CASUALTIES. The casualties among the different classes of troops were as follows: Total wounded, killed, and died of wounds. Total killed, wounded, and died of wounds, Regular Army 415 2,946 The number killed, wounded, and died of wounds, in the three classes of troops was as follows: The losses in killed and died of wounds among the volunteers were distributed as follows: The deaths from disease and accidents were as follows: 16 439 152 607 Of the 16 killed or died of wounds among the three and six months' men (all held for three months), 15 belonged to the Texas rangers, two companies of whom were organized by General Taylor before leaving Corpus Christi, and who were with him in the skirmishes preceding Palo Alto. This loss of but one man among the remaining 12,000, who were called out too late to participate in the battle of Palo Alto and for too short a period to be available for operations beyond the Rio Grande, indicates how useless was their service. The same remark applies with almost equal force to the 33,000 volunteers for the war, called out to replace the 27,000 men who had had the benefit of a year's campaign and instruction. An analysis of their losses shows that of the 152 killed and died of wounds, 118 fell upon the four regiments (the Second New York, First and Second Pennsylvania, and First South Carolina), which were with Scott's army at Cerro Gordo and remained with it till the hour of its triumph. Thus it appears that, excepting the Texas rangers from the three and six a The killed and wounded in the entire force of volunteers is taken from the Statistical Report of the Surgeon-General, Ex. Doc. No. 96, Senate, Thirty-fourth Congress, first session, p. 621. This number is taken in preference to 1,778, computed from Ex. Doc. No. 24, H. R., Thirty-first Congress, first session; both are based on figures of the Adjutant-General, compiled from the reports of commanders and regimental and company returns. As stated by the Adjutant-General, “The statistics of the war are given as close approximation only." House Ex. Doc. No. 24, Thirty-first Congress, first session, pp. 23, 24, 25, 26, Table C. House Ex. Doc. No. 24, Thirty-first Congress, first session, pp. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 Table C. months' men and the four gallant regiments which entered the Mexican capital from the volunteers called out for the war, the total loss among more than 42,000 men was but 35 in killed and died of their wounds. If we choose to carry the argument further and add to the 42,000 the 11,000 new regulars who were likewise called out to repair the mistake of twelve-month enlistments, it will appear that we had more than 53,000 men in the service, whose losses in killed and died of wounds numbered but 178. Laying aside the President's responsibility for this result, it is important to observe that 12,000 of these men (militia) were called out because our defective laws gave the President no power to increase the rank and file of the Army, while 41,000 were called out to remedy another legislative blunder which permitted him to accept volunteers for twelve months instead of for the war. To establish the fact that these 41,000 men, regulars and volunteers, need not have been summoned to the field except to retrieve errors of statesmanship, self-evident to the military mind, we have only to state that the old army recruited to 19,000, added to the 27,000 volunteers, had the latter been accepted for the war, would have given the Government a permanent force of 46,000 men. Contrasted with this number the greatest strength of the Mexican army was never estimated to exceed 36,000 men. As these conclusions bear solely on the extravagance of our system, it is possible that they may be lightly considered under the popular conviction that in time of peace our economy more than offsets the prodigality of war, but there are other considerations of deeper import than dollars and cents. In a government of the people and for the people, more than in any other, it is the duty of statesmen to study the means of preserving life as well as property, yet history shows that in proportion as the national treasure has been squandered, have the lives of our brave and patriotic citizen soldiers been thrown away. As an evidence of the penalty paid for entrusting raw troops to inexperienced officers who knew nothing of the principles governing their diet and health, let us again recur to statistics, taking, for example, the deaths by disease in the old and new regular regiments. A comparison of these figures shows that while the old army, numbering from first to last 19,290, was exposed for more than two years to a sickly climate and lost 2,574 enlisted men, or at the rate of 63 per cent per annum, the new establishment, numbering but 11,186, lost in less than a year 2,055, or at the rate of 19 per cent per annum- -a loss three times as great as the old regiments. That this loss might have been much lessened had their field officers been selected from the old regiments, scarcely admits of denial. Other figures may be quoted which should not escape the attention of the philanthropist. If it be admitted that but for the unfortunate option granted by the law, the 27,000 volunteers first called out, in connection with the old regular establishment, would have been sufficient to bring the war to a speedy termination, then it must also be granted a At the battle of Salem Heights or Chancellorsville the One hundred and twentyfirst New York Volunteers, after six months' training under a regular officer, went into action with 8 companies, numbering 458 men, and lost 228 killed and wounded, of whom 92 were killed and died of their wounds. This loss of part of a regiment in a single battle exceeded one-half of the loss of 53,000 men who served in the Mexi can war. that the men who died of disease in the new regular regiments and among the 33,000 volunteers afterwards called out for the war, were the victims of unwise legislation. In addition the number of men discharged (in ruined health) for disability was: New regular regiments. Total... 767 2,763 3,530 In paying a just tribute to the patriots who forsook their homes to go to a distant land, there to face the ravages of death in defense of the honor of the country, President Polk in his message to Congress, December, 1846, stated: Well may the American people be proud of the energy and gallantry of our regular and volunteer officers and soldiers. The events of these few months afford a gratifying proof that our country can, under any emergency, confidently rely for the maintenance of her honor and the defense of her rights on an effective force ready at all times voluntarily to relinquish the comforts of home for the perils and privations of the camp. And though such a force may be for the time expensive it is in the end economical, as the ability to command it removes the necessity of employing a large standing army in time of peace and proves that our people love their institutions and are ever ready to defend and protect them." The views expressed in these lines undoubtedly represent the average conviction of our people if not of our statesmen. Firmly convinced that in reducing the strength of the Regular Army without making any provision for its expansion, our system "is in the end economical," our representatives have suffered military organization to be neglected till in a moment of excitement, laws have been enacted, without debate, a single defect of which, like the short enlistment clause of the act of May, 1846, may entail the sacrifice of more than 6,000 men. COST OF THE WAR. The money disbursed by the pay department to the various classes of troops during the Mexican war was as follows: The mere pay of troops is, however, but a small portion of the expense of carrying on war, as is shown by the following table, which @ House Ex. Doc. No. 4, Twenty-ninth Congress, second session, p. 22. gives the expenditures of the War and Navy departments from the close of the Florida war to the year 1849: These figures show that while by reducing the Army to 8,000 men the expenditures during the two and a half years preceding the war were but $13,873,146.89, or at the rate of $5,549,258.75 per annum, the expenditures for the next four years were $88,500,208.38, or at the rate of $17,700,041.67 per annum. LESSONS OF THE WAR. Notwithstanding its unnecessary prolongation the Mexican war marked a great change if not a revolution in our military policy. This result was due to the decay and gradual abandonment of the militia system which up to that time had been regarded as the "great bulwark of national defense." Bearing in mind that the laws under which military operations were prosecuted were almost identical with the laws of 1812 let us examine the composition of the forces employed in the two wars: This figure is approximate. The return for September, 1814, gave the aggregate strength of the Army at 38.186. The report of the Commissioner of Pensions for 1874, p. 30, gives the number of men, including sailors and marines, who served twelve months or more, at 63,179. From this estimate there should still be deducted twelve months' rangers and volunteers, In the Mexican war it will be remembered that 11,211 men were mustered in for six months, but held only for three, the legal term of the militia. In reality these men, as also in all probability the 1.390, should be considered volunteers rather than militia, inasmuch as militia service was no longer obligatory in any of the States. The percentage of the different classes of troops to the total number of men employed in the two wars was as follows: |