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the insane" made for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1904, and for prior years.

The general rule is that in the construction of statutes effect should be given, if possible, to all the words contained therein and that the language employed should be taken in its usual, common, and ordinary signification. In Grant v. Dabney (19 Kans., 388) it was said:

"The word 'support' is generally used to mean articles for the sustenance of the family, as food, etc."

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The word "support" in some cases includes medicines and medical services as necessaries. It may have even a broader signification, dependent upon the connection or circumstances under which it is employed. To hold that the word "support," as used in the act of April 27, 1904, "for support, clothing, and treatment of the insane," read in the light of the acts of June 28, 1902, and March 3, 1903, is broad enough to embrace a claim of the character of the one under consideration would be to give the word "support" a forced, strained, and unauthorized construction, and one which would render it difficult to determine any limit that could be placed upon the use of said appropriation.

The expense in question was for permanent improvements "for the buildings and grounds," as contradistinguished from an expense "for support, clothing, and treatment

of the insane."

clothing, and treatment

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If the view of the Auditor should be approved, it would be difficult to see why the appropriation "for the support, of the insane" made from year to year could not be used for the construction of a general system of waterworks, heating and lighting plant, or a system of sewerage, or any other unusual or extraordinary expense "for the buildings and grounds."

I am of opinion that the appropriation "for support, of the insane" was in

clothing, and treatment

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tended to be used to meet the ordinary expenses of such

"support, clothing, and treatment

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of the insane,"

and not the unusual and extraordinary expenses for the permanent improvement of the "buildings and grounds" for which Congress has made other appropriations.

Section 7 of the act of June 7, 1897 (30 Stat., 93), entitled

"An act making appropriations for the current and contin gent expenses of the Indian Department and for fulfilling treaty stipulations with various Indian tribes for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1898, and for other purposes," provides:

"SEC. 11. That hereafter where funds appropriated in specific terms for a particular object are not sufficient for the object named, any other appropriation, general in its terms, which otherwise would be available, may, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior, be used to accomplish the object for which the specific appropriation was made."

Whether this section is applicable to cases other than those arising in the Indian Department it is not necessary here to decide, and no opinion on that subject is expressed. If the view I take of this case is correct the above section can in no event apply to the question here presented.

The proposed decision of the Auditor is not approved.

HOLDING TWO APPOINTMENTS AT THE SAME TIME.

The act of July 31, 1894, which provided that no person who holds an office the salary or annual compensation attached to which amounts to the sum of $2,500 shall be appointed to or hold any other office to which compensation is attached, has reference to an office having a fixed compensation of at least said amount, and does not apply to an office the compensation of which is fixed by fees for particular services, even where the amount of such fees earned exceeds $2,500 per annum; and therefore a captain in the Army receiving compensation of less than $2,500 per annum is not prohibited from holding at the same time the office of clerk of a United States circuit court; but if his compensation as captain on the retired list amounts to more than $2,500 per annum he would be prohibited from holding both of said offices at the same time.

(Comptroller Tracewell to J. A. Sladen, clerk of United States circuit court, November 28, 1904.)

In your communication of October 5, 1904, you request my decision of a question which you therein present as follows:

"Referring to your communication of July 6, 1904 (initialed N. H. T.), in reply to mine of June 24, 1904, I have the honor to thank you for your prompt and kind attention to the same, and to beg your further indulgence in this matter. I am led

to believe that in my former communication I presented the matter in so incomplete and bungling a manner that I misled the Comptroller as to the real question at issue.

"The question which I should have presented, and which I beg leave to present now, is not whether I can legally hold the office of clerk of a United States court while also holding an appointment as major on the retired list of the Army, but is as follows, namely, having been appointed a major on the retired list of the Army, can I now pay to myself, as clerk of the court, the fees allowed by law to such clerk.

"The facts are briefly as follows: I am now clerk of the United States circuit court for the district of Oregon, having held that office since January 1, 1894. During that time, until recently, I have been a captain on the retired list of the Army. On May 24, 1904, I was appointed by the President a major on the retired list of the Army under the provisions of the act of April 27, 1904.

"Section 2 of the act of July 31, 1894, says:

"No person who holds an office the salary or annual compensation attached to which amounts to the sum of twentyfive hundred dollars shall be appointed to or hold any other office to which compensation is attached unless specially heretofore or hereafter specially authorized by law; but this shall not apply to retired officers of the Army or Navy whenever they may be elected to public office or whenever the President shall appoint them to office by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.'

"The office of clerk of a United States court has been held not to be an office to which is attached the salary or annual compensation of $2,500. (1 Comp. Dec., 426; U. S. v. Durbacher, 63 Fed., 672.) Nor is the office of a captain on the retired list of the Army an office to which is attached such salary or annual compensation.

"The office of major on the retired list of the Army is one to which is attached a salary or annual compensation of $2,500. But the said office of major on the retired list of the Army is one to which I have been appointed by the President, and that appointment is made by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,' and the above act specially excepts from its general provisions such retired officers of the Army or Navy whenever the President shall appoint them to office by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.'

"It seems to me that my case comes clearly within the said exceptions. The act does not specify any particular office or class of offices to which the President may appoint retired officers. It specially provides that the President may appoint them to office with the concurrence of the Senate. I am a retired officer of the Army and therefore eligible to such appointment, and the President, under the provisions of said law,

has appointed me to the office of major on the retired list of the Army while I am holding the said office of clerk of a United States court.

"The evident purport of the law is to prohibit one person from holding two offices, each of which demands his entire time and attention. But such is not the case with a retired officer of the Army or Navy. He renders no service, he has no active duties to perform, nor is he charged with any public responsibility. He may not even be placed upon duty without his own concurrence. These conditions were evidently considered in framing the above act of July 31, 1894. It has the appearance of looking toward an entire exemption, from its general provisions, of retired officers of the Army and Navy. Retired officers of both arms of the service are occupying public offices, as Indian agents, members of the Panama Canal Commission, and other positions of profit and trust.

"The decision of the Comptroller is therefore asked as to whether, while holding the office of major upon the retired list of the Army, conferred under the provisions of the act of April 27, 1904, to which office I was appointed while holding the office of clerk of a United States court, and also while holding the office of a captain of infantry upon the retired list of the Army, I may pay myself as such clerk, from the fees of my said office as clerk, the compensation allowed by law therefor. * * *

"There is another phase to this question, in this: The act of July 31, 1894, says:

"No person who holds an office the salary or annual compensation attached to which amounts to the sum of twentyfive hundred dollars shall be appointed to or hold any other office to which compensation is attached,' &c. (The italics are mine.)

"In the case of Wood v. The United States (15 C. Cls. R., 151, and 107 U. S., 414), it is held that an officer upon the retired list of the Army holds only the office upon which he was retired, and that any promotion conferred upon such officer after his retirement, by the action of Congress or otherwise, creates no new office, but simply confers upon him additional rank without in any way altering his status as to the office he holds upon the said retired list. The case is fully set out in the opinion of the Court of Claims, supra, and is strongly affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, and, indeed, is, I believe, the ground taken by the Comptroller himself in a recent decision upon the effect of the above-mentioned act of April 27, 1904.

"In this view of the case, my own status upon the retired list of the Army would not be changed by the promotion conferred by the above-mentioned act, but the office I continue to hold upon said retired list of the Army continues to be

that of captain of infantry, the office with which I was originally placed on said retired list.

"The Attorney-General of the United States, in a recent opinion upon the status of the retired officers of the Army promoted under said act of 1904, after quoting the case of Wood v. The United States, above referred to, says:

I am further of the opinion that this view of the case is not affected by the fact that the exercise of the discretion of the Executive under the act of 1904 must be approved by the Senate. Concurrence by the Senate is a condition attached to the exercise of the President's discretion and to the right of the officers to be advanced, but does not make that an office which otherwise would not be so nor invoke the power of appointment under the Constitution. The condition is merely a particular method of providing for the advanced rank and pay conferred by Congress acting within its constitutional powers.'

"The decision of the Supreme Court, above referred to, as well as the other opinions, would seem to make clear the fact that the office now held by me upon the retired list of the Army is that held by me at the date of my retirement, namely, that of captain of infantry, and, as has been indicated, this office is not incompatible with the office of clerk of the court, now held by me.

"The promotion to the rank of major, conferred by the act of April 27, 1904, did not create any new office, nor confer any new office upon me. Notwithstanding my advance in rank, by this promotion, I still continue to hold the office of captain of infantry upon said retired list, the compensation of which is fixed by law. The pay of officers upon the retired list of the Army is determined by the rank upon which they are retired.' (Ct. Cls., supra.) The office held by me at the date of my retirement is a constitutional office. The increase in rank conferred by Congress is merely a change in rank and pay conferred as a gratuity for services rendered, as an increase in pension might be given for the same reason, and in no way changes the office held by me on said retired list, such changes in rank and pay having been frequently made by Congress in the exercise of its powers.

The Supreme Court, in the Wood case, says:

"The office of an officer of the Army and his rank are not necessarily identical; that the office has a rank attached to it, expressed by its title when no other rank is conferred on the officer; that the office remaining the same, the officer may have a different rank conferred on him as a title of distinction, to fix his relative position with reference to other officers as to privilege, precedence, or command, or to determine his pay; that by section 1274 of the Revised Statutes, the pay of officers on the retired list of the Army is determined by the rank upon

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