Mounted officers were allowed forage or a pecuniary commutation at the rate of Lieutenant-colonel Rank. Per month. $12.00 10.00 6.00 The inadequacy of this small force was recognized in the last section of the law, which authorized the President to call out the militia of the States to aid in the defense of the frontiers against the Indians. A feature of this law worthy of notice is the division of the regiment of infantry into three battalions, showing that nearly a century ago we had the same organization, the depot excepted, that now prevails in Europe. Going still further back, early in the Revolution, Hazen's regiment, recruited at large, consisted of four battalions. Such an organization, with the depot battalion as a link between the troops in the field and the people at home, has shown itself best suited to meet the demands of a long war. HARMAR'S MIAMI EXPEDITION. Harmar's expedition against the Miamis afforded the first test of our new policy in regard to Indian hostilities. His force consisted of 320 regulars and 1,133 militia, though but 60 regulars and 340 militia took part in the disastrous attack upon the Indian village" October 22, 1790, their loss being 183 killed and 31 wounded. We learn from the evidence laid before the court of inquiry which investigated General Harmar's conduct that amongst the militia were a great many hardly able to bear arms, such as old, infirm men, and young boys; they were not such as might be expected from a frontier, viz, the smart, active woodsman, well accustomed to arms, eager and alert to avenge the injuries done them and their connections;" also that many of the militia were "substitutes." This evidence further shows that in the attack on the village the militia behaved badly, disobeyed orders, and left the regular troops to be sacrificed. As a consequence, the expedition returned to Fort Washington (Cincinnati). After weighing the testimony and making full inquiry as to the facts, the court found--- that the conduct of the said Brig. Gen. Joseph Harmar merits high approbation. The story of this expedition must convince us that the characteristic features of our Revolutionary military policy were in no wise dependent upon the magnitude of the operations involved. Whether from indifference or inability to appreciate the value of discipline and instruction, we have never yet been able to utilize the principle of expansion now so successfully applied in military organization by other civilized nations. Under the law of April, 1790, the President could not add a single soldier to the Regular Army, while his authority to call out raw troops perhaps largely composed of "old, infirm men, and young boys," a Situated near the site of the present city of Fort Wayne, Indiana. with officers to match, was solely limited by his discretion. At this very time, by increasing the enlisted strength of each company from 76 to 200, the three-battalion regiment of infantry and the battalion of artillery were capable of expansion to more than 3,200 men. Instead of being able to adopt this simple and economical expedient, the President had no other alternative than to call out militia, the records of the court of inquiry bearing eloquent testimony as to the result. ORGANIZATION OF 1791. The insufficiency of our small military force having been painfully shown by the Miami expedition, Congress, on the 3d of March, 1791, added another regiment for a term of three years, with the pay and organization of the one already in service, its enlisted men being limited to 912. By the fourth section of the law, men enlisted for the new regiment were given a bounty of $6, and by way of equalization, its inevitable concomitant, the same allowance was granted to all enlisted men of the previous establishment. The fifth section authorized the President to appoint, for such time as he might deem necessary, 1 major-general, 1 brigadier-general, 1 quartermaster, and 1 chaplain. The major-general was authorized to choose his aid-de-camp and the brigadier-general his brigade-major (adjutant-general) from the captains or subalterns of the line. The monthly pay and allowances of the Army in these early days of the Republic were as follows: The seventh section authorized the President, in his discretion, to engage a body of militia to serve as cavalry, they furnishing their own horses, arms, and provisions. The pay and allowance of these troops were to be at the discretion of the President, which left the door open for extravagant expenditure. The eighth and ninth sections were as follows: SEC. 8. That if the President should be of opinion that it will be conducive to the public service to employ troops enlisted under the denomination of levies, in addition to, or in place of, the militia which, in virtue of the powers vested in him by law, he is authorized to call into the service of the United States, it shall be lawful for him to raise, for a term not exceeding six months (to be discharged sooner if the public service will permit), a corps not exceeding two thousand noncommissioned officers, privates, and musicians, with a suitable number of commissioned officers. And in case it shall appear probable to the President that the regiment directed to be raised by the aforesaid act, and by this act, will not be completed in time to prosecute such military operations as exigencies may require, it shall be lawful for the President to make a substitute for the deficiency by raising such farther number of levies or by calling into the service of the United States such a body of militia as shall be equal thereto. SEC. 9. That the President be, and he hereby is, empowered to organize the said levies, and alone to appoint the commissioned officers thereof, in the manner he may judge proper. Section 12 gave $3 bounty to each enlisted man of the "levies," and section 14 gave recruiting officers $2 for each man enlisted in the regulars. During the Revolution the regular troops or Continentals, were largely supplemented by militia, and it will be remembered that the latter, having little or no respect for officers of their own choosing. would not submit to the restraints of discipline, and never could be depended upon. This fact was distinctly recognized in the law just quoted, which took the radical step, far in advance of our Revolutionary war policy, of creating an entirely new class of troops to support the regular army in case of emergency. The above legislation merits our closest scrutiny. Here was laid the foundation of the volunteer system, which attained its fullest development during our long civil war. The "levies," known later as "volunteers," were authorized under the plenary power of Congress to “raise and support armies," and the power of appointing their officers was given the President, to whom it obviously belonged, as the "levies" were wholly distinct from the militia or State troops. The subsequent transfer of this power from the President to the governors of the States was a voluntary return to the practice under the Confederation and a surrender of the prerogatives of the General Government under the Constitution. ST. CLAIR'S DEFEAT. The great lessons of the Revolution, as well as those taught by the recent Miami expedition, were wasted upon the Government. A year after Harmar's defeat General St. Clair was sent against the Indians with another mixed force of regulars and militia. His little army, counting but 1,400 effectives, was attacked on the 4th of November, 1791, by a nearly equal force of Indians, and routed, with a loss of 632 killed and 264 wounded. The committee of the House of Representatives appointed to investigate this disaster reported that "the militia appear to have been composed principally of substitutes and totally ungovernable and regardless of military duty and subordination;" and that "the attack was unexpected, the troops having just been dismissed from morning parade. It commenced upon the militia, who were in advance of the main army, and who fled through the main army without firing a gun. This circumstance threw the troops into some disorder, from which it appears they never recovered during the action." In the opinion of the committee, "the want of discipline and experience of the troops” was one of the main causes of the defeat. The report concludes as follows: The committee conceive it but justice to the Commander in Chief to say that, in their opinion, the failure of the late expedition can in no respect be imputed to his conduct, either at any time before or during the action. It is indisputable that the policy adopted by Congress of depending upon raw troops caused the needless sacrifice of 632 lives, and the reader should note that this number exceeded the total killed in the battles of Long Island and Camden, the two most sanguinary contests of the Revolution. The strength and organization of the army authorized by Congress on the 3d of March, eight months before the massacre, was as follows: Had the President been empowered to increase the 28 companies from 76 to 150 men the enlisted strength of the Army could have been raised from 2,128 to 4.200. Far from permitting this, the law itself almost discouraged a quick recruitment of the new regular regiment, by authorizing the enrollment of levies or militia to make up for deficiencies in its effective strength. ORGANIZATION OF 1792. St. Clair's defeat was followed on the 5th of March, 1792, by an act "making further and more effectual provision for the protection of the frontiers of the United States." By the terms of this act the battalion of artillery and the two regiments of infantry, then in service, were to be filled up to the maximum fixed for the enlisted men of each infantry regiment, not to exceed 960. Three additional regiments of infantry were likewise authorized to be raised for a period not exceeding three years, two of which, each of 960 men, were to be organized like the two existing regiments, while the third was to consist of two battalions of infantry, and a squadron of light dragoons, the enlisted men of each battalion and of the squadron to number 320. As if anticipating that fighting on foot would be the future rôle of our cavalry, the law prescribed that it shall be a condition in the enlistment of the said dragoons to serve as dismounted dragoons whenever they shall be ordered thereto." The staff under this establishment was the same as that of 1791. The field and staff of each regiment and battalion of infantry and of the artillery battalion were the same as in the organization of 1790. Each company of infantry consisted of 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 musicians, 70 privates; total, 83. The field and staff of the squadron of light dragoons comprised 1 major, 1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster, and 1 surgeon's mate. Each troop of cavalry consisted of 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 cornet, 4 sergeants. 4 corporals, 1 farrier, 1 saddler, 1 trumpeter, and 69 dragoons; total, 83. The bounty under this act was increased to $8, and equalization was insured to all men in service who had enlisted since April, 1790 The thirteenth section authorized the President to call into service as many cavalry, and for such periods, as he might deem requisite, appointing the officers thereof. Instead of leaving their pay and allowances to his discretion, however, as in 1791, the pay was fixed at $1 per day for each noncommissioned officer and 75 cents per day for each private, who at his own risk should find his horse, arms, and accouterments, 25 cents per day being allowed in lieu of rations and forage. The officers were likewise allowed 50 cents per day for the use and risk of their horses. In addition to this cavalry force, the President was empowered to employ Indians at his discretion, at a total compensation not exceeding $20,000. The pay of the army was also increased, as shown by the following table, the allowances being the same as before: Aid-de-camp, in addition to pay in line. 24.00 Brigade major, to act as deputy inspector, in addition to pay in line 24.00 Principal artificer 40.00 Second artificer 26.00 The pay of enlisted men was exempt from all previous deductions. Adjutants and paymasters were given $10 per month and quartermasters $8 per month extra pay. It should be noted as a peculiar feature of this law that infantry and cavalry were united in the same regiment, as were infantry and artillery by the law of 1785. 15836-04-6 |