ARTICLE 13. Every State shall abide by the decision of the United States, in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this confederation are submitted to them. And the articles of this confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the union shall be perpetual, nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States and be afterwards confirmed by the legislature of every State. It will be perceived that the power to carry on war was made to depend upon the harmonious cooperation of at least nine States, each one of which, with the assent of Congress, could maintain in time of peace its own army and navy. 66 Congress had raised its own Desirous of rewarding their that Congress has and ought of appointing officers in the Up to the time of the Confederation, armies and commissioned all the officers. skill and gallantry in 1776, it resolved to retain the power heretofore exercised Continental service according to merit." It is true that it accorded later the right of recommendation to the States, but under the new system no field or company officer could be commissioned, nor could a soldier be enlisted, save by the legislature of his State. The power given to the legislatures "to raise the men, and clothe, arm, and equip them at the expense of the United States," placed the National Treasury at the mercy of every State agent. More serious still, as Congress could not enlist a soldier, nor levy a tax, nor enforce a requisition for men or for money, any legislature could neutralize the power of a State, if not defeat the chief object of the Confederation. Instead of resting the war power in a central government, which alone could insure its vigorous exercise, Congress was reduced to a mere consultative body or congress of diplomats, with authority to concert only such measures for common defense as might receive the sanction of nine of the allied sovereignties they represented. If any State became lukewarm or conceived that its local interests were neglected, it could promptly recall its delegates. Weak as had been our military policy under the government of the Continental Congress, it was to become still more imbecile through the inherent defects of the new system. To the indecision and delays of a single Congress were now superadded the indecisions and delays of at least nine more deliberative bodies. CHAPTER IV. CAMPAIGN OF 1778. TROOPS REQUIRED AND FURNISHED. This campaign opened amid the sufferings of a half-clad, half-starved army at the camp of Valley Forge, whither Washington had retired with a force of from 8,000 to 10,000 Continentals. As none of the battalions during the preceding year had been recruited to more than about one-third of their strength, Congress, on the 6th of February, recommended the several States to draft men for nine months, to be discharged before the end of that time in proportion as they could be replaced by those enlisting for three years of the war. Notwithstanding this measure, the whole Continental force on the 8th of May only numbered some 15,000 men, the total strength of the British being put down by Washington at 16,000.a When, on the 8th of May, these figures were laid before a council of war at Valley Forge, it unanimously decided that the best policy was to remain on the defensive and await future events. It is probable that the decision was influenced by a knowledge of the French alliance, an event confidently regarded by all as equivalent to the establishment of American independence. While our army lay at Valley Forge in sad need of clothing and supplies, the influence of a trained officer again made itself felt in spite of these adverse circumstances. Baron Steuben, a veteran of the wars of Frederick the Great, having been appointed InspectorGeneral of the Army, set on foot great improvements in tactics, regulations, and discipline. Too weak to assume the offensive, our troops remained at Valley Forge till the 18th of June, when the English commander, hearing of the approach of a French fleet with reenforcements, evacuated Philadelphia and fell back on New York. Washington rapidly followed in pursuit, and overtook and engaged the enemy near Monmouth Court House on the 28th of June, our casualties being some two hundred, while the British lost three hundred in battle and some two thousand Hessians who deserted during the retreat. Active operations between the main armies ended with this engagement, the forces on both sides being transferred to the east of the a This estimate was too low. We learn from the American State Papers that the total British force then in America was more than twice as great, and that on the 26th of March, 19,500 men were stationed in Philadelphia alone. After all the recruits had joined, it was hoped that the Continental force might reach 20,000. 15836-04- -3 33 Hudson. The only other event of importance during the campaign was a combined attack of 4,000 French and 8,000 Continentals and militia on the British force at Newport, 8,000 strong. The enterprise miscarried in consequence of a storm which drove off the French fleet. In November, the French fleet sailed for the West Indies, and on the 29th of December the British captured Savannah. By the middle of January they were masters of the whole State of Georgia, and thenceforward the South became the principal theater of operations during the remainder of the war. The following table shows the costly army kept on foot during a campaign which at its close found the American forces everywhere reduced to the defensive, and an entire State in the hands of the enemy: Conjectural estimate of militia employed in addition to the above.b Georgia, 2,000 militia for six months and 1,200 State troops Total Grand total 500 4,500 1,000 2,000 600 2,000 3, 200 13, 800 51,046 The above figures give, in the Continental establishment, 2,000 men less than in the year before; and in the militia a decrease of 15,000, due to the almost total inactivity of the enemy. a From American State Papers, vol. 12, p. 16. Two corrections in totals have been made by editors, namely, 32,893 for 32,887, in third column, and 37,246 for 37,252 in fifth column. Three errors also occur in the items of fifth column as carried over from third column. These also have been corrected, assuming that the third column is correct. Exact returns of militia were never rendered. See Report of General Knox, Secretary of War, American State Papers, Military Affairs, vol. 1. BOUNTY. The year, though barren in military operations, had its valuable budget of military experience. While the patriotism of a people, taken collectively, is quite equal to keeping up a prolonged struggle for liberty, cost what it may, we find that the patriotism of the individual utterly fails to induce him to undergo, voluntarily, the hardships and dangers of war. The first bounty offered by the States and by Congress was a confession of this truth, which each succeeding campaign only too painfully confirmed. Congress now tried to conceal an evil which it could not check. On the 18th of September it resolved That General Washington be authorized, if he shall judge it for the interest of the United States, to augment the Continental bounty to recruits, enlisting for three years or during the war, to a sum not exceeding ten dollars; and that he use his discretion in keeping the matter secret as long as he shall deem necessary. To carry this into effect Congress further resolved that $80,000 be transmitted to William Palfrey, of Massachusetts, Paymaster-General of the Army. DRAFTING. The system of voluntary enlistments, even when stimulated by large bounties, having failed to raise the men required, Congress, as we have seen, was forced to recommend the draft. Only solicitous to escape the consequences of this measure, States, townships, and individuals cared little for the character of the men they sent into the field. On the 17th of March, Washington wrote to the President of the Massachusetts council: It gives me inexpressible concern to have repeated information from the best authority that the committees of the different towns and districts in your State hire deserters from General Burgoyne's army and employ them as substitutes to excuse the personal service of the inhabitants. I need not enlarge upon the dangers of substituting, as soldiers, men who have given a glaring proof of a treacherous disposition, and who are bound to us by no motives of attachment, instead of citizens in whom the ties of country, kindred, and sometimes property are so many securities for their fidelity. The evils with which this measure is pregnant are obvious, and of such serious nature as makes it necessary not only to stop the further progress of it, but likewise to apply a retrospective remedy, and if possible to annul it, so far as it has been carried into effect. Unless this is done, although you may be amused for the present with the flattering idea of speedily completing your battalions, they will be found, at or before the opening of the campaign, reduced by the defection of every British soldier to their original weak condition, and the accumulated bounties of the continent and of the State will have been fruitlessly sacrificed. Indeed, General Burgoyne could hardly, if he were consulted, suggest a more effectual plan for plundering us of so much money, reenforcing General Howe with so many men, and preventing us from recruiting a certain number of regiments; to say nothing of the additional losses, which may be dreaded, in desertions among the native soldiers, from the contagion of ill example and the arts of seduction, which it is more than probable will be put in practice.« The next day he wrote again: The evil which I apprehended from the enlistment of deserters has already made its appearance. One of the colonels informs me that every British deserter sent to his regiment, except one, has already gone off. One of these people a few nights a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 5, pp. 287, 288. ago took off a light-horse with its accouterments from an advanced picket. I hope upon this proof of the infidelity of the above-described class that a total stop will be put to the hiring them. a This enlistment of deserters to fill quotas went so far that Congress was at length compelled to denounce it by resolution. The desire to get men in order to avoid the draft suggested another expedient- the enlistment of slaves-since resorted to on both sides during the war of the rebellion Free negroes had been permitted to enlist from the beginning of the Revolution, but in 1778 it was proposed in Rhode Island to raise a battalion of slaves. The governor of that State, in writing to Washington, explains the action of the assembly in this matter: Liberty is given to every effective slave to enter into the service during the war, and upon his passing muster he is absolutely made free and entitled to all the wages, bounties, and encouragements given by Congress to any soldier enlisting into the service. The masters are allowed at the rate of one hundred and twenty pounds for the most valuable slave, and in proportion for those of less value. The number of slaves in the State is not great, but it is generally thought that three hundred and upward will be enlisted. VOLUNTEERS. In a letter to his brother Augustine, Washington gives his views in regard to raising a body of volunteers in Virginia: I observe what you say respecting voluntary enlistment, or rather your scheme for raising 2,000 volunteers; and I candidly own to you that I have no opinion of it. These measures only tend to burthen the public with a number of officers without adding one jot to our strength, but greatly to confusion and disorder. If the several States would but fall on some vigorous measures to fill up their respective regiments, nothing more need be asked of them. But while these are neglected, or, in other words, ineffectually and feebly attended to, and these succedaneums (sic) tried, we can never have an army to be depended upon. OFFICERS. Another difficulty arose in 1778, almost as grave as the non-enlistment of recruits. Paper money, steadily issued from the beginning of the war, had now become so depreciated that officers could not possibly support themselves and their families on their pay. The general state of the country toward the close of the year is thus given by Washington in a letter to Benjamin Harrison. If I were to be called upon to draw a picture of the times and of men, from what I have seen, heard, and in part know, I should in one word say that idleness, dissipation, and extravagance seem to have laid fast hold of most of them; that speculation, peculation, and an insatiable thirst for riches seem to have got the better of every other consideration, and almost every order of men; that party disputes and personal quarrels are the great business of the day; whilst the momentous concerns of an empire, a great and accumulating debt, ruined finances, depreciated money, and want of credit, whilst in its consequences is the want of everything, are but secondary considerations, and postponed from day to day, from week to week, as if our affairs wore the most promising aspect. Our money is now sinking 50 per cent a day in this city (Philadelphia), and I shall not be surprised if, in the course of a few months, a total stop is put to the currency of it; and yet an assembly, a concert, a dinner, or supper that will cost a Sparks's Writings of Washington, vol. 5, p. 288, note. |