than one for which he is certified or for which he has had substantial experience within a reasonably current period. In general and depending upon the subject matter involved, 5 years is such a reasonable period.

MAJORITY TO MINORITY TRANSFER POLICY

The school district shall permit a student attending a school in which his race is in the majority to choose to attend another school, where space is available, and where his race is in the minority.

TRANSPORTATION

The transportation system, in those school districts having transportation systems, shall be completely reexamined regularly by the superintendent, his staff, and the school board. Bus routes and the assignment of students to buses will be designed to insure the transportation of all eligible pupils on a nonsegregated and otherwise nondiscriminatory basis.

SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION AND SITE SELECTION

All school construction, school consolidation, and site election (including the location of any temporary classrooms) in the system shall be done in a manner which will prevent the recurrence of the dual school structure once this desegregation plan is implemented.

ATTENDANCE OUSTSIDE SYSTEM OF RESIDENCE

If the school district grants transfers to students living in the district for their attendance at public schools outside the district, or if it permits transfers into the district of students who live outside the district, it shall do so on a nondiscriminatory basis, except that it shall not consent to transfers where the cumulative effect will reduce desegregation in either district or reenforce the dual school system.

See United States v. Hinds County, supra, decided November 6, 1969. The orders there embrace these same requirements.

II

In addition to the foregoing requirements of general applicability, the order of the court which is peculiar to each of the specific cases being considered is as follows:

No. 26285-JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI

This is a freedom of choice system. The issue presented has to do with school building construction. We enjoined the proposed construction pending appeal.

309-313

A Federal appellate court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered. Bell v. State of Maryland, 378 U.S. 2268, 84 S. Ct. 1814, 12 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1964). We therefore reverse and remand for compliance with the requirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the other provisions and conditions of this order. Our order enjoining the proposed construction pending appeal is continued in effect until such time as the district court has approved a plan for conversion to a unitary school system.

No. 28261-MARSHALL COUNTY

*

III

In the event of an appeal or appeals to this court from an order entered as aforesaid in the district courts, such appeal shall be on the original record and the parties are encouraged to appeal on an agreed statement as is provided for in rule 10 (d), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP). Pursuant to rule 2, FRAP, the provisions of rule 4(a) as to the time for filing notice of appeal are suspended and it is ordered that any notice of appeal be filed within 15 days of the date of entry of the order appealed from and notices of cross-appeal within 5 days thereafter. The provisions of rule 11 are suspended and it is ordered that the record be transmitted to this court within 15 days after filing of the notice of appeal. The provisions of rule 31 are suspended to the extent that the brief of the appellant shall be filed within 15 days after the date on which the record is filed and the brief of the appellee shall be filed within 10 days after the date on which the brief of appellant is filed. No reply brief shall be filed except upon order of the court. The times set herein may be enlarged by the court upon good cause shown.

The mandate in each of the within matters shall issue forthwith. No stay will be granted pending petition for rehearing or application for certiorari.

Reversed as to all save Mobile and St. John The Baptist Parish; affirmed as to Mobile with direction; affirmed in part and reversed in part as to St. John The Baptist Parish; remanded to the district courts for further proceedings consistent herewith.

KEYES v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DENVER

303 F.Supp. 279 (1969)

VACATED AND REMANDED-AUGUST 5, 1969

Suit by schoolchildren to enjoin implementation of resolution of Denver School Board which rescinded previous resolutions pertaining o integration of the schools. On motion for preliminary injunction, he district court, William E. Doyle, J., held that city school board's escission of four resolutions which required positive integration of chool system constituted arbitrary State legislative action which conravened the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. Motion granted.

Opinion after remand (D.C., 303 F.Supp. 289)

Barnes and Jensen, by Craig S. Barnes, Gerald L. Jensen, Holland and Hart, by Gordon G. Greiner, Lawrence W. Treece, Robert T. Connery, Denver, Colo., Vilma Martinez Singer, New York City, for plaintiffs.

Henry, Cockrell, Quinn and Creighton, by Richard C. Cockrell, Victor Quinn, Thomas E. Creighton, Benjamin L. Craig, Michael Jackson, Denver, Colo., Beirne, Wirthlin and Manley, by Robert E. Manley, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendants, except John H. Amesse, James D. Voorhees, Jr., and Rachel B. Noel, as individuals.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM E. DOYLE, District Judge.

I-JURISDICTION

This is before us on a motion for temporary injunction. Examination of the complaint reveals that jurisdiction is invoked by reason of title 28, U.S.C. 1343 (3) (4), which authorizes the court to entertain. suits which seek to redress injuries resulting from violations of the Constitution of the United States. Although the Declaratory Judgment Act has been invoked, this does not of itself confer any independent jurdisdiction. The Civil Rights Act is also drawn into play (title 42 U.S.C. secs. 1983, 1985). It is alleged that the State of Colorado, acting through its agents, violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. By reason of the allegations of the complaint and the facts which have been presented, it is determined that there is subject matter jurisdiction to hear the cause.

The plaintiffs, who are schoolchildren, allege through their parents that their rights have been violated and continue to be violated through acts that have been described. Consequently, they are aggrieved persons. There is no dispute about their identity or their interest in the case, nor is there any question raised as to the propriety of a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated. Consequently, there does not appear to be any problem about jurisdiction, personal or subject matter, to entertain the cause, both sides have conceded that it is a matter that needs immediate attention and that it should be disposed of without delay.

II-THE ISSUES

The pleadings describe alleged injuries resulting from the plaintiffs having been subjected to unequal treatment with respect to their right to an education. They seek to enjoin the implementation of a resolution of the school board passed on June 9 of this year which would have rescinded previous resolutions which had made some effort to mitigate or reduce segregation which allegedly had existed in schools in the northeast part of Denver. The defendants deny that there has been any actionable segregation. Although no answer has been filed, they maintain that segregation, if any, exists by reason of maintaining neighborhood schools and natural migration, and that no action on their part has brought this about or intensified it. Basically, this is the issue which has been tried here, and has been tried rather extensively. The complaint herein contains several causes of action and counts. At this stage of the proceedings we are concerned only with the first cause of action and the counts which are related to it. All of these allegations pertain to the rescission of school board resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531, which resolutions made changes in the attendance areas of certain high schools, junior high schools, and elementary schools in northeast Denver, and undertook to desegregate these schools, all of which had become or were becoming predominantly Negro schools. It is alleged that on June 9, 1969, the newly elected school board, by motion, rescinded all three resolutions. The complaint alleges that the action of the board was in violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights the 14th amendment-and seeks a decree reinstating resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531.

The motion for preliminary injunction which is now before us seeks to enjoin the implementation of board resolution 1533 which would adopt and follow the policy which would carry out the practices which existed prior to the board's adoption of Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531. The temporary injunction seeks maintenance of the status quo and, specifically, an order enjoining the school board from modifying the purchase order for schoolbuses, destroying documents relating or pertaining to the implementation of Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531 and, thirdly, from taking any action or making any communications to faculty, staff, parents, or students during the pendency of the suit which would make it impossible or more difficult to proceed with the implementation of Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531. The defendants have not filed an answer. However, at the hearing they denied that any of their acts were invalid and generally maintained that they had made good faith efforts to integrate the schools in question to the