Fourth. That the war resources of a nation can only be called forth and energetically directed by one general government to which the people owe a paramount allegiance.

Fifth. Admitting the poverty of the colonies, their want of credit, their inability to provide proper clothing, food, arms, ammunition, and other supplies for the Army; also the possibilities of a confederation which might deprive Congress of the power to enforce its requisitions all of these considerations, instead of being accepted as reasons for adopting a feeble military policy, called for wise legislation looking to a vigorous prosecution of the war with the least expense in men and money.

Sixth. No matter what reasons may be given for the adoption of an unwise military policy, that these are powerless to diminish or modify the disastrous effects which inevitably follow.

Seventh. That when a nation attempts to combat disciplined troops with raw levies, it must maintain an army of at least twice the size of that of the enemy, and even then have no guarantee of success.

Eighth. That neither voluntary enlistments based on patriotism, nor the bounty, can be relied upon to supply men for the army during a prolonged war.

Ninth. That the draft, connected or not connected with voluntary enlistments and bounties, is the only sure reliance of a government in time of war.

Tenth. That short enlistments are destructive to discipline, constantly expose an army to disaster, and inevitably prolong war with all its attendant dangers and expenses.

Eleventh. That short enlistments at the beginning of a war tend to disgust men with the service, and force the government to resort either to bounties or the draft.

Twelfth. That regular troops, engaged for the war, are the only safe reliance of a government, and are in every point of view the best and most economical.

Thirteenth. That when a nation at war relies upon a system of regulars and volunteers, or regulars and militia, the men, in the absence of compulsion, or very strong inducements, will invariably enlist in the organizations most lax in discipline.

Fourteenth. That troops become reliable only in proportion as they are disciplined; that discipline is the fruit of long training, and cannot be attained without the existence of a good corps of officers.

Fifteenth. That the insufficiency of numbers to counterbalance a lack of discipline should convince us that our true policy, both in peace and war, as Washington puts it, "Ought to be to have a good army rather than a large one."

CHAPTER VIII.

THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE REVOLUTION TILL THE WAR OF 1812.

Washington's solicitude in regard to our military policy did not end with the Revolutionary struggle. In taking leave of the governors of the States before resigning his commission, he wrote with a wisdom no less becoming the soldier than the statesman:

There are four things, which I humbly conceive, are essential to the well-being, I may even venture to say, to the existence of the United States, as an independent power.

First. An indissoluble union of the States under one federal head;
Second. A sacred regard to public justice;

Third. The adoption of a proper peace establishment; and,

Fourth. The prevalence of that pacific and friendly disposition among the people of the United States, which will induce them to forget their local prejudices and policies; to make those mutual concessions which are requisite to the general prosperity; and in some instances, to sacrifice their individual advantages to the interest of the community.

In amplification of his views as to a proper peace establishment, he continues:

It is necessary to say but a few words on the third topic which was proposed, and which regards particularly the defense of the Republic; as there can be little doubt that Congress will recommend a proper peace establishment for the United States, in which a due attention will be paid to the importance of placing the militia of the Union upon a regular and respectable footing. If this should be the case, I would beg leave to urge the great advantage of it in the strongest terms. The militia of this country must be considered as the palladium of our security, and the first effectual resort in case of hostility. It is essential, therefore that the same system should pervade the whole; that the formation and discipline of the militia of the continent should be absolutely uniform, and that the same species of arms, accouterments, and military apparatus, should be introduced in every part of the United States. No one, who has not learned it from experience, can conceive the difficulty, expense, and confusion, which result from a contrary system, or the vague arrangements which have hitherto prevailed. * * *

Despite this advice, the moment independence was established, all the States hastened to resume nearly every attribute of sovereignty. So unmindful were they of the common welfare, that every measure looking to the discharge of the national debt was resisted, and remonstrance was necessary to induce them to send enough delegates to Congress to constitute a quorum for business.

The finances of the nation being completely exhausted, Congress on the 2d of June, 1784, resolved

That the commanding officer be, and he is hereby, directed to discharge the troops now in the service of the United States, except twenty-five privates to guard the stores

at Fort Pitt and fifty-five to guard the stores at West Point, and other magazines, with a proportionate number of officers; no officer to remain in service above the rank of captain, and those privates to be retained who were enlisted on the best terms: Provided, That Congress before its recess shall not take other measures respecting the disposition of those troops.

This law disbanded all that remained of the Continental Army, save one battery of artillery at West Point, which was raised by Alexander Hamilton in New York in 1776, and which is now in the regular service as Battery F of the Fourth Regiment of Artillery. As the express purpose of retaining these 80 soldiers was to guard the public stores, the resolution was equivalent to a declaration that our infant republic would begin its career by entirely dispensing with a regular army.

On the following day, wholly ignoring the disasters occasioned by the employment of raw levies during the Revolution, Congress adopted the following preamble and resolution:

Whereas a body of troops to consist of 700 noncommissioned officers and privates, properly officered, are immediately and indispensably necessary for securing and protecting the northwestern frontiers of the United States, and their Indian friends and allies, and for garrisoning the posts soon to be evacuated by the troops of his Britannic Majesty:

Resolved, That it be and it is hereby recommended to the States hereafter named, and as most conveniently situated, to furnish forthwith from their militia, 700 men, to serve for twelve months, unless sooner discharged, in the following proportions: Connecticut, 165; New York, 165; New Jersey, 110; Pennsylvania, 260; making in the whole 700.

Resolved, That the Secretary of War take order for forming the said troops when assembled into one regiment to consist of eight companies of infantry and two of artillery, arming and equipping them in a soldier-like manner.

The officers of this mixed regiment of infantry and artillery, composed of militia from different States, consisted of 1 lieutenant-colonel from Pennsylvania, commandant; 2 majors, one from New York and one from Connecticut, commandants of companies; 8 captains, 10 lieutenants, one as adjutant; 10 ensigns, 1 chaplain, 1 surgeon, and 4 mates. It did not take long to convince Congress that a certain number of regular troops was indispensable. On the 1st of April. 1785, it resolved

That it is necessary that a body of troops consisting of 700 noncommissioned officers and privates be raised for the term of three years, unless sooner discharged, for the protection of the Northwestern frontiers, to defend the settlers on the land belonging to the United States from the depredations of the Indians and to prevent unwarrantable intrusion thereon, and for guarding the public stores.

A few days later, on the 7th and 12th of April, this important measure was supplemented by further legislation, designating the States which were to furnish the recruits and defining the organization of the new regular regiment." This was identical with that of the militia regiment of the previous year, except that there was no chaplain and that a lieutenant was to act as quartermaster and another lieutenant as paymaster.

With a view, no doubt, to induce the officers and men of the militia then in the United States service to join the new regiment, the recruits were to come from the same States which had supplied the militia contingents and similar proportions.

@ In various reorganizations of the Army this regiment has been retained and is now in the service as the Third U. S. Infantry.

The pay and allowances of this mixed regiment of infantry and artillery were as follows:

The adjutant, quartermaster, and paymaster each received $10 extra pay per month.

At the time this force was reorganized the population of the United States was about 3,500,000.

On the 20th of October, 1786, Congress voted

That the number of 1,340 noncommissioned officers and privates be raised for the term of three years unless sooner discharged, and that they, together with the troops now in service, be formed into a "legionary corps" to consist of 2,040 noncommissioned officers and privates. That the additional troops be raised by the following States in the following proportions, viz:

That the Secretary of War inform the executive authorities of the respective States in which the troops are to be raised, the number and rank of commissioned officers to be furnished by each State in proportion to the men.

That the pay and allowances of the troops to be raised by this resolve be the same as act of Congress of the 12th of April, 1785.

Congress requested the States to "use their utmost efforts to raise the quotas of troops respectively assigned them with all possible expedition."

It does not appear that any of these troops were raised save two companies of artillery.

SHAY'S REBELLION.

Scarcely had the little army just created by Congress been absorbed on the frontiers, when an event took place which showed that foreign foes and hostile Indians were not the only dangers to be provided against. In December, 1786, nearly 1,000 malcontents assembled at Worcester, Mass., and forced the supreme court of that State to adjourn, so as to prevent the collection of debts.

Clamorous for paper money and determined to resist taxation under the State laws, the insurgents, now 2,000 strong, moved against Springfield Arsenal, led by Daniel Shay and other former officers and soldiers of the Revolution. They would have taken the place but for the resolution of its commander, General Shepherd, who opened fire with his artillery and dispersed his assailants, killing three and wounding one.

The present exposed condition of all our great arsenals finds its condemnation in the history of this brief rebellion. The situation of the Government at its outbreak was one of utter helplessness. Through the States only was it able to procure troops, and these could only be supported by the levying of State taxes, which the insurgents were in arms to resist.

Unable to look to Congress for support, the governor of Massachusetts called out 4,000 militia under General Lincoln, who soon restored order. In view of the exhausted condition of the State treasury, the merchants of Boston advanced the necessary funds to defray the expenses of these troops. The term of service, as in the Revolution, was fixed at thirty days.

Apropos of this rebellion, which found strong sympathizers throughout all of the New England States, John Adams, second President of the Republic, expressed himself as follows:

National defense is one of the cardinal duties of a statesman. On this head I recollect nothing with which to reproach myself. The subject has always been near my heart. The delightful imaginations of universal and perpetual peace have often amused, but have never been credited by me.

66

REORGANIZATION OF 1787.

In order to save the great expense of transporting new levies to the distant frontiers," and also "to avail the public of the discipline and knowledge of the country" acquired by the 700 troops raised in 1785, Congress, on the 3d of October, in the hope of inducing the men to reenlist, resolved

That seven hundred noncommissioned officers and privates be raised for the term of three years, unless sooner discharged.

The troops and officers were furnished as in the previous establishment on the basis of 260 enlisted men from Pennsylvania, 165 from Connecticut, 165 from New York, and 110 from New Jersey.

These troops and the two companies of artillery raised by the resolution of October 20, 1786, were organized into one regiment of infantry of eight companies and one battalion of artillery of four companies.

The strength of the companies was the same in the infantry and the artillery, each consisting of 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 musicians, and 60 privates.