by any one of them; and general and special terms, one or more of them, may be held at the same time.

§ 47. Certain suits may be transferred.—All civil suits at issue at the time of the passage of this act, that from and after the first of May, 1849, shall be placed upon the calendar of the supreme court at any general or special term thereof, to be held in the city of New-York, and which shall be in readiness for hearing on questions of law only, or are equity cases, may by an order of that court, or of the judge holding such special term, be transferred to the said superior court of the city of New-York, and to be heard at the general terms thereof.

In pursuance of this provision 454 causes were transferred from the supreme court to the superior court. A large proportion of these suits had been commenced and were pending in the late court of chancery on the first Monday of July, 1847, when the constitution went into effect, and abolished that court. This section was amended by an act passed 16th January, 1851, (Laws of 1851, p. 8.); the amendment consisted in striking out at the end of this section the words "hereinafter [in the last-mentioned act called "herein before"] provided for."

§ 48. Jurisdiction.-The said superior court shall have jurisdiction of every suit so transferred to it, and may exercise the same powers in respect to every such suit, and any proceedings therein, as the supreme court might have exercised, if the suit had remained in that court.

49. Hearing of transferred suits.-It shall be the special duty of the three justices to be elected under the provisions of this title and of their successors, to devote their time and labors, for the term of two years, from the first of May, one thousand eight hundred and forty-nine, to the hearing and determination. of the suits transferred from the supreme court; and for that purpose they, or any two of them, shall hold a general term of the said superior court, of at least two weeks in duration, in each month of the year, except the month of August.

This section [49] is repealed, [Laws of 1851, p. 8.] and no section has been substituted.

§ 50. Appeal.-Appeals from the judgments of the superior court in such suits, may be taken to the court of appeals, in the same manner as from the judgments of the superior court in actions originally commenced therein.

$51. Section applied.-The provisions of section twentyeight of this act, shall apply to the said superior court.

§ 52. [45.] Repeal of existing provisions.-The provisions contained in sections two, three, and four, of the article of the revised statutes, entitled "Of the jurisdiction of justices' courts," as amended by sections one and two, of the act concerning justices' courts, passed May 14, 1840, and the provisions contained in section 59 to 66, of the same article, both inclusive, are repealed, and the provisions of this title substituted in place thereof. But this repeal shall not affect any action heretofore commenced in a court of a justice of the peace.

The other statutory provisions relating to these courts are 2 R. S. 324 to 375, Laws of 1846, cap. 120, 140, 276. Laws of 1847, cap. 329.

Previous to the code it was usual in summonses issuing out of justice courts to require the defendant to answer to “a plea of trespass on the case," but when the code abolished the "forms of actions," it became the custom to issue summonses merely requiring the defendant" to answer without mentioning any action or plea. The superior court held such a summons sufficient in a case appealed to that court from the marine court. Williams v. Price, 2 Sand. S. C. R. 229; but subsequently the court of common pleas for the city and county of New-York, without however, having their attention called to the case of Williams v. Price, which was

The codifiers in reporting this title, observed, that it was "intended to make such alterations only in the justices' courts acts as are rendered necessary by dispensing with the forms of action, by abolishing actions upon judgments, and by introducing a new system of pleading," and per Mason J. This title "has retained the mode provided in the revised statutes for the commencement of actions, and which is by summons, warrant, or attachment, and which three modes of commencing actions as such under the code, constitute the only manner in which actions can now be commenced in any of the courts of this State." Re Fort Plain and Cooperstown, Plank Road Co. ex parte Ransom, 3 Code Rep. 148.

not then reported, held that a summons in a justice's court which did not state the nature of the action the defendant was to answer, was a nullity, and on appeal reversed a judgment founded on such summons. Cooper v. Chamberlain, 2 Code Rep. 142, and in some cases not reported. And see Ellis v. Mrit, Ib. 68. In a subsequent case Aldrich v. Williamson not reported. The county judge of Suffolk county [Judge Rose] refused to reverse on appeal a judgment of a justice's court because the summons did not state the nature of the action, and we are informed that the justice's courts generally refuse to be bound by the decision of the New York common pleas. A summons stating a cause of action for more than $100 is a nullity. Yager v. Hannah, 6 Hill, 631. In justice's courts all defects in the process are waived by an appearance and answer without objection. Heilner v. Barras, 3 Code Rep. 17.

53. [46.] (Amended.)—Jurisdiction.-Justices of the peace shall have civil jurisdiction in the following actions, and no other :

1. An action arising on contract for the recovery of money only, if the sum claimed do not exceed one hundred dollars;

2. An action for damages for an injury to the person, or to real property, or for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, if the damages claimed do not exceed one hundred dollars;

3. (Amended.)-An action for a penalty not exceeding $100; 4. An action commenced by attachment of property, as now provided by statute, if the debt or damages claimed do not exceed one hundred dollars;

5. An action upon a bond, conditioned for the payment of money, not exceeding one hundred dollars, though the penalty exceed that sum, the judgment to be given for the sum actually due. Where the payments are to be made by instalments, an action may be brought for each instalment as it shall become due;

6. An action upon a surety bond taken by them, though the penalty or amount claimed exceed one hundred dollars;

7. An action on a judgment rendered in a court of a justice of the peace, or of a justice's or other inferior court in a city where such action is not prohibited by section 71;

8. To take and enter judgment on the confession of a defendant, where the amount confessed shall not exceed two hundred and fifty dollars, in the manner prescribed by article 8, title 4, chapter 2 of part 3, of the revised statutes;

9. An action for damages for fraud in the sale, purchase or

ཐ

• mrsonal property, if the damages claimed do not exundred dollars.

The readments by leaving out the words "given by statute" at the end of sea 3, che addition of subdivision 9 printed in italic.

a state his demand at more than one hundred dollars, but claim dam→ a hundred, the justice has jurisdiction. So the plaintiff may sue xceeding one hundred dollars, and reduce it to the justice's jurisdiction Pavardicky credits or deductions-Tuttle v. Maston, (1 John. Cas. 25, 12 Johns ...a Xuncil Y. Ingersoll, 24 Wend. 113.) The plaintiff is not obliged, when aces his suit to reduce his demand to $100 for that might give the defendhas a set-off, an undue advantage. The parties may present and prove ades as they are, and if a balance is found, exceeding the justice's jurisdiche excess may be remitted, and judgment taken for the residue. (Justice's

13.)

sible contract, as a promissory note for $125, or the sale at one time of Ama of pot-ashes, cannot be made the foundation of several suits, so as to An one suit, and part in another. Only one suit can be brought on an Nenach Justice's Manual 3d ed., 13. 16 Johns. R. 121. Smith v. Jones, 15

This rule, however, is only applicable to hostile suits, Cornell v. Cook, 310, for the parties may, by consent, divide a large demand into any number de tona. Vi vues, and the defendant may confess separate judgments for each. Acustice has no jurisdiction where the sum total of the accounts of both parties, veved to the sat sfaction of the justice, shall exceed four hundred dollars. But

accounts have been settled, the balance is the only subsisting account; and esa las balance and the subsequent accounts, exceed four hundred dollars, the jushas jurisdiction (Code, Sec. 54, subd. 4, 2 Cow. 431.)

The superior court in Maguire v. Callagher (2 Sand. S. C. R. 402, 1 Code Rep. 120), held that a judgment being an express contract of record, assistant justices and aslices of the peace had jurisdiction of suits upon judgments, they being actions arosing on contract, but the common pleas of the city and county of New-York have elused to acknowledge the authority of the case of Maguire v. Callagher, and have cekded that the Nth subdivision of this section (sect. 53) controls this subdivision [sub. I that a must co's court in the city of New-York has no jurisdiction of an action mcgugat of an assistant justice's court between the same parties, and brought vive of the court first obtained. Mills v. Winslow, 3 Code Rep. 44. [see, dd if pos

Amended] The amendment consists in the omission at the end

e veace na Marclips v. Sture, [1 Code Rep. 58] held that an action to mot an action for a penalty.

Su Attachment, in this code, section 228.

but the plantit cannot split one entire demand so as to bring 1x Judas R. 999. 16 Johns. R. 121-136.

Nữ up, to subdivision 1.

Pose of 1848 had no provision corresponding to that conit was therefore held that a judgment taken by confes*** Ta sum exceeding $100, while the code of 1848 es v. Hinkston, 5 Pr. R. 322.

Every judgment confessed without a compliance with these provisions will be void as against all persons except a purchaser in good faith, of any goods or chattels, lands or tenements, under such judgment, and except the defendant making such confession.

The personal appearance of the plaintiff before the justice upon a confession is not necessary, unless the judgment is for more than $50, and the want of such appearance cannot be taken advantage of by the defendant. If, however, the judgment is for a sum exceeding $50, it would be necessary that both parties should personally appear before the justice, to make the requisite affidavit. (Edw. Tr. 3d, ed. 118.)

But a creditor having a demand exceeding $50, may take from his debtor several confessions, each for a sum less than $50, to the full amount of his claim, and thus avoid the necessity of making the affidavit required by statute. Cornell v. Cook, 7 Cow. 310, 2 R. S. 342.

The confession must be for a specified sum. A judgment entered for such a sum as A. B. should award is bad, the confession being made before the award is declared; for a justice has no power to enter a confession for an uncertain and unliquidated amount. But a confession for the amount of a note, described so as to be capable of being identified, or for a sum to be ascertained by calculation, would probably be good. Nicholls v. Hewitt, 4 Johns. R. 423.

The confession must also state how the indebtedness confessed, arose.

Form of Confession.-[Title of Action.] I hereby, pursuant to the statute, confess judgment in this action for dollars, the amount due the said plaintiff for money borrowed, (or, as the case may be,) besides costs of suit ; and consent that the said plaintiff enter judgment against me accordingly.

When judgment is confessed for a sum exceeding $50 it will be void as against all persons, except the defendant and purchasers in good faith under the judgment, unless the above mentioned affidavit is made. 2 R. S. 342, ss. 115, 116.

As the affidavit must expressly refer to the confession, the most convenient practice is to subjoin or annex it to the confession.

Form of Affidavit--Town of -ss. John Doe and Richard Roe, both of [insert residences and occupations of deponents] the parties named in the above, [or,] annexed confession of judgment, being respectively sworn, say, and each for himself says, that the said Richard Roe is honestly and justly indebted to the said John Doe, in the sum of dollars, over and

above all just demands, which the said Richard Roe has against the said John Doe ; and that said confession of judgment is not made or taken with a view to defraud any creditor.

If there is more than one plaintiff or defendant, the affidavit should, in strictness, be made by all of them.

Actions cognizable before a justice may be brought against all town and county officers, (2 R. S. 325, sec. 6,) individually specifying in the process and proceedings, their name of office; and such actions may be commenced in the same manner as against individuals. (2 R. S. 569.) Corporations may sue and be sued in justices' courts-Const. art. 8, sec. 3, and which also defines what is meant by the word corporations. Laws of 1847, p. 646, s. 45 amend the 5th subd. of s. 4, tit. 4, cap. 2, part 3 of the revised statutes, by striking out the words "or against corporations," and enact that

Process against corporations may be issued as in other cases, and may be served on the presiding officer, secretary, cashier, treasurer, or any director or trustee thereof, by whatever name such director or trustee may be called, and although a justice has no jurisdiction of a suit against a foreign corporation, such corporation may confer jurisdiction by appearing and answering without objecting to the jurisdiction. Paulding v. Hudson, Manuf. Co. 3 Code Rep. 223.

Counties and towns are corporations. An action against a county must be brought against its supervisors; and process must be served upon the chairman or clerk of the board. An action against a town must be brought against it by its name (2 R. S. 569, sec. 109;) where, however, county and town officers are authorized by law to sue by their name of office, suits may be brought by and against such officers. (1 R. S. 376.)