thorizes such purchase is the question to be decided. Repeals by implication are not favored, and if a sufficient and reasonable meaning can be given to both statutes this must be done. "If this act authorizing the establishment of a station stood alone, or if the matter of the establishment of fish-culture stations was a new and unconsidered one, there would be more force in the contention of the Commissioner. But the country is dotted with stations established by virtue of acts of Congress, and this act must be read in the light of other acts on the same general subject. If Congress, in authorizing from year to year the establishment of these stations, had omitted all reference to the acquisition of land therefor, it might reasonably be inferred that this was done with a full knowledge of the prohibition found in section 3736, Revised Statutes, and of the fact that the appropriations were being construed to authorize the purchase of land. A careful examination of the many acts relating to the establishment of fish-culture stations negatives this idea and convinces me that the appropriation under consideration does not make any exception to the general provisions of the law.

"The act of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat., 954), provides:

"For the purchase of ground, construction of buildings and ponds, and purchase of equipment of fish hatchery and rearing stations near Craig's Brook, Reed's Pond, and Branch Pond, Maine, eleven thousand dollars.'

"The act of August 5, 1892 (27 Stat., 361), provides:

"For the establishment of fish-cultural stations in the States of Montana and Texas, at points to be selected by the United States Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries, including the purchase of the necessary lands and water rights, and the erection of buildings, and for such other construetions, equipment, and work necessary to place the stations on an efficient basis, * twenty thousand dollars.'

* *

"Acts similar in character, and all making specific provision for the purchase of land, have been passed providing for the establishment of stations in Michigan (26 Stat., 384), Vermont (id., 964), New York (id.), Iowa (28 Stat., 386, 638), Tennessee (id.; 30 Stat., 612), New Hampshire (id., 25), California (id., 236), and North Carolina (id., 662). Donations of land before the establishment of a station were required in the cases of Georgia and Washington (30 Stat., 612), and in several cases the purchase of land, already leased for station purposes, was authorized (26 id., 384,965; 29 id., 279)."

The following passages from the opinion of AttorneyGeneral Speed (11 Op. Att. Gen., 201) were also quoted by me therein:

"The doubt upon the point has arisen under the provision of the seventh section of the act of May 1, 1820 (5 Stat., 568),

which declares that no land shall be purchased on account of the United States, except under a law authorizing such purchase. This is a general and permanent enactment, and the doubt which has been suggested must be held to be well founded and incapable of being resolved in favor of the right of the Department to purchase the land in question, unless the words of the act of 1863, which have been quoted, are legally capable of being construed as conferring authority on the Department to make the proposed purchase. Certainly the words of the act do not expressly confer that authority. The power to purchase land, from the authority conferred to construct permanent defenses,' must be derived, if derived at all, by implication from those words.

* * *

"It is clear, then, that the power to construct such defenses as are thus described, and to purchase materials therefor, may be executed entirely well without the exercise of a power to purchase land, although it will be readily conceded that the United States, in most cases, before expending money for the purchase of materials necessary in the construction of defenses of this description and for the erection of such works, as a matter of proper precaution and prudence, should become the owner of the sites on which they are to be reared. The power in question being derivable, therefore, only by implication from the authority conferred by the statute, the question is whether we are at liberty, in view of the general and permanent prohibition contained in the statute of 1820, to determine that the power conferred on the Executive Department by the act of 1863 embraces a power so clearly merely incidental to the one conferred.

"I am of the opinion that we are not and that the general effect of the act of 1820 is to render the exercise by an Executive Department of a power to purchase land on account of the United States illegal unless the intention of Congress that such a power should be exercised has been so clearly expressed in the law which is invoked as containing the authority that the power may be said to be an express one under the words of that law. * *

"There never was a time in the history of this Government when the purchase of land on account of the United States, without authority of law, was a legal act on the part of the Executive. What effect then can the act of 1820 have, as a substantive expression of the will of Congress, unless that of prohibiting the purchase of real estate on account of the United States under merely implied authority? I can conceive of

none."

In a later decision rendered by Attorney-General Devens (15 Op. Att. Gen., 212), he held that an act making an appropriation for the construction of a movable dam impliedly

authorized the purchase of such land as was necessary for the construction of the dam. Neither section 3736, prohibiting the purchase of land without authority of law, nor the opinion of Attorney-General Speed construing that section were referred to in his opinion. His conclusion and the reason therefor are comprised in the following short paragraph:

"In my opinion that provision impliedly authorizes the purchase, with the approval of the Secretary of War, of such land as is necessary for the construction of the dam. This view rests upon the well-established rule of interpretation that whenever a power is given by statute everything necessary to the making of it effectual or requisite to attain the end is implied." (1 Kent's Com., 464.)

In a still later opinion by Attorney-General Garland (19 Op. Att. Gen., 79), he held that an appropriation made for the erection of monuments or memorial tablets at Gettysburg did not authorize the purchase of land. The following are his reasons therefor:

"The appropriation is specifically for the erection of monuments or memorial tablets. There is no express authority in the law to purchase land. The specific language that the money is for the erection of monuments or tablets, applies it to that use and rebuts the implication that it may be applied to any other purpose. The appropriation under consideration is found in the sundry civil bill. In the same act ten different appropriations are made for the erection of structures, and a much larger number for the continuance or completion of buildings already commenced. In the former, where the site is to be purchased before the erection can be commenced, the appropriation specifically provides for the purchase of the site. When the legislature thus, in the same act, makes the distinction by recognizing that the appropriation for an erection does not, by implication, embrace the purchase of the site, it would be an unwarranted construction of a later clause in the same act to imply that which so much care had been taken to express in like cases in previous clauses of the same enactment."

And in a still later opinion by Attorney-General Griggs (22 Op. Att. Gen., 665), following the opinion of Attorney-General Devens, but without referring to the opinions of Attorneys-General Speed and Garland, he held that the appropriaaion for transportation of the Army and its supplies, which contained a provision for constructing roads and wharves, impliedly authorized the purchase of such land as may be

His

necessary for the erection of wharves so provided for. reasons for this conclusion are expressed by him as follows:

"It is a settled rule of interpretation that whenever a power is given by statute, everything for the making of it effectual, or requisite to attain the end, is implied. (1 Kent's Com., 464.) Now apply this rule to this case. It is impossible to build a wharf without having the land upon which to build it. Then when Congress has made an appropriation, and one of the objects for which the appropriation is to be used, specially designated in the act, is the construction of wharves, does it not necessarily follow that the right to purchase land upon which to build such wharves is implied? In what other manner can land upon which a wharf is to be erected be obtained? Proceedings in condemnation, if such could be had, would result virtually in the purchase of the land condemned, for such land as might be taken would be at an appraised value to be paid for by the Government, and, in the absence of express provision in the statute, the same objection can be urged to taking any part of the appropriation with which to lease land as may be suggested to the purchase of land on account of the United States to be used for the location of wharves. I think therefore that the only reasonable construction is to conclude that the authority to construct wharves impliedly authorizes the purchase of the necessary land for the purpose."

The reasons given in the opinions of Attorneys-General Speed and Garland appear to me to be more cogent, and their conclusions more conservative of sound principles of law, than those in the contrary opinions.

Therefore unless the terms of the appropriation clearly manifest an intention to except it from the prohibition contained in section 3736, or clearly authorize the purchase of land, I do not think such authority can be implied from language providing for the mere construction of a building or other structure.

The question arises under your submission on the language of the act cited, providing for the erection of the bridge and its approaches, whether, in view of the history of this legislation, the intention of Congress is clearly manifested-that the appropriations therein made were intended by Congress to be used in procuring the necessary lands upon which to construct the approaches to said bridge. If such intention is manifest and clear, then these acts are not repugnant to section 3736 of the Revised Statutes prohibiting the purchase of lands on account of the United States.

While it may be true and this office has held that the estimates upon which an appropriation is based can not be used to vary the clear meaning of the language found in the act, yet it has never been held by this office, or by any court, that these aids may not be used to arrive at the meaning of Congress, which, without their use, would be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain, but with their use would be clear and apparent.

Section 3736 of the Revised Statutes does not require any specific formula of language to be used which will authorize the purchase of lands on account of the United States.

If it were not for said section, the authority of Congress to build a bridge or other structure carrying an appropriation adequate thereto would clearly authorize the use of such appropriation for every incident necessary to build said bridge or structure, including the purchase of all necessary sites. But with section 3736 standing as permanent legislation, in order to purchase lands on account of the United States for sites on which to erect public buildings or bridges, in my judgment, an act providing simply for the construction of a bridge at a certain place over a certain stream would not carry with it the authority to purchase sites for said bridge to rest upon or the approaches thereto.

But in my judgment the language of the act of April 27, 1904, supra, when read in the light of the estimates

"Southwest approach, including temporary roadway to Alexandria turnpike and land damages, $34,180,"

clearly shows that the appropriation therein made of $428,000 was intended to be applicable to the procuring of sites for the approaches to said bridge, and every expense incident thereto, and to the construction of these approaches. Otherwise what force and meaning can be given to the language of the act"Continuing construction, including approaches of the highway bridge across the Potomac River any and all purposes connected therewith, $428,000, and the total cost of said bridge and approaches shall not exceed $1,196,000."

* * *

and for

Specific authority is here granted to continue the construction of the bridge and money appropriated therefor. Specific authority is also given "for approaches" and for any and all purposes connected therewith.