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Warren v. Eddy.

The allegations are, that when the first bill of goods was bought, the defendant said he was worth $20,000; when the second bill was bought, that he was worth $15,000. Assuming that the defendant made those representations, did he make them from a mistaken opinion as to what he was worth; or did he know at the time that he was insolvent; and did he, knowing this, make them with intent to defraud the plaintiffs ?

In my opinion, the circumstances alleged in the affidavits upon which the order of arrest was granted, are very slight to show the fraudulent intent; and these circumstances, slight as they are, are satisfactorily explained by the affidavits on which the motion to vacate the order of arrest was made.

The order of the special term should be reversed, with ten dollars costs.

[NEW YORK GENERAL TERM, November 5, 1860. Sutherland, Hogeboom and Bonney, Justices.]

WARREN vs. EDDY, impleaded, &c.

An order for affirmance, by default, founded upon a notice of argument addressed to and served upon the attorney of a defendant, after the death of the latter, and after the attorney for the appellant has been notified of his death, is irregular.

If the personal representative of the deceased defendant is a non-resident, so that the action cannot be revived in his name, the proper course of the plaintiff, if he desires to prosecute the appeal, after receiving notice of the death of the defendant, and that his administrator intends to abandon the appeal, is, to have an administrator appointed here, and then apply to have the action revived in the name of the latter.

Whether the general term, where a case has been made, on appeal, will get possession of the appeal, so as to be able to affirm the judgment, before the case has been filed or served? Quære.

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Warren v. Eddy.

PPEAL from an order made at a special term, setting aside a judgment of affirmance.

Mr. Garvin, for the defendant and respondent.

E. P. Clark, for the plaintiff and appellant.

By the Court, SUTHERLAND, J. I think the order of the general term affirming the judgment, and the judgment of affirmance entered thereon, were made and entered irregularly, and that the order of the special term appealed from, setting aside the judgment of affirmance, should be affirmed.

The notice of argument for the February general term, 1860, was addressed to and served upon J. W. Culver, as the attorney for the defendant Daniel F. Eddy, long after the death of the latter, and after the attorney for the appellant had been notified of his death.

At the time of the service of the notice, J. W. Culver could not act for a dead man, and he had no authority to act for or represent his estate.

The order of the general term for affirmance by default, founded on such notice, was therefore irregular, inasmuch as it was made without notice to any one representing the estate or interests of Daniel F. Eddy's estate. His personal representative was a non-resident, and the action could not therefore have been revived in his name; but the plaintiff, if he desired to prosecute the appeal, after he received notice of the death of Eddy, and that his foreign administrator intended to abandon the appeal, could have had an administrator appointed here, and then he could have applied to have the action revived in the name of such domestic administrator. I see no other way in which he could regularly obtain a judgment of affirmance, after the death of Eddy.

There is doubt, too, as the case was never served or filed, whether the general term ever got possession of the appeal, so as to affirm the judgment. The general term could of

Warren v. Eddy.

course dismiss the appeal for the non-service of the case, but whether they can affirm the judgment, where a case has been made, before the case has been either filed or served, is, to say the least, doubtful. (See Hunt v. Bloomer, 3 Kern. 341; Pope v. Dinsmore, 29 Barb. 367.) But it is not necessary I think the order of the

to decide that question in this case. special term should be affirmed, with $10 costs on the first point alone.

[NEW YORK GENERAL TERM, November 5, 1860. Sutherland, Hogeboom and Bonney, Justices.]

INDEX

A

ACTION.

1. Where a complaint alleged that the
defendants, officers of a corporation,
wrongfully and fraudulently issued
false certificates of stock, beyond the
chartered power or right of the cor-
poration; that subsequently a parcel
of such false certificates, purporting
to represent 3000 shares of genuine
stock, came into the hands of the
plaintiff, by purchase, not from the
defendants, but from third parties,
who had taken them, either directly
or remotely, from the defendants;
Held, on demurrer, that the com-
plaint showed no cause of action on
the part of the plaintiff, against the
defendants; there being no privity
between the parties, and the plain-
tiff having his remedy against the
parties from whom he purchased the
false certificates. Seizer v. Mali,
76

2. Where a party is in possession of
property, claiming it as his own, and
proves a sale thereof to him by the
former owner, sufficient as between
them, to pass the title, this is suffi-
cient proof of property to entitle him
to recover against a wrongdoer, for
taking and converting it. Beaty v.
634
Swarthout,

3. Before an action will lie, at the suit
of an individual sustaining peculiar
damages, against a municipal cor-
poration, for an omission to per-
form a duty enjoined by law, it must
be shown that the duty has been im-
posed absolutely and imperatively,

667

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it was agreed between the parties
that B. S. should give his promisso-
ry note for the price, to be indorsed
by G. S. a resident of M. in the state
of Illinois. A note, payable to the
order of G. S. at M. was accordingly
made and signed by B. S. and by
him forwarded to G. S. in Illinois.
G. S. on receiving the note, indorsed
it, and sent the same by mail to B.
S. at Beloit, Wisconsin, who enclosed
the note thus indorsed, to the plain-
tiffs at New York. Held that the
note, and the indorsement, were in-
dependent contracts; the former to
be performed in Illinois, and the lat-
ter in New York. That both the
note and the indorsement were to be
deemed made in New York; and
that the question of the liability of
G. S., as indorser, was to be determ-
ined by the law of New York, and
not by the law of Illinois. Accord-
ingly held that a recovery could be
had, in this state, against the indor-
ser, without proving any attempt to
collect the note of the maker by a
suit against him. Lee v. Selleck, 522

See also Boutwell v. O'Keefe, 434.
Clark v. Gilbert, 576.
Woodford v. Patterson, 636.
PARTNERSHIP, 8.

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6.

could not be obtained without such
influence; Held illegal, and that no
contract made in consideration
thereof could be enforced by law.
Devlin v. Brady,
518

And where a promissory note, given
as the consideration of such an
agreement, to M. was indorsed by
the latter to the plaintiff, with
notice of the facts, who procured
the same to be discounted by a
bank for his own benefit, and be
himself received the proceeds of the
discount, and the plaintiff, after the
note was dishonored and in the
bands of the bank, took it up and
paid to the bank the amount there-
of; Held that he was not entitled to
stand in the shoes of the bank,
which received it before maturity,
and paid value for it, in good faith;
but that his position and rights, as
against the prior parties thereto,
were the same as if he had never
parted with the note.
ib

4. Rescission of.

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
WORK AND LABOR.

ALIEN.

1. Although an alien may not acquire
title to real estate, as against the
true owner, by an adverse posses-
sion of twenty years, claiming title
thereto in himself, yet the statute
of limitations will furnish a perfect
defense to an action of ejectment
against him by the true owner.
263
Overing v. Russell,

AMENDMENT.

1. Of answer.

1. A motion to amend an answer, so as
to authorize certain evidence to be
given, if within the jurisdiction of
a referee to grant, is addressed to
his discretion, and from his decision
no appeal will lie. Woodruff v.
Hurson,
557

2. Where the amendment proposed to
be made, in an answer, contemplates
a new defense, pro tanto, a referee
has no jurisdiction over the motion,

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