Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political EconomistTexas A & M University Press, 1977 - Počet stran: 311 Though written by an economist, this book's subject is not "economics" in the ordinary sense of that term. Instead, it is James Buchanan's contribution to what he has called the "contractarian revival," the renewed interest in and emphasis on the metaphor of the social contract in evaluating political alternatives. He believes that genuine constitutional dialogue must take place in this country if America is to remain a free society and that the perspectives of an economist are valuable in the discussion of basic issues of social philosophy. |
Obsah
Introduction | 3 |
A Contractarian Perspective on Anarchy | 11 |
Law and the Invisible Hand | 25 |
Autorská práva | |
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Freedom in Constitutional Contract: Perspectives of a Political Economist James M. Buchanan Náhled není k dispozici. - 1977 |
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