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Mar. 1898.]

Opinion of the Court - REAVIS, J.

and void and of no force and effect, and that no appeal was ever taken from said original judgment by Liberman and no proceedings had ever been instituted in said superior court to modify or vacate the final order or decree entered in the original case. Such findings are not excepted to by

plaintiff.

Plaintiff maintains that the findings of fact and conclusions of law and decree were not filed within ninety days after the trial and submission of the cause to the superior court and that, under the constitutional provision requiring a decision by the superior court within ninety days after the final submission of any cause to it, any judgment thereafter rendered was void. But this contention cannot be sustained, and in the judgment sought to be vacated here the decision appears to have been given orally by the court and could thereafter have been entered at any time. Some question is made by plaintiff upon the irregularity of the entry of the findings of fact and conclusions of law and the failure of the superior judge to distinctly label the decree; but these were mere irregularities, and from the record the judgment of the superior court substantially appears. From the allegations of the complaint and the findings of the superior court it fully appears that all the questions in litigation here were tried and determined by the same superior court in 1891 and that the conclusions and judgment of the court have been of record since January, 1892. During all that time the holder of the warrants in question has taken no action under the code of procedure to vacate or set aside the judgment. It has so frequently been ruled by this court that city warrants, such as those in question here, are not within the principles controlling the transfer of negotiable paper that it is merely proper to state that the plaintiff has no better rights in this suit than the original payee of the warrants, Liberman; and his rights were all completely

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adjudicated, as we have seen, by the judgment sought to be vacated in this suit. In the case of Long v. Eisenbeis, 18 Wash. 423 (51 Pac. 1061), it was said:

"No reason is alleged by plaintiffs why application to vacate the judgment in the original action was not seasonably made. It will be found, upon an examination of the authorities, that, where such applications to vacate a judgment have been entertained, it has been in those cases where the complainants were without fault or negligence."

The judgment of the superior court is reversed with direction to enter judgment in this cause for the defendants. SCOTT, C. J., and ANDERS and DUNBAR, JJ., concur. GORDON, J., took no part in the decision of this cause.

[No. 2795. Decided March 26, 1898.]

SIMON S. WALDO, Respondent, v. WALTER J. MILROY,
Appellant, ABRAM M. HYATT et al., Respondents.

ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATION NECESSITY FOR-ACTION ON NOTE BY

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The assignee of a foreign administrator may maintain an action in the courts of this state, although no administration has been had in this state upon that portion of the decedent's estate situated here.

In an action in the courts of this state by an assignee of a promissory note and mortgage, which had been assigned to him by a foreign administrator, the record of the foreign court showing the appointment of plaintiff's assignor as administrator is admissible in evidence.

The objection that the complaint in an action by the assignee of a foreign administrator does not sufficiently plead the proceedings had in the probate court of another state should be urged in form of a motion to make the complaint more definite, and not by demurrer.

Mar. 1898.]

Opinion of the Court- GORDON, J.

Appeal from Superior Court, Yakima County.-Hon. JOHN B. DAVIDSON, Judge. Affirmed.

R. B. Milroy, and Frank H. Rudkin, for appellant:

Whether an assignee of a foreign administrator can maintain suit on a chose in action in this state, where the assignment is absolute, is a much disputed question. That he cannot, see Dial v. Gary, 37 Am. Rep. 737; Pond v. Makepeace, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 114; Stearns v. Burnham, 17 Am. Dec. 228; 1 Jones, Mortgages, § 797.

O. G. Ellis, and Bogle & Rigg, for respondents:

The overwhelming weight of authority conclusively establishes the right of the assignee of a chose in action from a foreign executor or administrator to maintain an action thereon in his name in the courts of the state where the debtor resides. Petersen v. Chemical Bank, 32 N. Y. 21 (88 Am. Dec. 298); Smith v. Tiffany, 16 Hun, 552; Wilkins v. Ellett, 108 U. S. (27 Law. ed.) 256; Harper v. Butler, 2 Pet. (7 Law. ed.) 239; Mackay v. St. Mary's Church, 2 Am. St. Rep. 881; Riddick v. Moore, 65 N. C. 382; Rand v. Hubbard, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 258; Leake v. Gilchrist, 2 Dev. 73; Smith v. Railway Co., 23 Wis. 267.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

GORDON, J.-This action was originally commenced in the name of Lydia Waldo for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage executed by the appellant Milroy. The respondents First National Bank, Richard Strobach, Nettie Strobach, E. A. Warriner, A. M. Hyatt and O. W. Bright were made parties defendant under the allegation that they had, or claimed, an interest in the premises subsequent to the mortgage lien. The plaintiff in the action as originally

Opinion of the Court - GORDON, J.

[19 Wash. commenced was a resident of the state of Connecticut. Subsequent to the commencement of the action, upon suggestion of the death of plaintiff, Simon S. Waldo, respondent, was on notice permitted to file an amended complaint, and to prosecute the action in his own name as owner of the note and mortgage. The amended complaint alleges the death of Lydia Waldo, the appointment of one John Waldo as her administrator by a Connecticut court and the assignment of the note and mortgage in suit by such administrator to the respondent. The appellant moved the court to strike the amended complaint, for the reason that it "substitutes a new and different cause of action from that set out in the original complaint." This motion was denied; thereupon the appellant demurred to the complaint upon two grounds; first, that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue, and second, that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled, and the appellant answered denying upon information and belief all of the allegations of the complaint excepting that one in which it was alleged that he was an unmarried man. Upon these issues the cause proceeded to trial as between the parties to the controversy in this court, and resulted in a decree in respondent's favor, from which decree this appeal was taken. The first contention of the appellant is that the court erred in denying his motion to strike the amended complaint. We think that contention and the second one, viz., that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to the complaint, may be considered together they raise substantially the same question. It is appellant's contention that the action abated by the death of Lydia Waldo (the original plaintiff) and that inasmuch as no administrator was appointed by any competent court of this state the assignee of a foreign administrator cannot maintain an ac

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tion. We have in the recent case of Munson v. Exchange National Bank, decided March 21, 1898, ante, p. 125, determined this question adversely to appellant's contention, and upon the authority of that case conclude that the court did not err in denying the motion to strike and overruling the demurrer to the complaint. The lower court also denied appellant's application for leave to file an amended answer, setting up that if an administrator of the estate of Lydia Waldo had ever been appointed it was by some court without the state of Washington. This was but another form of raising the same contention already passed upon, and the court did not err in refusing leave to amend. We do not think that it was error on the part of the court to receive the record of the Connecticut court showing appointment of respondent's assignor as administrator. The contention of appellant that the complaint did not sufficiently plead the proceedings had in the probate court in Connecticut, if tenable, should have been urged in form of a motion to make the complaint more definite.

No reversible error appearing the judgment is affirmed. ANDERS, DUNBAR and REAVIS, JJ., concur.

[No. 2738. Decided March 28, 1898.]

W. D. GIBSON, Respondent, v. A. S. KERRY, Appellant.

LIMITATIONS PARTIAL PAYMENT

BURDEN OF PROOF.

Where the bar of the statute of limitations has been pleaded against an action on account, the burden of relieving the account of the bar by proof of partial payment within the period of limitation, is upon the plaintiff, and, in case of denial of part payment by defendant, can be established only by clear and convincing testimony.

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