Opinion of the Court-GORDON, J. [19 Wash. judgment was clearly authorized under the complaint and it is affirmed. [No. 2836. Decided June 3, 1898.] W. P. FULLER & Co. et al., Appellants, v. AURELIUS B. HULL, Trustee, Respondent. FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE - JUDGMENT LIEN-TRANSCRIPT - EXECUTION FOR DEFICIENCY. Under Code Proc., § 449, providing that a judgment lien shall attach from the date of judgment, if a transcript thereof be filed in the county auditor's office within twenty days, a decree of foreclosure becomes a lien upon the mortgagor's general realty for any deficiency after sale of the mortgaged premises from the day of its rendition, in case a transcript of the decree is filed within twenty days thereafter. Where a general execution has been issued upon a decree of foreclosure, it will be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the mortgaged premises were duly sold and the special writ therefor returned. Under Code Proc., § 449, providing that the transcripts of judgments shall contain "the names at length of all the parties," it is necessary to include only the names of parties against whom a money judgment is rendered. Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County.-Hon. THOMAS CARROLL, Judge. Affirmed. Sharpstein & Blattner, for appellants. The opinion of the court was delivered by GORDON, J.-On the 23d of March, 1893, a judgment was entered in the superior court of Pierce county against Samuel Bertelson and Anna M. Bertelson for $2,970, with interest and costs, and a decree rendered foreclosing a June, 1898.] Opinion of the Court - GORDON, J. mortgage given by them on certain real property, not the subject of this action. At the date of the rendition of such judgment and decree the Bertelsons also owned other real estate in said county, and on the 28th day of March, 1893, by their deed of warranty conveyed the premises here in controversy to Robert D. Duff and Alexander Bain. On the 12th of April, 1893, a transcript of the judgment entered in the foreclosure suit was filed and recorded in the office of the county auditor. On the 10th of June, 1893, Duff and Bain, their wives joining with them, executed a mortgage to the Tacoma Lumber & Mfg. Co. upon the premises involved in this action, to secure their promissory note in the sum of $1,543.71. Thereafter, the last mentioned mortgage was foreclosed and the premises sold to C. A. Plummer, who subsequently assigned his certificate of purchase to the appellants herein. On May 8, 1895, the respondent, assignee of the judgment creditor, caused a writ of execution to issue out of said court for a balance on said judgment amounting to $2,127.12. Under this execution the sheriff levied upon and sold the premises here in controversy and the respondent became the purchaser at such execution sale. Appellants brought this action under § 529, 2 Hill's Code (Bal. Code, § 5500) to determine the title to the premises so sold and, the cause having been tried upon documentary evidence in the court below, judgment was rendered against them, and thereupon they appealed. The first contention is that the judgment under and through which respondent claims was not a lien upon the premises in question at the time of the conveyance to Duff and Bain on March 28, 1893. It is admitted that a transcript of the judgment was filed with the auditor within twenty days after the judgment was rendered, and this 26-19 WASH. Opinion of the Court― GORDON, J. [19 Wash. being true it follows that the contention is fully answered by § 449, 2 Hill's Code, which provides that "The lien shall attach from the day of the date of said judgment, if the said transcript shall have been filed within the said twenty days." It is next urged that a judgment against mortgagors rendered in a decree of foreclosure does not become a lien upon the general property of the judgment debtors until after the mortgaged premises are exhausted and then only in the event that there is a deficiency. The position is not well taken. Hays v. Miller, 1 Wash. T. 143; Shumway v. Orchard, 12 Wash, 104 (40 Pac. 634); Fletcher v. Holmes, 25 Ind. 458. Appellants also urge that no general writ of execution can issue in any event until after a sale of the mortgaged premises and a return of the special writ. It is not necessary to determine that question, for there is nothing here to show that the general execution did issue before the sale of the mortgaged premises, and in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption of regularity must obtain. In the present case the large credit upon the judgment, which appears from the general execution to have been made, strengthens the presumption that the mortgaged premises were duly sold and the proceeds credited. The final contention is that the transcript of the judgment through which the respondent claims did not comply with the provisions of § 449, supra, in that it did not contain "the names at length of all the parties." It does, however, appear that the names of Samuel Bertelson and Anna M. Bertelson were shown by the transcript. They were the mortgagors and the only persons against whom a money judgment was rendered. No personal claim of any character was made against the other parties to the action, and it was not necessary that their names should have appeared upon the transcript. Perceiving no error in the record the judgment of the superior court is affirmed. DUNBAR and REAVIS, JJ., concur. ANDERS, J., not sitting. [No. 2899. Decided June 3, 1898. THOMAS CARSTENS et al., Appellants, v. S. D. GUSTIN et al., Respondents. INTERPLEADER-WHEN LIES. A complaint of interpleader does not state a cause of action, though alleging that plaintiffs hold a sum of money claimed by different parties,' whose rights they desire adjudicated, when it further appears from the complaint that the money is the proceeds from the sale of a boom of logs, which had been levied upon by a judgment creditor of one of the parties in a logging firm, that the plaintiffs had set up a claim of ownership under a contract with the firm and given a bond for possession of the logs, and that, upon a trial of their claim, the judgment creditor had been given judgment against plaintiffs on their forthcoming bond for the value of the logs. Appeal from Superior Court, King County.-Hon. WM. HICKMAN MOORE, Judge. Affirmed. John E. Humphries, W. E. Humphrey, and E. P. Edsen, for appellants. John G. Barnes, and W. W. Wilshire, for respondents: The statutory proceedings provided for in 2 Hill's Code, §§ 153-155 (Bal. Code, §§ 4843-4845) takes the place of a bill of interpleader in equity, and the action is governed by the same rules that govern such a bill. Washington Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 28 How. Pr. 435; Cady v. Potter, 55 Barb. 463; Board of Education v. Scoville, 13 Kan. 17; 19 403 S22 62 Opinion of the Court - REAVIS, J. [19 Wash. St. Louis Life Ins. Co. v. Alliance Mutual Life Ins. Co., 23 Minn. 7; Johnson v. Maxey, 43 Ala. 521. If plaintiff is liable to different claimants, even though it be for the same demand, there is no case for a bill of interpleader. Greene v. Mumford, 4 R. I. 313; Crawford v. Fisher, 1 Hare, 436; Pfister v. Wade, 56 Cal. 43. In order to be entitled to maintain interpleader, the plaintiff must claim no interest himself in the thing in dispute. He must occupy the position of a stakeholder. He must stand entirely indifferent between the conflicting claimants. He cannot mingle up a demand of his own upon the property or fund with the demand that the other persons shall interplead. 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (1st ed.) § 1325; Adams v. Dixon, 19 Ga. 513 (65 Am. Dec. 608); Cullen v. Dawson, 24 Minn. 66; Lozier's Exr's v. Van Saun's Adm'rs, 3 N.J. Eq. 325; Lincoln v. Rutland & B. R. R. Co., 24 Vt. 639; North Pacific Lumber Co. v. Lang, 42 Pac. 801 (52 Am. St. Rep. 780.) The opinion of the court was delivered by REAVIS, J.-The appellants commenced an action, denominating their complaint an interpleader. It states in substance that Thomas and Ernest Carstens were a partnership known as Carstens Brothers and that the defendants Skavdale and Thomas L. and M. L. Jose were in partnership under the firm name of Saginaw Logging Company, and that defendant Moyer was sheriff of King county; that the defendants Gustin and wife and Tibbetts were partners under the firm name of Gustin & Tibbetts; that prior to June 18, 1896, Gustin & Tibbetts recovered judgment in the superior court against Thomas L. Jose, which was duly entered of record as unpaid in said court; that plaintiffs, Carstens Brothers, entered into a |