Accordingly, we believe it appropriate to remand the cases to those courts.3 In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this interest may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. But it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them. While giving weight to these public and private considerations, the courts will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems. They will also consider the adequacy of any plans the defendants may propose to meet these problems and to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system. During this period of transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction of these cases. The judgments below, except that in the Delaware case, are accordingly reversed and the cases are remanded to the district courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases. The judgment in the Delaware case-ordering the immediate admission of the plaintiffs to schools previously attended only by white children-is affirmed on the basis of the principles stated in our May 17, 1954, opinion, but the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Delaware for such further proceedings as that court may deem necessary in light of this opinion. It is so ordered. 3 The cases coming to us from Kansas, South Carolina, and Virginia were originally heard by three-judge District Courts convened under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. These cases will accordingly be remanded to those three-judge courts. See Briggs v. Elliott, 342 U.S. 350. See Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 239. * See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329–330. COOPER v. AARON 358 U.S. 1 (1958) CERTIORARI TO THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 8TH CIRCUIT * No. 1. ARGUED SEPTEMBER 11, 1958-DECIDED SEPTEMBER 12, 1958 OPINION ANNOUNCED SEPTEMBER 29, 1958 Richard C. Butler argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were A. F. House and, by special leave of Court, John H. Haley, pro hac vice. Thurgood Marshall argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief Wiley A. Branton, William Coleman, Jr., Jack Greenberg, and Louis H. Pollak. Solicitor General Rankin, at the invitation of the Court, post, page 27, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging that the relief sought by respondents should be granted. With him on the brief were Oscar H. Davis, Philip Elman, and Ralph S. Spritzer. OPINION OF THE COURT Opinion of the Court by The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice BLACK, Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, Mr. Justice BURTON, Mr. Justice CLARK, Mr. Justice HARLAN, Mr. Justice BRENNAN, and Mr. Justice WHITTAKER. As this case reaches us, it raises questions of the highest importance to the maintenance of our federal system of government. It necessarily involves a claim by the Governor and legislature of a State that there is no duty on State officials to obey Federal court orders resting on this Court's considered interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, it involves actions by the Governor and Legislature of Arkansas upon the premise that they are not bound by our holding in Brown v. Board of Education (347 U.S. 483). That holding was that the 14th amendment forbids States to use their governmental powers to bar children on racial grounds from atending schools where there is State participation through any arrangement, management, funds, or property. We are urged to uphold a suspension of the Little Rock School *NOTE. The per curiam opinion announced on September 12, 1958, and printed in a footnote, post, p. 5, applies not only to this case but also to No. 1 Miscellaneous, August Special Term, 1958, Aaron et al. v. Cooper et al., on application for vacation of order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit staying issuance of its mandate, for stay of order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, and for such other orders as petitioners may be entitled to, argued August 28, 1958. Board's plan to do away with segregated public schools in Little Rock until State laws and efforts to upset and nullify our holding in Brown v. Board of Education have been further challenged and tested in the courts. We reject these contentions. The case was argued before us on September 11, 1958. On the following day we, unanimously affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (257 F. 2d 33), which had reversed a judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas (163 F. Supp. 13). The district court had granted the application of the petitioners, the Little Rock School Board and school superintendent, to suspend for 211⁄2 years the operation of the school board's courtapproved desegregation program. In order that the school board might know, without doubt, its duty in this regard before the opening of school, which had been set for the following Monday, September 15, 1958, we immediately issued the judgment, reserving the expression of our supporting views to a later date.* This opinion of all of the members of the Court embodies those views. The following are the facts and circumstances so far as necessary to show how the legal questions are presented. On May 17, 1954, this court decided that enforced racial segregation in the public schools of a State is a denial of the equal protection of the laws enjoining by the 14th amendment. Brown v. Board of Education (347 U.S. 483). The court postponed, pending further argument, formulation of a decree to effectuate this decision. That degree was rendered May 31, 1955. Brown v. Board of Education (349 U.S. 294). In the formulation of that decree, the court recognized that good faith compliance with the principles declared in Brown might in some situations "call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision." (Id., at 300). The court went on to state: Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic *The following was the Court's per curiam opinion: "PER CURIAM. “The Court, having fully deliberated upon the oral arguments had on August 28, 1958, as supplemented by the arguments presented on September 11, 1958, and all the briefs on file, is unanimously of the opinion that the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit of August 18, 1958, 257 F. 2d 33, must be affirmed. In view of the imminent commencement of the new school year at the Central High School of Little Rock, Arkansas, we deem it important to make prompt announcement of our judgment affirming the Court of Appeals. The expression of the views supporting our judgment will be prepared and announced in due course. "It is accordingly ordered that the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, dated August 18, 1958, 257 F. 2d 33, reversing the judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, dated June 20, 1958, 163 F. Supp. 13, be affirmed, and that the judgments of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, dated August 28, 1965, see 143 F. Supp. 855, and September 3, 1957, enforcing the School Board's plan for desegregation in compliance with the decision of this Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 349 U.S. 294, be reinstated. It follows that the order of the Court of Appeals dated August 21, 1958, staying its own mandate is of no further effect. "The judgment of this Court shall be effective immediately, and shall be communicated forthwith to the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas." and effective manner. But it should go without saying that the While giving weight to these public and private considera- 349 U.S., at 300-301. Under such circumstances, the district courts were directed to require "a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance," and to take such action as was necessary to bring about the end of racial segregation in the public schools "with all deliberate speed." Ibid. Of course, in many locations, obedience to the duty of desegregation would require the immediate general admission of Negro children, otherwise qualified as students for their appropriate classes, at particular schools. On the other hand, a district court, after analysis of the relevant factors (which, of course, excludes hostility to racial desegregation), might conclude that justification existed for not requiring the present nonsegregated admission of all qualified Negro children. In such circumstances, however, the courts should scrutinize the program of the school authorities to make sure that they had developed arrangements pointed toward the earliest practicable completion of desegregation, and had taken appropriate steps to put their program into effective operation. It was made plain that delay in any guise in order to deny the constitutional rights of Negro children could not be countenanced, and that only a prompt start, diligently and earnestly pursued, to eliminate racial segregation from the public schools could constitute good faith compliance. State authorities were thus duty bound to devote every effort toward initiating desegregation and bringing about the elimination of racial discrimination in the public school system. On May 20, 1954, 3 days after the first Brown opinion, the Little Rock District School Board adopted, and on May 23, 1954, made public, a statement of policy entitled "Supreme Court Decision-Segregation in Public Schools." In this statement the board recognized that: It is our responsibility to comply with Federal constitutional requirements and we intend to do so when the Supreme Court of the United States outlines the method to be followed. Thereafter the board undertook studies of the administrative problems confronting the transition to a desegregated public school system at Little Rock. It instructed the superintendent of schools to prepare a plan for desegregation, and approved such a plan on May 24, 1955, 7 days before the second Brown opinion. The plan provided for desegregation at the senior high school level (grades 10 through 12) as the first stage. Desegregation at the junior high and elementary levels was to follow. It was contemplated that desegregation at the high school level would commence in the fall of 1957, and the expectation was that complete desegregation of the school system would be accomplished by 1963. Following the adoption of this plan, the superintendent of schools discussed it with a large number of citizen groups in the city. As a result of these discussions, the board reached the conclusion that "a large majority of the residents" of Little Rock were of "the belief... that the plan, although objectionable in principle," from the point of view of those supporting segregated schools, "was still the best for the interests of all pupils in the district." Upon challenge by a group of Negro plaintiffs desiring more rapid completion of the desegregation process, the district court upheld the school board's plan. Aaron v. Cooper (143 F.Supp. 855). The court of appeals affirmed (243 F.2d 361). Review of that judgment was not sought here. While the school board was thus going forward with its preparation for desegregating the Little Rock school system, other State authorities, in contrast, were actively pursuing a program designed to perpetuate in Arkansas the system of racial segregation which this court had held violated the 14th amendment. First came, in November 1956, an amendment to the State constitution flatly commanding the Arkansas General Assembly to oppose "in every constitutional manner the unconstitutional desegregation decisions of May 17, 1954, and May 31, 1955, of the U.S. Supreme Court," Arkansas Constitutional Amendment 44, and. through the initiative, a pupil assignment law (Arkansas Statute 80-1519 to 80-1524). Pursuant to this State constitutional command, a law relieving school children from compulsory attendance at racially mixed schools, Arkansas Statute 80-1525, and a law establishing a State Sovereignty Commission, Arkansas Statute 6-801 to 6-824, were enacted by the general assembly in February 1957. The school board and the superintendent of schools nevertheless continued with preparations to carry out the first stage of the desegregation program. Nine Negro children were scheduled for admission in September 1957 to Central High School, which has more than 2,000 students. Various administrative measures, designed to assure the smooth transition of this first stage of desegregation, were undertaken. On September 2, 1957, the day before these Negro students were to enter Central High, the school authorities were met with drastic opposing action on the part of the Governor of Arkansas who dispatched units of the Arkansas National Guard to the Central High School grounds and placed the school "off limits" to colored students. As found by the district court in subsequent proceedings, the Governor's action had not been requested by the school authorities, and was entirely unheralded. The findings were these: Up to this time [September 2], no crowds had gathered about Central High School and no acts of violence or threats of violence in connection with the carrying out of the plan |