May, 1898.] Opinion of the Court- REAVIS, J. of the settlement of the same, it will be observed that the notice given did not specify the place of settlement and certification. In determining the effect of such omission of place in the notice to settle a statement of facts, this court said, in American Asphalt Co. v. Gribble, 8 Wash. 255 (35 Pac. 1098): "The notice of filing the statement of facts herein, which was served on the respondent, failed to designate a place at which the appellant would apply to the court or judge who tried the cause or rendered the judgment complained of, to settle and certify said statement of facts. The notice, therefore, omitted one of the positive requirements of the statute then in force (Code Proc. § 1422), and consequently was wholly ineffectual for the purpose intended;" and it was ruled that such statement of facts could not be considered by the court, and a motion to strike the statement from the record was granted. Section 9 of the appeal act, Laws 1893, p. 114 (Bal. Code, § 5058) under which this appeal is taken, prescribes that, "Either party may then serve upon the other a written notice that he will apply to the judge of the court before whom the cause is pending or was tried, at a time and place specified," etc., to settle and certify the statement. It will thus be seen that the effect of such omission to specify the place in the notice to settle and certify a statement of facts or bill of exceptions has been determined in the case above cited. The motion to strike the statement of facts is therefore granted and, there being nothing further to be considered in the cause, the appeal is dismissed. SCOTT, C., J., and GORDON and DUNBAR, JJ., concur. Opinion of the Court - REAVIS, J. [19 Wash. [No. 2948. Decided May 26, 1898.] THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. August SMITH, Appellant. INTENT TO RAPE- - SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION. An information charging defendant with an assault with intent to commit rape, made "on the 20th day of October, 1897, and within three years next before the filing of this information," by feloniously attempting to carnally know and abuse a female child under the age of eighteen years (the age of consent), is sufficient in its charges as to time and nature of the offense. (GORDON, J., dissents). Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County.-Hon. LEANDER H. PRATHER, Judge. Affirmed. Fenton & O'Brien, for appellant. John A. Pierce, Prosecuting Attorney, for the State. The opinion of the court was delivered by REAVIS, J.-Appellant was charged with a public offense in the following terms: 66 The crime of assault with intent to commit rape, committed as follows, to-wit: That on the 20th day of October, 1897, and within three years next before the filing of this information, at the county of Spokane and state of Washington, the said defendant, August Smith, then and there in the said county and state being, then and there unlawfully and feloniously did then and there in and upon one Millie Rux, a female child under the age of eighteen years, feloniously attempt to carnally know and abuse," etc. A motion to quash and a demurrer to the information were filed and overruled before trial. The demurrer sets up that the information does not substantially conform to the requirements of the criminal code; that the facts May, 1898.] Opinion of the Court-REAVIS, J. stated in the information do not constitute a crime; that the information does not inform the defendant of the nature and cause of the charge against him; that the information is not direct and certain; that the allegation of time is indefinite and uncertain; that the act or omission charged as the crime is not stated with such degree of certainty as to enable the court to pronounce judgment; and that the statutes under which the information was filed are unconstitutional. It will not be necessary specifically to notice each ground of the demurrer. The jury returned a verdict of "guilty as charged in the information," and the judgment of the court entered thereon adjudged the defendant guilty of the crime of assault with intent to commit rape as charged in the information. It is maintained by counsel for appellant that it is uncertain what offense is charged in the information; whether the defendant is charged under the statute prescribing the punishment for assault with intent to commit rape (§ 22, Penal Code; Bal. Code, § 7057) or charged with an attempt to commit rape under ch. 14, 2 Hill's Penal Code (Bal. Code, $7436), "on attempts to commit crimes." The information specifically charges appellant with assault with intent to commit rape, and then states the fact constituting the crime, that is, "unlawfully and feloniously attempting to carnally know and abuse," etc., in the language of the statute of 1897, Laws 1897, p. 19. It has been ruled here that it is not necessary to charge or allege force in assault with intent to commit rape where the fact is alleged that the female is under the age of consent. See State v. Hunter, 18 Wash. 670 (52 Pac. 247). The fact that the word "attempt " is used in stating the facts which constitute the crime cannot be misleading. It does not purport to be technically used to define the crime of attempt to commit rape, for an assault with an intent to commit the substantive crime involves necessarily an attempt. See State v. Elswood, 15 Wash. 453 (46 Pac. 727). The time is specifically charged in the information. The offense is specifically charged. The objections to the information were, therefore, properly overruled and the judgment of the superior court is affirmed. SCOTT, C. J., and DUNBAR, J., concur. [No. 2941. Decided May 27, 1898.] THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, on the Relation of C. P. Twiss et ux., Respondents, v. E. F. CARPENTER, as Sheriff of Lewis County, Washington, AND JOHN MILES, Appellants. FORECLOSURE SALE BY PARCELS- ·REDEMPTION. Where mortgaged premises have been sold by the sheriff, on foreclosure in parcels, and the sale has been confirmed by the court, the mortgagee is entitled to redeem any parcel so sold separately by tendering the amount for which it was sold, together with interest on same and taxes and costs chargeable against said tract, under the provisions of Code Proc., § 504 (Bal. Code, § 5288), authorizing the sheriff to sell lots and parcels separately or together, as he shall deem most advantageous, and of § 512, allowing redemption of property sold subject to redemption, "or any part thereof separately sold." Appeal from Superior Court, Lewis County.--Hon. H. S. ELLIOTT, Judge. Affirmed. Reynolds & Stewart, for appellants. May, 1898.] Opinion of the Court- GORDON, J. The opinion of the court was delivered by GORDON, J.-On June 2, 1897, the superior court of Lewis county entered a decree foreclosing a mortgage executed by the respondents to the appellant Miles upon the S. of the S. E. of sec. 26, and the S. of the S. W. of sec. 25, Tp. 13 N., of R. 1 W., in Lewis county. On July 10, 1897, the mortgaged premises were sold to satisfy the mortgage debt, which then amounted to $1,210.75 and costs. The decree contained no specific direction as to the manner in which the premises should be sold, and they were sold in four separate parcels. Two of the tracts so sold, to-wit: the S. W. of the S. E. 1 of sec. 26 and the S. E. of the S. E. of sec. 26, were sold at $10.60 per acre. The two remaining tracts were sold at $6.61 per acre, the entire premises bringing $1,376.80, and the appellant Miles (who was the mortgagee) became the purchaser at the sale. Thereafter and within the time permitted by law in which to redeem from the sale, the respondents gave notice of their intention to redeem one of the tracts so sold, viz., the S. W. of the S. E. of sec. 26, and pursuant to said notice offered to pay the appellants the amount for which said tract was sold, together with interest, taxes and costs chargeable against said tract, and demanded a certificate of redemption, which was declined by appellants for the alleged reason that respondents were not entitled to redeem without paying the entire purchase price bid by Miles for the entire mortgaged premises. Thereupon respondents instituted this proceeding in the superior court to compel the execution of a redemption certificate for the tract of land so sold. Appellants' demurrer to the petition having been overruled, an answer was interposed which, in addition to what has already been stated, set forth that the property mortgaged comprised one farm that had always |