cise of this, or some controlling power adequate to drawing out, in due proportion, the abilities and resources of the States, without which power in Congress, and a more punctual compliance on the part of the States than has been manifested for some time past, the war cannot be prosecuted to advantage; and while some States, exposed to danger, strain every nerve, others, removed from danger and at ease, are remiss and negligent; whereas all should make the proper exertions, and furnish their proportions, whether immediately or remotely affected, and which can alone give energy to military operations. Perhaps a knowledge that this power was lodged in Congress, might be the means to prevent its ever being exercised, and the more readily induce obedience; indeed, if Congress was unquestionably possessed of the power, nothing should induce the display of it but obstinate disobedience, and the urgency of the general welfare.

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

Philadelphia, April 3rd, 1781.

DEAR SIR,

The letter from the Delegation, by the last post, informed you of the arrival of the stores here, which were to have been delivered in Virginia by one of the French ships. The infinite importance of them to the State, especially since the arrival of a reinforcement to Arnold, of which we are just apprized by the Marquis, has determined the Delegates to forward them by land, without loss of time. This

will be attempted, in the first instance, in the channel of the Quartermaster's department, and, if it cannot be effected in that mode, without delay, we propose to engage private wagons for the purpose, on the credit of the State. Should the latter alternative be embraced, I find it will be necessary to stipulate instantaneous payment, from the Treasury, on the arrival of the wagons at Richmond, in specie or old continental currency to the real amount thereof. I mention this circumstance that you may be prepared for it. The expense of the transportation will be between five and six hundred pounds, Virginia money. The exchange between specie and the old paper, at present, is about one hundred and thirtyfive for one.

The Delegates having understood that the refugees taken by Captain Tilley, on his return to Newport from the Chesapeake, consisted chiefly of persons who formerly lived in Virginia, some of whom were traitors who deserved exemplary punishment, and others vindictive enemies to the State, thought proper to make the inclosed application to the French Minister. By conversation I have since had with him on the subject, I doubt whether it will be deemed consistent with their general rules of conduct, to give up, to be punished as malefactors, any of the captives made by their fleet, which does not serve, like their land army, as an auxiliary to the forces of the United States. If these persons had been taken by their land forces, which serve as auxiliaries under the Commander-in-Chief, it seems there would have been no difficulty in the case. However, the application will certainly prevent the exchange or release

to which it refers, if the Executive think it expedient to do so. On the least intimation, I am persuaded the apostates would be even sent over to France, and secured in the most effectual manner during the war. Perhaps this would not be amiss, as being not our prisoners, no use can be made of them in redeeming our citizens from captivity.

DEAR SIR,

TO THOMAS JEFFERSON.

Philadelphia, April 16, 1781.

The inclosed paper is a copy of a report, from a committee, now lying on the table of Congress for consideration. The delicacy and importance of the subject makes me wish for your judgment on it, before it undergoes the final decision of Congress.

The necessity of arming Congress with coercive powers arises from the shameful deficiency of some of the States which are most capable of yielding their apportioned supplies, and the military exactions to which others, already exhausted by the enemy and our own troops, are in consequence exposed. Without such powers, too, in the General Government, the whole confederacy may be insulted, and the most salutary measures frustrated, by the most inconsiderable State in the Union. At a time when all the other States were submitting to the loss and inconvenience of an embargo on their exports, Delaware absolutely declined coming into the measure, and not only defeated the general object of it, but enriched herself at the expense of those who did their duty.

The expediency, however, of making the proposed application to the States, will depend on the probability of their complying with it. If they should refuse, Congress will be in a worse situation than at present; for as the Confederation now stands, and according to the nature even of alliances much less intimate, there is an implied right of coercion against the delinquent party, and the exercise of it by Congress, whenever a palpable necessity occurs, will probably be acquiesced in.

It may be asked, perhaps, by what means Congress could exercise such a power, if the States were to invest them with it. As long as there is a regular army on foot, a small detachment from it, acting under civil authority, would at any time render a voluntary contribution of supplies due from a State, an eligible alternative. But there is a still more easy and efficacious mode. The situation of most of the States is such, that two or three vessels of force employed against their trade will make it their interest to yield prompt obedience to all just requisitions on them. With respect to those States that have little or no foreign trade of their own, it is provided that all inland trade with such States as supply them with foreign merchandize may be interdicted, and the concurrence of the latter may be enforced, in case of refusal, by operations on their foreign trade.

There is a collateral reason which interests the States who are feeble in maritime resources, in such a plan. If a naval armament was considered as the proper instrument of general government, it would be, both preserved in a respectable state in time of

peace, and it would be an object to man it with citizens, taken in due proportions, from every State. A navy so formed, and under the orders of the General Council of the State, would not only be a guard against aggressions and insults from abroad, but, without it, what is to protect the Southern States, for many years to come, against the insults and aggressions of their northern brethren?

THE REPORT.

Whereas it is stipulated and declared in the 13th Article of the Confederation, "that every State shall abide by the determinations of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this Confederation are submitted to them: And that the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State;" by which Article a general and implied power is vested in the United States in Congress assembled, to enforce and carry into effect all the Articles of the said Confederation against any of the States which shall refuse or neglect to abide by such their determinations, or shall otherwise violate any of the articles; but no determinate and particular provision is made for that purpose: And whereas the want of such provision may be a pretext to call into question the legality of such measures as may be necessary for preserving the authority of the Confederation, and for doing justice to the States which shall duly fulfil their federal engagements; and it is, moreover, most consonant to the spirit of a free Constitution, that, on the one hand, all exercise