepted Holland's deed in fulfillment of a parol bargain to exchange lands, then Holland could have compelled the exchange in equity, and Hoyt could not have refused to make it. And if Holland had a right to receive the land from Hoyt for the price already paid, it can make no difference that he could only obtain specific performance in equity. Pay ag or promising to pay anything more than the land would be paying for what he owned already. An equitable title is just as much property as a legal title, stands on the same footing | present case contemplated joint possession and with legal titles as a consideration. And if Holland, under such circumstances, should see fit to sue for the price of his land at law on Holland's refusal to convey he would recover the value of that which Hoyt ought to have conveyed to him." In Scott v. Bush a verbal contract was entered into for the purchase of certain lands. The would-be purchaser paid a portion of the purchase money, and afterwards brought suit to recover back such money. The court held that, the contract being void, neither party could enforce it, and that the vendee had the right to recover as for money received without consideration. The court, however, say: "Some decisions have apparently disregarded this distinction between contracts made valid by part performance and stipulations or arrangements which have never become binding. An agreement made valid by part performance is in law as valid as in equity for all purposes except the remedy to enforce it. An equitable right is as good as a consideration for a contract as a legal right. Holland v. Hoyt, 14 Mich. 238." In the latter case the court allude to the rule that a contract void under the statute of frauds is a mere nullity, and cannot be used for any purpose whatever, and say: "We cannot conceive of such a thing as a contract which cannot be enforced as a contract, and yet can be the foundation of legal obligations arising out of nothing else." The distinction between a mere naked parol contract and a contract made susceptible by part performance of enforcement in equity is clearly pointed out and the conclusion reached that "there is no middle ground between binding contracts, and the absence of any binding obligations." See, also, Fuller v. Rice, 52 Mich. 435, 18 N. W. 204; Putnam v. Tinkler, 83 Mich. 629-638, 47 N. W. 687. In the present case we are not dealing with a contract resting in parol. Under all the facts and circumstances, the jury were justified in concluding that the services were performed in reliance upon the contract, and were accepted in recognition thereof. The proof does not rest alone in parol, but upon the subsequent conduct of the parties as well, -performance on the one part, and acceptance on the other. It has frequently been held that a party admitted into possession of land under an oral contract for its purchase is entitled, upon the execution of the contract on his part, to specific performance, and that in such case the parties have so far carried the contract into effect as to validate it. Twiss v. George, 33 Mich. 253; Davis v. Strobridge, 44 Mich. 157, 6 N. W. 205; Kinyon v. Young, 44 Mich. 339, 6 N. W. 835; Lamb v. Hinman, 46 Mich. 112, 6 N. W. 676, and 8 N. W. 709; Murphy v. Stever, 47 Mich. 522, 11 N. W. 36S; Fairfield v. Barbour, 51 Mich. 57, 16 N. W. 230; Welch v. Whelpley, 62 Mich. 15, 28 N. W. 744. In several of the cases the possession was not exclusive. The contract in the operation so long as both parties should live. There was abundant testimony tending to rebut the presumption that the services were rendered gratuitously, and the court was fully justified in submitting that question to the jury. The testimony tended to show that the services were performed with the mutual understanding that at the death of Marie L. Williams claimant should succeed to the es tate, and that decedent had agreed to make a will accordingly. When a promise is made to compensate for services by will and the promisor dies without so providing, the value of the services may be recovered as a claim against the estate. Faxton v. Faxon, 28 Mich. 159; Sword v. Keith, 31 Mich. 247; Carmichael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 85, 40 N. W. 173; Fenton v. Emblers, 3 Burrows, 1278; Jacobson v. Le Grange's Ex'rs, 3 Johns. 199; Patterson v. Patterson, 13 Johns. 379; Martin v. Wright's Adm'rs, 13 Wend. 460; Eaton v. Benton, 2 Hill, 576; Bayliss v. Pricture's Estate, 24 Wis. 651; Jilson v. Gilbert, 26 Wis. 637; Little v. Dawson, 4 Dall. 111; Snyder v. Castor, 4 Yeates, 353. When the promise rests in parol, its performance cannot be enforced in equity, if lands are to be devised (Harder v. Harder, 2 Sandf. Ch. 19; Gould v. Mansfield, 103 Mass. 408), unless under such circumstances as would justify the enforcement of a parol contract for the conveyance of lands (McClure v. McClure, 1 Pa. St. 374). But, if the contract is not within the statute of frauds. equity may compel those on whom the legal title has devolved to convey lands in fulfillment of the promise to give them by will. Randall v. Willis, 5 Ves. 262; Fortescue v. Hannah, 19 Ves. 67; Brinker v. Brinker, 7 Pa. St. 53; Logan v. McGinnis, 12 Pa. St. 32; Mundorff v. Kilbourn, 4 Md. 459. One witness says that Mrs. Williams at one time said that "it was agreed that they were not to get married." No other witness refers to that subject. It does not appear that this was one of the conditions of the agreement, or that it was more than a conclusion arrived at by both parties. It was in response to a question as to whether anything was said as to how long they were to live together and work together. Claimant was sworn, and testified as to the fact of an agreement in writing hav ing been made between her mother and Thomas R. Williams; that she continued to live with Mr. and Mrs. Williams after the expiration of the term named in the contract; that her name was Sophia Smith; that Mr. Williams died in 1872, in the insane asylum at Kalamazoo; that he was taken to the asylum in November, 1871; that prior to that time Mr. Williams had gone to New York to consult a physician with reference to his eyes, and that subsequently he became blind. None of these matters were disputed, and the estate could not have been prejudiced by the testimony. The judgment is affirmed. The other justices concurred. Act March 14, 1895, prohibiting the printing on the official ballot of the name of a candidate receiving the nomination of two or more parties in more than one column, is a valid exercise of the power of the legislature (Const. art. 7, 86) "to pass laws to preserve the purity of elections and guard against abuses of the elective franchise.' Supplemental opinion. For former opinion, see 62 N. W. 564. Myron H. Walker (E. M. Irish and Howard & Roos, of counsel), for relator. Fred A. Maynard. Atty. Gen. (Moses Taggart, of counsel), for respondents. GRANT, J. A brief opinion was filed in this case upon the hearing, and is found in 62 N. W. 564. The provision of the constitution empowering the legislature to enact laws to preserve the purity of elections and the provisions of the statute are sufficiently stated in that opinion. For want of time, a written opinion upon the constitutional question was then withheld. If the effect of this act, as is strenuously argued by the learned counsel for the relator, is to "subvert or impede the right to vote," it is clearly unconstitutional. If, on the contrary, it neither subverts nor impedes, but only regulates that right, it is constitutional. As experience has disclosed corruption, fraud, venality, and assaults upon the purity of the ballot, the legislatures of the several states have enacted laws to prevent them. Few, if any, of these enactments, have escaped attack in the courts, and the charge against them has usually been that they are unconstitutional, and infringe upon the sacred and constitutional rights of the citizen. The registry law of this state was attacked. So, also, were the laws providing for the present system, the quasi Australian ballot. The effect of these laws has been to render voting more inconvenient, to require greater care on the part of the elector, and to sometimes deprive him of his vote. The elector who has failed, through forgetfulness or other reason, to register on the days provided by the law, must lose his vote, unless he was sick or absent from the township on business, and without intent to avoid registration. The elector may not desire to vote for any man upon the ballot, and in that case he must erase the name of the objectionable candidate, and write another name, or mark some name for the same office upon another ticket, or lose his vote for that office. He may innocently make certain marks prohibited by law, or he may innocently show his ticket, either of which will cause the loss of his vote. These and other similar provisions designed to secure an honest elec tion, and to preserve "this most precious right to those who are entitled to enjoy it," have been sustained by the courts. The constitution does not guaranty that each voter shall have the same facilities with every other voter in expressing his will at the ballot box, or, to apply the rule to the present case, it does not guaranty to each voter the right to express his will by a single mark. The constitutionality of the law is not to be tested by the fact that one voter can cast his ballot by making one mark, while another may be required to make two or more to express his will. When each has been afforded the opportunity and been provided with reasonable facilities to vote, the constitution has been complied with. All else is regulation, and lies in the sound discretion of the legislature, to whom alone such regulation is committed. Courts cannot hold them unconstitutional because, in their judg ment, they are harsh or unwise, or have their origin in partisan purposes. Constitutional laws often have their origin in such purposes, and unconstitutional laws often based upon pure motives and honest intentions. Courts have nothing to do with the motives of legislators, nor the reasons they may have for passing the law. The polar star of interpretation to guide them is the language of the constitution itself, and the sole question always is, does the law destroy or abridge the right? are It is well, perhaps, to refer to some of the decisions of this court as to the power of the legislature to pass acts to maintain the purity of elections, which is expressly conferred upon them by Const. art. 7, § 6. In Chateau v. Jacob, 88 Mich. 170, 50 N. W. 102, a candidate for alderman claimed the right to have his name appear upon the official ballot as a candidate on the Citizens' Committee's independent ticket. He had the right to be a candidate, but it was held he had no right to have his name printed upon the official ballot, because it did not appear that he was selected by any assemblage of electors of his ward, and that anybody could vote for him by writing his name upon the ballot. In Common Council v. Rush, 82 Mich. 532, 46 N. W. 951, it was held that parties might place a county ticket upon the official ballot as the law then stood, and, if they desired to vote for any state ticket. they could erase the county ticket, and place their own in its stead. In that case one voter would be put to more trouble in preparing his ballot than another. In Attorney General v. May, 99 Mich. 538, 58 N. W. 483, we said that every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of the law, citing the authorities. In Attorney General v. Common Council of City of Detroit, 78 Mich. 545, 44 N. W. 388, it was said: "In order to prevent fraud at the ballot box, it is proper and legal that all needful rules and regulations be made to that end; but it is not necessary that such rules and regulations shall be so unreasonable and restrictive as to exclude a large number of legal voters from exercising their franchise. * * The power of the legislature in such cases is limited to laws regulating the enjoyment of the right, by facilitating its lawful exercise, and by preventing its abuse. The right to vote must not be impaired by the regulation. It must be regulation, not destruction." In Common Council v. Rush, supra, we held that it was "the exclusive province of the legislature to enact laws providing for the registration of voters, and the time, place, and manner of conducting elections. It may regulate, but cannot destroy, the enjoyment of the elective franchise. Whether such regulation be reasonable or unreasonable is for the determination of the legislature, and not for the courts, so long as such regulation does not become destructive. * * When power is conferred upon the legislature to provide the instrumentalities by which certain objects are to be accomplished, the sole right to choose the means accompanies the power, in the absence of any constitutional provisions prescribing the means. The finding by this court that the law impeded, hampered, or restricted the right to vote, and is therefore void, would be a clear assumption of, and encroachment upon, legislative power, a substitution of our judgment for that of the legislature. It can only be declared void when it destroys the right. Its unconstitutionality can be determined by no other rule." See, also, Attorney General v. McQuade, 94 Mich. 439, 53 N. W. 944. Other decisions by this and other courts might be cited and quoted from, but the above are sufficient to establish the rule by which courts must be governed in determining the constitutionality of acts passed by the legislature for the purity of elections. The rule is thus stated by Justice Cooley: "All such reasonable regulations of the constitutional right which seem to the legislature important to the preservation of order in elections, and guard against fraud, undue influence, and oppression, and to preserve the purity of the ballot box, are not only within the constitutional power of the legislature, but are commendable, and at least some of them absolutely essential." Cooley, Const. Lim. 753. See, also, Paine, Elect. § 301. In the light of this well-established rule, let us examine the official ballot, to ascertain what the voter is required to do in order to cast his vote under this law. When he enters the booth with his ballot, he seeks that portion of it representing his political affiliations. We will assume that the law was in force at the election in question; that relator was first nominated by the Free Silver party; that he was also the nominee of all the other parties, except the Republican; and that he elected to have his name appear upon the ballot on the Free Silver ticket. The ballot, aside from the vignettes and instructions, would be as follows: v.64N.w.no.13-32 The voter, if he belonged to any other party than the Free Silver or Republican party, would see at a glance that there was no candidate for congress upon his ticket, and that there were only two candidates for that office upon the ballot. After having made the cross in the space at the head of his party ticket, if he desire to vote for either of the candidates appearing on the ballot he would then make another cross in the square opposite the name. If he desired to vote for neither of these, but for some other man, he would write the name in the blank space on his party ticket. Any voter able to read could in a few seconds prepare his ballot. Is this destructive of the elective franchise? Does it destroy the full, free, and intelligent exercise of that precious right which is essential to the perpetuity of our government? To so hold would be absurd, and further argument cannot make it clearer. To what extent is the voter impeded? If he belongs to the Democratic or Prohibition or People's party, and desires to vote for a congressional candidate, he is required to make two crosses or marks instead of one. If he cannot read, he is certainly not impeded, because the parties sworn to assist him in preparing his ballot will readily inform him upon the subject, and mark it according to his wishes. It would be much more difficult to prepare a ballot under the pure Australian system, where each name must be marked. It would be a serious reflection upon the intelligence of the voters of Michigan to hold that they could be deceived by such a ballot or impeded in the right to vote. Especially is this true in view of the means of disseminating intelligence through the newspapers, upon the hustings, by printed posters, and the importunities of candidates and their friends. It is, however, said that the voter has the right to suppose that all his party nominees will be on his party ticket. The constitution neither expressly nor impliedly confers any such right. If he be possessed of any intelligence whatever, he cannot fail to see at once the vacant space upon the ticket, and to know that, if he desires to vote for a congressman, he must check one of the two candidates, or write a name in the blank space. Both the opportunity and the facility to vote are afforded. If it be said that the voter who does not examine his ticket may by this means be deprived of his vote for an office, it may also be said with equal certainty that, if another condidate than the one nominated by the convention is upon it, he will probably vote for the man who he had no reason to suppose was on his ticket, and for whom he never intended to vote. The ballot prepared under the present law challenges the voter's attention by the vacant space upon his party ticket to the fact that, if he desires to vote for a candidate for that office, he must seek his name upon other tickets, or write a name upon his own ticket. It is ap parent that this law will tend to secure a more intelligent vote than if the name of the candidate was upon all three tickets. It is alleged in the answer that the convention of one of the political parties did not expressly authorize its committee to fill any vacancy, and that its congressional candidate withdrew, and such committee placed the name of the relator upon its ticket. It is alleged by the respondents that corrupt bargains have been made, between unscrupulous managers of different political parties, by which one candidate has been bought off and another substituted, and that new political parties have been organized by unscrupulous men for the sole purpose of bargain and sale, and that the purpose of this law is to prevent these corrupt deals between corrupt politicians. No fraud is charged in the present case, but it affords an illustration of the opportunities for such trades which every good citizen condemns, and which should, if possible, be prevented by law. once. It is also insisted that the candidate has the constitutional right to have his name appear upon the ticket of every party which indorses him. It gives every candidate the right to have his name appear upon the ticket once. Naturally, it belongs in the column of that party with which he is openly affiliated; but if he chooses to have his name attached to the ticket of some other party, and that party does not object, he possesses that right. But I know of no reason or authority for saying that any candidate possesses the constitutional and inalienable right to have his name appear more than once upon the official ballot containing the tickets of two or more political parties. The Australian ballot contemplates that his name shall be there but It follows, then, that every voter has a reasonable opportunity to vote for him. This is the sole constitutional right guarantied him. He has no occasion to find fault so long as he is permitted to have his name upon the ballot upon such ticket as he chooses, with the constitutional right following of an opportunity given to every voter to vote for him, which he can do by simply making two crosses instead of one. The law is general, and aims at no political party. One party may be affected at one election, and another at another, or all parties may be affected at one election, some in one locality and others in another. It does not prevent coalition between different political par ties, which is often very commendable and patriotic. It does not deprive the members of those political parties of the means to put their coalition into effect by their votes, but furnishes all reasonable facilities for so doing. It only requires some degree of intelli gence and care on the part of the voters. We hold the law to be constitutional. MCGRATH, C. J., did not sit. LONG and HOOKER, JJ., concurred with GRANT. J. |