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from such a writing, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts; but such evidence shall be received with caution. [L. 1862; D. Cd. § 826; H. C. § 836.]

It is competent for a witness before testifying to refresh his memory from memoranda of a conversation, though they were not made by him but by his stenographer in his presence: State v. Magers, 35 Or. 538, 57 Pac. 197.

Private writings may be used to refresh the memory of a witness when made by him or another under his direction immediately thereafter, or at any time when the fact was fresh in his memory, and he knew the facts were correctly stated in the writing: Susewind v. Lever, 37 Or. 367, 61 Pac. 664.

Stenographer's notes made at a preliminary examination may be used to refresh the memory of the person who made them, to contradict the testimony of the witness, where the proper foundation therefor has been laid: State v. Bartmess, 33 Or. 117, 54 Pac. 167.

A witness may, while testifying in an action to recover the contents of her trunk, use what she swears is a correct list of the articles which she knew were in the trunk, made by her some two months after the trunk was taken, and soon after she found defendants had it: Oyler v. Dautoff, 36 Or. 361, 59 Pac. 474.

A clerk who kept certain books and knew them to be correct, while giving testimony, may refresh his memory by consulting

$849.

memoranda copied from the books and carefully compared by him, if, after so doing. he is enabled to testify from memory of the original transactions: Haines v. Cadwell, 40 Or. — -, 66 Pac. 910.

The error, if any, of allowing a clerk who kept certain books to testify after refreshiing his memory from memoranda copied from the books, is cured by subsequently introducing the books in evidence: Haines v. Cadwell, supra.

It is only when a witness has to rely upon a memorandum from which to testify that it need be produced, and if, after inspecting the writing, he has sufficient recollection of the facts to testify of his own recollection, he need not produce the writing for the inspection of the other party; but, if, after examining the writing, the witness can not recall the facts, and is dependent upon the memorandum, the writing must be produced and submitted for inspection: State v. Magers, 36 Or. 42, 58 Pac. 892.

A memorandum is not admissible in evidence unless it appears that the person who made it knew when he made it that it was true, and that he is at the time he testifies unable to state the facts except by using the statements therein contained: Susewind v. Lever, 37 Or. 367, 61 Pac. 644; Friendly v. Lee, 20 Or. 202, 25 Pac. 396.

Cross-examination, to what it Extends.

The adverse party may cross-examine the witness as to any matter stated in his direct examination, or connected therewith, and in so doing, may put leading questions; but if he examine him as to other matters, such examination is to be subject to the same rules as a direct examination. D. Cd. § 827; H. C. § 837.]

CROSS-EXAMINATION.-A party may not cross-examine a witness on any matters oler than those stated in the direct examination, or properly connected therewith. Within these limits, the cross-examination should be liberal, and may properly extend to other matters that tend to limit, explain, or modify the facts stated on cross-examination, provided they are directly connected therewith: Ah Doon v. Smith, 25 Or. 89, 34 Pac. 109; Sayres v. Allen, 25 Or. 211, 35 Pac. 254; Maxwell v. Bolles, 28 Or. 5, 41 Pac. 661; State v. Ogden, 39 Or. 195, 65 Pac. 449.

The scope of the examination lies within the discretion of the court, but an abuse of discretion is error: Sayres v. Allen, 25 Or. 211, 35 Pac. 254; State v. Reinhart, 26 Or. 482, 38 Pac. 822; State v. McGrath, 35 Or. 114, 57 Pac. 321.

A witness may be examined on matters not connected with the direct examination, in order to test his accuracy, veracity, and credibility: State v. Savage, 36 Or. 209, 60 Pac. 610; Smitson v. Southern Pac. Co. 37 Or. 88. 60 Pac. 907; State v. Mah Jim, 13 Or. 235, 10 Pac. 306.

A person on cross-examination may be asked if he has not made other statements inconsistent with his present testimony, recalling to him time, place. and persons present, in order to lay the foundation for impeaching testimony: Krewson v. Purdom, 13 Or. 563, 11 Pac. 281. The foundation may also be laid on cross-examination for showing the hostility of the witness: State v. Ellsworth, 30 Or. 145. 47 Pac. 199; but questions for showing hostility must, on cross-examination, be limited to the

[L. 1862;

feeling for or against the person testified about: State v. Welch, 33 Or. 38, 54 Pac. 213.

That a witness has been convicted of a crime may be shown on cross-examination in order to show his credibility: State v. Bacon, 13 Or. 143, 9 Pac. 393, 57 Am. Rep. 8, note; see the discussion in State v. Bartmess, 33 Or. 121, 54 Pac. 167. Whether a person may be asked concerning any serious charge brought against him rests in the sound discretion of the court: State v. Chee Gong, 17 Or. 635, 21 Pac. 882.

But he can not be cross-examined on matters otherwise simply for the sake of disgracing or harassing him: State v. Olds. 18 Or. 440, 22 Pac. 940; State v. Bacon, 13 Or. 144, 9 Pac. 393, 57 Am. Rep. 8, note.

Where the plaintiff, in an action on a contract, discloses on his examination in chief only so much of the transaction as leaves an inference of the contract's legality, it is proper for defendant to bring out on cross-examination the remaining facts and circumstances under which the contract arose, and which show its illegality: Ah Doon v. Smith, 25 Or. 94, 34 Pac. 1093.

A witness in an action for damages to realty caused by diversion of a stream, having testified on direct examination that floods brought down driftwood. a question whether they also brought down boulders and rocks is not proper cross-examination, in the absence of a showing that the witness testified in regard to boulders in his direct examination: Oldenburg v. Oregon Sugar Co. 40 Or. 65 Pac. $69.

In an action to recover money alleged to have been collected by defendant as plaintiff's agent, where defendant alleges that he paid a designated amount to plaintiff through her husband, out of which plaintiff's claims should be satisfied, and the husband has testified in rebuttal that the money so paid was due him on account of a partnership existing between himself and defendant, and collections made by defendant as receiver and otherwise on accounts due him and another as partners, he may properly be cross-examined as to the nature of the business of such partnership, and as to the collections and receivership: Sayres v. Allen, 25 Or. 211, 35 Pac. 254.

On an issue as to the consideration for a mortgage, the party attacking the instrument may cross-examine the mortgage on the facts and circumstances surrounding its execution and delivery: Maxwell v. Bolles, 28 Or. 6, 41 Pac. 661.

In a criminal case, the district attorney has the right to cross-examine a witness for the defendant as to anything that would show his interest in the result, and anything he did, or that he aided the defendant about the trial, for the purpose of enabling the jury to properly weigh the evidence of such witness, and to intelligibly pass upon his credibility: State v. Olds, 18 Or. 440, 22 Pac. 940.

Where the defendant called a witness who gave evidence material to the defense, and then testified on cross-examination that he gave money himself to assist the defense, and procured money from others in Portland, Tacoma, and Seattle for the same purpose, it is not competent either on crossexamination of the same witness or by making him a state witness to prove the names of the particular persons who contributed money, or that they were saloon keepers or gamblers: State v. Olds, supra. While the indorsement of the payee imports a consideration, and the holder may rest on that presumption until evidence of the illegality of the note is produced; yet, if. where such illegality is pleaded, he testifies in chief that he gave consideration for the note, such testimony is material to the issues made, and the defendant is entitled to cross-examine in regard to the consideration: Kenny v. Walker, 29 Or. 43, 44 Pac. 501.

In an action for negligence in dumping ashes from an engine and failing to extinguish the fire in such ashes, where defendant's engineer has testified to the exercise of exceptional care on the part of defendant's servants in extinguishing such fire, because of a previous fire that day from the same engine. it is proper to permit cross-examination as to the location of the previous fire: Lieuallen v. Mosgrove, 37 Or. 452, 61 Pac. 1022.

A witness who has testified on direct examination that the scow, the condition of which at the time it was sunk is in issue, was built by a certain person, and was in good condition at the time it was delivered to the defendant, may be asked on crossexamination if he knew the builder before he built the scow, and whether he ever knew or heard of the scow being sunk before it was finally sunk in defendant's service: Oregon Pottery Co. v. Kern, 30 Or. 328, 47 Pac. 917.

In an action for damages for the loss of a scow, where a witness has testified that he calked the scow just before its delivery to defendant. and that it was then in good condition and worth a certain sum, witness may be asked on cross-examination if he ever knew about the scow before he was called to repair it, if he had ever examined it, for the purpose of showing the means of knowledge and extent of information of the witness on the question of value: Oregon Pottern Co. v. Kern, supra.

position of plaintiff when she fell from a train and was injured, questions as to statements made by him out of court concerning how the accident occurred, inconsistent with his testimony in chief, were properly allowed to lay foundation for impeachment: Smitson v. Southern Pac. Co. 37 Or. 88, 60 Pac. 907.

A defendant in a criminal action, who voluntarily testifies in his own behalf, may be cross-examined as to statements made on his preliminary examination, contrary to his testimony on the trial, although he did not in his direct examination refer to the preliminary examination: State v. Bartmess, 33 Or. 120, 54 Pac. 167; State v. Abrams, 11 Or. 169, 8 Pac. 327. See the general discussion in regard to this matter in State v. Bartmess.

Where a party on cross-examination brings out matters not testified to on direct, he can not complain of the witness being examined on such matters on redirect; but he can not on redirect examination be asked whether he had any reason to doubt that a specified defendant was a partner in the firm who executed the notes in suit, where there was nothing in the cross-examination to call out such a question: Farmers' Bank v. Saling, 33 Or. 394, 54 Pac. 190.

Where the cross-examination of a party goes to matters outside of his examination in chief, but which are pertinent to his adversary's case, and might have been introduced by him in the first instance, such examination becomes subject to the rules that would govern a direct examination on his own account, and it is discretionary with the court whether the testimony shall be introduced then and in that manner: Osmun v. Winters. 30 Or. 188, 46 Pac. 780; Long v. Landers, 10 Or. 175.

Where a juror in a former case was called to prove statements sworn to by S., who was a codefendant in the first case, but who had died pending the second case, such juror can not be asked on cross-examination if he did not hang the jury for thirtysix hours, and other questions touching his conduct as a juror in said action: State v. Huffman, 16 Or. 16, 16 Pac. 640.

A defendant in an action for injury from fire alleged to have been kindled by him, can not be cross-examined as to the custom of back firing, for the purpose of proving his negligence, where, on his direct examination, he has neither admitted that he set the fire, nor testified to any custom: Willis v. Lance, 28 Or. 371, 43 Pac. 384, 487.

Where a witness testified in chief that he had found money on the premises of the codefendant, but nothing was said about how he happened to be searching on such premises. he can not be asked on crossexamination why he made such search, as such testimony is not connected with the testimony in chief: State v. Savage, 36 Or. 208, 60 Pac. 610.

A witness who has testified on direct examination that he has destroyed a given receipt, in answer to a question asked solely to show the reason for its nonproduction, can not be asked on cross-examination how he came to pay the money and get the receipt therefor: Schreyer v. Turner Flouring Co. 29 Or. 16, 43 Pac. 719.

A witness who has been asked in chief to produce a given note without any question as to its consideration, or as to the manner or purpose of its execution, can not tetsify on his cross-examination in what capacity he acted on any matters pertaining to such note: Schreyer v. Turner Flouring Co. 29 Or. 17, 43 Pac. 719.

In a prosecution for gambling, it was not proper for the defense on cross-examination of the state's witnesses, or otherwise, to introduce evidence tending to prove that the particular act of gambling investigated Where a witness on cross-examination by the grand jury was different, and ocmade contradictory statements as to the curred on a different day in the same

month, and in a different place in the same town, from the one then being investigated by the trial jury; State v. Adams, 20 Or. 525, 26 Pac. 837.

Where it appeared that a party had two furnished houses in the same vicinity, and there was a question which was his residence, it was not error in the court to exclude evidence on his cross-examination tending to show at which place he had the most furniture. Such evidence was too remote to give any aid in determining the question: Weidert v. State Ins. Co. 19 Or. 274, 24 Pac. 242, 20 Am. St. Rep. 809.

The testimony of a witness is not only his evidence in chief, but is that evidence as explained, modified, limited, or contradicted by the cross-examination. Both direct and cross-examination must be treated as evidence given on behalf of the party calling the witness: Ah Doon v. Smith, 25 Or. 89, 34 Pac. 1093.

Though the cross-examination may have been on an immaterial point, and hence not proper, it was harmless, where the facts were stated on direct examination: Capital Lumb. Co. v. Learned, 36 Or. 551, 59 Pac. 454.

The matter of permitting a witness to be recalled for further examination after having been fully cross-examined and excused is within the sound discretion of the trial court: State v. Robinson, 32 Or. 51, 48 Pac. 357.

Where defendant in a criminal case offers himself as a witness, he is subject to the same rules as to cross-examination as any other witness: State v. Abrams, 11 Or. 169. 8 Pac. 327. This should be qualified in that a defendant in a criminal action can not be questioned in regard to any other crime than that for which he is being tried. See the discussion in State v. Bartmess, 33 Or. 123, 54 Pac. 167.

$ 850. Party Producing Witness not Allowed to Impeach his Credit.

The party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credit by evidence of bad character, but he may contradict him by other evidence, and may also show that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, as provided in section 853. [L. 1862; D. Cd. § 828; H. C. § 838.]

IMPEACHING ONE'S OWN WITNESS. -A party who calls a witness and is surprised by his unexpected and unfavorable testimony on a material point, may, for the purpose of refreshing his recollection and inducing him to correct his testimony, or explain his apparent inconsistency, repeat to such witness, with the circumstances of time, place, and persons present, declarations and statements previously made by him which are inconsistent with his present sworn testimony, and he may ask whether he made them. If the witness denies or does not remember having made the statements, the party who called him may then offer testimony thereof to excuse his mistake in calling him, and destroy the effect of any adverse testimony he may have given. Care must be taken, however, that such statements are not allowed to go to the jury as substantiative evidence; they should be carefully limited to the purpose of excuse and explanation: State v. Steeves. 29 Or. 103. 43 Pac. 947; State v. Bartmess, 33 Or. 114, 54 Pac. 167; Langford v. Jones, 18 Or. 326, 22 Pac. 1064.

The state is entitled to contradict one of its witnesses by asking him if he did not

§ 851. Re-examination of Witness.

testify that he had the conversation related when he was examined by the state's attorney under the information law: State v. McDaniel, 39 Or. 161, 65 Pac. 521. And where the state claimed that defendant killed deceased because of his fear of the deceased's father, and the witness testified that a few days before the homicide the defendant stated to the witness that deceased's father was a savage old bull dog, it is held that the state is entitled to contradict the witness by producing his affidavit, in which he had previously sworn that defendant had also said in the same conversation that he was afraid to go with deceased because of her father: State v. McDaniel, supra.

But this section does not allow a party to inquire about matters regarding which the witness has not given any testimony. or testimony of a weak and unsatisfactory character, and then prove statements made at another time in reference to such matters: Langford v. Jones, 18 Or. 326, 22 Pac. 1064.

PRACTICE OF IMPEACHING BY PROOF OF CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS: See note to §§ 852 and 853.

A witness once examined shall not be re-examined as to the same matter without leave of the court; but he may be re-examined as to any new matter upon which he has been examined by the adverse party. After the examinations on both sides are concluded, the witness shall not be recalled without leave of the court. Leave is granted or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. [L. 1862; D. Cd. § 829; H. C. § 839.]

See note to § 842, ante.

The matter of permitting a witness to be recalled for further cross-examination after having been fully cross-examined and

§ 852. Witness, how Impeached.

excused from the stand is within the sound discretion of the trial court: State v. Robinson, 32 Or. 51, 48 Pac. 357.

A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called,

by contradictory evidence, or by evidence that his general reputation for truth is bad; or that his moral character is such as to render him unworthy of belief, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts; except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness or the record of the judgment that he has been convicted of a crime. [L. 1862; D. Cd. § 830; H. C. § 840.]

WITNESS PRESUMED TO SPEAK TRUTH: See § 695.

IMPEACHING WITNESS OF OPPOSITE PARTY. This and the succeeding section are simply declaratory of the common law: State v. Hunsaker, 16 Or. 499, 19 Pac. 605. It may be shown by the examination of a witness that he has been convicted either of a felony or misdemeanor, and the record may also be introduced to prove that fact: State v. Bacon, 13 Or. 143, 9 Pac. 393, 57 Am. Rep. 8, note. In State v. Chee Gong, 17 Or. 635, 21 Pac. 882, however, it is held that what a witness may be asked concerning any serious charge brought against him rests in the sound discretion of the court to allow or exclude such inquiry as the ends of justice may seem to require.

It seems, however, that where the witness is a party to the suit, he may not be questioned in regard to any other crime: State v. Lurch, 12 Or. 99, 6 Pac. 408; State v. Saunders, 14 Or. 300, 12 Pac. 441; State v. Bartmess, 33 Or. 123, 54 Pac. 167.

A party being a witness in her own behalf can not be impeached by a letter written by her to another person containing language which would indicate she was unchaste: Leverich v. Frank, 6 Or. 212.

The regular mode of examining into the

general reputation is to inquire whether the witness knows the general reputation of the person in question among his neighbors, and if his answer is in the affirmative, then he may be asked what that reputation is. If the word "general," however, is omitted, such testimony is intrinsically probable or is corroborated by other evidence: Wimer v. Smith, 22 Or. 476, 30 Pac. 416.

The moral character of a witness can not be impeached by showing particular acts of immoral character: Leverich v. Frank, 6 Or. 212.

To show that the reputation of a witness for truth and veracity is bad does not of itself entirely destroy his testimony, where it is intrinsically probable or is corroborated by other evidence: Wimer v. Smith, 22 Or. 476. 30 Pac. 416.

If a party calls a witness to impeach a witness of the other party by showing that his general reputation for truth is bad, and the other party on cross-examination calls out particular facts to show that such witness is not worthy of belief, such facts can be considered by the jury as affecting the credibility of the witness attempted to be impeached: Steeples v. Newton, 7 Or. 110, 33 Am. Rep. 705. See note to next section.

§ 853. Witness Impeached with Inconsistent Statements.

A witness may also be impeached by evidence that he has made, at other times, statements inconsistent with his present testimony; but before this can be done, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of times, places, and persons present; and he shall be asked whether he has made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing, they shall be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them. [L. 1862; D. Cd. § 831; H. C. § 841.]

In order to impeach a witness by showing contradictory statements, he must be asked, with particulars of time, place, and circumstances, whether he has made other specified statements inconsistent with his preseat testimony: Krewson v. Purdom, 13 Or. 563, 11 Pac. 281; State v. Lurch, 12 Or. 107, 6 Pac. 411; Sheppard v. Yocum, 10 Or. 402; State v. Hunsaker, 16 Or. 497, 19 Pac. 605. The object of the rule is simply for the protection of the witness, to give him an opportunity to recall the facts and correct the statements when immediately brought to his mind: Sheppard v. Yocum, 10 Or. 402. Where the answer of the witness shows that he understands the questions, and the time referred to, it is not necessary to state the place any more particularly: State v. Welch, 33 Or. 33, 54 Pac. 213.

A witness can not be asked if he did not make contradictory statements during the preliminary hearing without reciting such alleged statements: State v. Ogden, 39 Or. 195, 65 Pac. 449.

The attention of the witness need not be called to any particular place in a small hamlet, in an interrogatory made for the purpose of impeaching him, especially where the witness admits meeting in such hamlet the person to whom the contradictory state

ments are alleged to have been made: State v. Welch, 33 Ör. 33, 54 Pac. 213.

The same rules in regard to laying the foundation for impeaching a witness apply to laying the foundation for showing the hostility of the witness: State v. Ellsworth, 30 Or. 145, 47 Pac. 199; State v. Stewart, 11 Or. 52, 4 Pac. 128.

As a foundation for showing the hostility of a witness to defendant it is enough to ask if, in referring to the failure of the jury to agree on a verdict at a former trial. the witness did not at a certain time and place ask his friend, a man sixty or sixtyfive years old, with gray moustache, whose name was unknown to counsel, what he thought of the jury in the case, and on his answering that he understood they disagreed, state to him, "Well, that was better than an acquittal." This was sufficiently definite as to time, place, and persons present, to refresh the witness' memory: State v. Ellsworth, 30 Or. 145, 47 Pac. 199; State v. Mackey, 12 Or. 154, 6 Pac. 648.

A witness for the state can not be discredited by showing bad feelings between the sons of the witness and the defendant: State v. Ogden, 39 Or. 195, 65 Pac. 450.

The error, if any, in refusing to permit a witness to be examined concerning his

hostility was cured where his subsequent cross-examination disclosed his condition of mind: State v. Welch, 33 Or. 33, 54 Pac. 213. The question "Between the time you lost your money and the time you went out to Forest Grove, was you not on the streets of the City of Portland with L. Besser, chief of police, looking for the men that got your money, and did you not see McDonald, one of the defendants, and did not L. Besser point out McDonald to you and ask you if he was the man that got your money?" was held to be insufficient as not relating time and place sufficiently: State v. McDonald, 8 Or. 114.

The exclusion of evidence tending to impeach the witness by showing inconsistent statements at other times is harmless where the witness himself admits having

$ 854. Evidence of Good Character.

made such statements: State v. Fletcher, 24 Or. 295, 33 Pac. 575.

At witness may be impeached by members of the grand jury as to the testimony given by her before such jury where the proper foundation has been laid: State v. Brown, 28 Or. 161, 41 Pac. 1042.

A witness can not be interrogated concerning oral statements made by him for the purpose of being written down, and which were reduced to writing, without first being shown the writing itself: State v. Steeves, 29 Or. 101, 43 Pač. 947. A witness on a murder trial can not be impeached by introducing his testimony given at the coroner's inquest, which was reduced to writing, without first showing him the writing: State v. Crockett, 39 Or. 76, 65 Pac. 447.

Evidence of the good character of a party is not admissible in a civil action, suit, or proceeding, unless the issue therein involve his character, nor of a witness in any action, suit, or proceeding, until the character of such witness has been impeached. [L. 1862; D. Cd. § 832; H. C. § 842.]

Evidence showing the plaintiff's reputation for truth and veracity to be good is not competent in a civil action until such character has been attacked: Osmun v. Winters, 25 Or. 272, 35 Pac. 250; First Nat. Bank v. Commercial Assur. Co. 33 Or. 43, 52 Pac. 1052; Sheppard v. Yocum, 10 Or. 402; Cooper v. Phipps, 24 Or. 357, 33 Pac. 985, 22 L. R. A. 836; Munkers v. Farmers' Ins. Co. 30 Or. 214, 46 Pac. 850.

An attempt to show on cross-examination that a witness has at other times made statements not in harmony with his testimony on the trial, or is corrupt, is not a sufficient foundation on which to admit testimony of his good reputation for truth and veracity: First Nat. Bank v. Commercial Assur. Co. 33 Or. 43, 52 Pac. 1052; Sheppard v. Yocum, 10 Or. 402.

In a criminal case, however, the good character of the defendant may always be shown: State v. Porter, 32 Or. 135, 49 Pac. 964.

The witness may first be asked touching his knowledge of the general reputation of the party, and then whether it is good or bad, if the witness is found to possess sufficient knowledge on that subject: Kelley v. Highfield, 15 Or. 277, 14 Pac. 744; but where a witness shows himself unacquainted with the plaintiff's standing before and after the acts complained of in an action for malicious prosecution, he is not competent to testify as to the damage to plaintiff's reputation and character by defendant's acts: Stamper v. Raymond, 38 Or. 32, 62 Pac. 20.

§ 855. Writing May be Inspected by Adverse Party.

Whenever a writing is shown to a witness, it may be inspected by the adverse party, and if proved by the witness, shall be read to the jury before his testimony is closed, or it shall not be read, except on recalling the witness. [L. 1862; D. Cd. § 833; H. C. § 843.]

$ 856. Judge or Juror May be Called as a Witness.

The judge himself, or any juror, may be called as a witness by either party, but in the former case it is in the discretion of the court or judge to order the trial to be postponed or suspended, and to take place before another judge. [L. 1862; D. Cd. § 834; H. C. § 844.]

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE EFFECT OF EVIDENCE.

$857. Jury, Judges of the Effect of Evidence.

The jury, subject to the control of the court, in the cases specified in

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